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ABSTRACT.
Botswana is a formally liberal democratic country that is
known for its impressive economic growth and political
stability. The country has sometimes been referred to as
Africa's economic miracle and a shining example of democracy
in a continent notorious for economic mismanagement, military
dictatorships and one-party government. However, this picture
of Botswana is too superficial and generous.
This study seeks to delve beneath the surface of this much
acclaimed liberal democracy in order to explore the system of
labour repression that is the dark side of Botswana's
constitutional framework of individual rights and democratic
freedoms. In Botswana, the collective rights and freedoms of
trade unions, though formally recognized, are in fact severely
restricted. The state prevents workers in the public sector
from forming or belonging to trade unions at all. In the
private sector there are manifold constraints on industrial
bargaining, organisation and activity. These forms of control
over the trade union movement derive from the Botswana state's
position as a peripheral capitalist state.
These structures of social domination, however, have not gone
unchallenged by the labour movement. The growth and
development of the trade union movement and the challenges
posed by the labour movement to both the state and capital
have shifted the state towards limited labour reforms. This
shows that, while the Botswana state remains the guarantor of
private capital accumulation, its form is nevertheless
determined by the constellation of class forces in which it is
located. If the state is to maintain legitimacy and hegemony
in society, and not rely on coercion alone, it must accede to
some of the demands of the working class. Botswan&s liberal
democracy gives the working class space to fight for the
reduction of exploitation and to push the state toward more
social reforms.
At the same time, however, there is occurring a marked change
in how the state relates to labour - from what may be called a
strategy of "national economic development" to one more
influenced by neo-liberal economic and political approaches.
The conclusion I have reached in this analysis is that workers
and their unions need to develop a long term strategy to
increase their social weight in relation to the state and
capital. The strategic option recommended here is social
movement unionism. It is argued that because of the liberal
democratic form of Botswana capitalism, social movement
unionism, rather than overt political unionism stands a better
chance of success because this form of unionism will not split
the ranks of the workers along party lines.
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PART ONE.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER ONE.
INTRODUCTION TO BOTSWANA
1.1 Purpose Of The Study.
The purpose of this study is to examine the system of
state repression and domination of organised labour in
Botswana, a formally liberal democratic country. I
argue that state repression and domination of labour
were necessitated by the imperatives of economic
development under a capitalist mode of production.
Invariably, post-colonial state policies in developing
countries, designed to meet the requirements of
economic growth, necessitate various forms of state
intervention in the economy and in industrial
relations. My concern is to explore the specific form
of this intervention in Botswana, which until the
beginning of the 1990s was one of the few formally
liberal democratic countries in Africa.
Botswana's peripheral capitalist development can be
divided into three distinct phases. The first phase was
that of Botswana's integration into the world
capitalist system through colonialism. This lasted up
to the time of formal political independence. The
second phase of Botswana's capitalist development was
from Independence in 1966 to 1990. This is the focal
point of my analysis. This period was characterised by
direct state intervention in the economy and in
industrial relations. At the economic level, the state
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intervened through creating a physical and social
infrastructure and establishing public enterprises in
various sectors of the economy. At the level of
industrial relations, the state intervened through a
restrictive wages policy and labour legislation. The
first wages policy was in place for close to twenty
years from 1972 to 1990.
The third phase of Eotswana's peripheral capitalist
development is the one that is emerging in the 1990s
and was initiated by the adoption of the 1990 ReDort
of the Presidenti pl Commission on the Review of the
Incomes Policy, (hereinafter, the Presidential
Commission). The third phase of Botswana's capitalist
development is being characterised by changes which
appear to indicate a transition from state
interventionism to a more neo-liberal form of state
involvement in the economy. Although this period lies
outside the main focus of my analysis, I comment on it
in my concluding chapter because of the implications it
has for the future of the labour movement.
1.2 The Thesis
The thesis of this study is that, even in a formally
liberal democratic country such as Botswana, the
imperatives of economic growth and development in a
capitalist context give rise to the state's close
supervision and control of organised labour. This
3
constitutes a repressive structure of social relations
that is maintained by the state through the exercise of
political power and legitimated through an ideology of
nationalism. The corollary of the thesis, however, is
that these structures of repression only set
limitations to class actions; they do not prevent them.
1.3 Theoretical Overview
The theory that informs this study is that of
historical materialism. My starting point is that the
motive force of history is constituted by changes in
the modes of production, the consequent division of
society into distinct classes, and the struggles of
these classes against one another. On the basis of this
starting point, I argue that the repressive structures
of social relations are historically specific and
contingent upon the balance of class forces. It is the
case, therefore, that in the course of on-going
struggles, the subaltern classes will generate counter-
ideologies to engage their class opponents. As Marx
(1968a:97) pointed out:
Men make their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make
it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted by the past.
Following Marx, it can be argued that, though within
structural limits, some amount of economic and
political struggles are possible. As Hyinan (1975:5-6)
argues, there exists an area of choice in the
structure of social relationships, even if this choice
4
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can occur only within definite limits. These limits
tend to relax as the level of technical and economic
development rises and the working class increases its
social weight (Fine, 1991)
The repressive structures of social relations
constitute forms of labour control by the state on
behalf of capital, whilst industrial action in various
forms constitutes resistance to the capitalist control
of the labour process. Labour control refers to those
activities of representatives of capital to assert the
authority of capital over wage labour and thereby
incorporate labour into the capitalist mode of
production. Labour resistance refers to those
activities of wage labour through its representative
organisations to defy the authority of capital and
assert the autonomy of workers, thereby obstructing the
incorporation of labour into the capitalist mode of
production (Crisp 1984:1).
As Crisp argues, following Marx, labour control and
labour resistance are integral and inseparable features
of the capitalist mode of production; they presuppose
the existence of each other, condition the existence of
each other, and reciprocally bring forth each other.
Central to my analysis is the dialectical relationship
between structure and agency, and a recognition that
social structures are transformable through the actions
of actors caught up in those structures. The state-
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labour relation is interactive: the state influences
the labour movement by imposing political limits upon
it, but the labour movement in turn influences the
state by its struggles from below.
On the basis of this argument, the study also focuses
on the actions of the working class as autonomous
actors within the limits of these repressive structure
of control. I argue that in order to maintain social
cohesion in an inherently unstable system of economic
and political relations, the state has to concede to
some of the demands of the working class, in order to
gain legitimacy and support for the attainment of
state-defined national goals, even though these goals
are in the long term interest of the economically
dominant class. That is to say, these concessions are
made within the parameters of capitalist relations of
production.
In a class divided society in which in general the
state owns the means of production in the sphere of
infrastructural development and elsewhere the means of
production are largely in the hands of private capital,
there is bound to be a clash of interests between the
class that owns the means of production (state and
capital) and those who only own their labour power. The
economically dominant class, or the coalition of
fractions of classes that own the means of production,
have the support of the state. Because of this
6
relationship, the state tries to sustain this social
order by declaring universal legitimacy of the narrow
interests of this class. As Marx (1970:65) pointed out:
Each new class which puts itself in the place
of the ruling class before it, is compelled
merely in order to carry through its aim, to
represent its interests as the common interests
of all members of society, that is, expressed
in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the
form of rationality, and represent them as the
only rational universally valid ones.
The form in which particular class interests are
presented as the general interests of society is
through the ideology of nationalism. The prevalent
ideological forms are those of "national interest" and
"national development". Ideology is used in this
context to refer to a particular form of human thinking
that conceals class contradictions of society in
metaphysical abstractions, and tends to present the
society as a harmonious entity (Billig 1982:32).
However, in a class divided society, national interest
can not be taken for granted. It is important that such
ideologies be put in their social context in order to
reveal their class content.
The sense in which this thesis breaks new ground, that
is, how it is an original contribution to knowledge
about Botswana, is that it is a departure from the
conventional analysis on Botswana's political economy,
which have been limited to the descriptive analyses of
economic growth and structural transformation. For my
part, I undertake to delve beneath these descriptions
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and dominant conceptual frames to reveal the character
of a system of labour repression. I view the process of
economic development and the relations of production
which characterise this process as constituting a
terrain of class struggle in which the interests of
capital accumulation are in conflict with the interest
of the working class. I also move beyond the current
analyses of the political economy of Botswana by
showing how the economic growth and structural changes
that have occurred in Botswana in the last 25 years
were accompanied by the process of class formation and
class conflict. The process of economic growth and
structural changes also shapes classes, which becomes
as much an outcome as a starting point of the process
of accumulation (Richard and Waterbury 1990:10).
In order to sustain the process of capital
accumulation, the state, the organisation of monopoly
of the means of coercion, intervenes in industrial
relations by creating a repressive industrial relations
system, which is backed by the ideology of national
interest. What is new in this study is that I give the
previously static description of economic growth and
structural transformation a new dynamic by situating
this process within the context of the capitalist mode
of production and its attendant social relations. I
also examine the class character of the Botswana state
and argue that the post-Independence economic policies
must be seen as a class project of the nascent national
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bourgeoisie which now has structural links with the
political elite. This is one other issue that the
current analyses on Botswana has not taken on board.
BOTSWANA: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW.
1.4 Colonial Economic Legacy
Botswana lies at the heart of the Southern African sub-
continent. The country is completely landlocked, being
surrounded by South Africa in the south, Zimbabwe in
the east, and Namibia in the west and north west.
Physically, Botswana is a very large country. Its total
land area is 582,000 square kilometres, about the size
of France, or the state of Texas in the United States
of America. However, Botswana's huge physical size is
out of proportion to its population. The 1991
population census put Botswana's population at
1,326,796. Of this, 1,010,154 people were living in the
rural areas, and only 316,642 lived in Botswana's four
major urban areas. Gaborone, the capital city, had some
133,468 people, or more than a third of Botswana's
urban population [1]. Although Botswana can boast about
the Okavango Delta, the biggest inland drainage system
in the world, which also has the most varied species
of flora and fauna, most of the country is flat and
dry. More than two thirds of the land area is covered
with the thick sand layers of the Kgalagadi Desert.
Most Batswana live in the eastern region of the
country, where soils are more fertile [2]
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Botswana was colonised by Britain in 1876. However, for
the ninety years of colonial rule, the country remained
underdeveloped, and was used mainly as a labour reserve
colony for South Africa. At the time of her
Independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana was listed
amongst the world's poorest countries. 	 It was
uncharitably labelled a "hopeless basket case"
(Coclough and MacArthy 1980). Botswana was so lowly
rated by the Colonial Office, so much that the country
was even ruled from outside its borders, from Mafeking,
in the Cape Colony: the only case in the annals of the
history of British imperialism. Harvey and Lewis
(1990:15) argue that the country suffered social and
economic neglect, even by African standards. They
argue:
Despite more than eighty years of British rule,
Botswana inherited very little in 1966: very
little infrastructure, and very few people with
education, training, or experience except that
provided by traditional activities and low
level work in South African mines and
farms.. .until before Independence, . . .the
country had no capital city, nor even the
benefits of the small spending power of
colonial administration. Another symbol of
neglect was that Bechuanaland Protectorate
never had its own governor like other colonies;
the governor was the British High Commissioner
to the Cape Colony, and later to the Union of
South Africa.
Botswana must rank as one of the few countries in the
world that never benefited even indirectly from the
industrial revolution that changed the world,
especially Europe and North America. Botswana inherited
very little in terms of social and or economic
infrastructure from the colonial period.
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The developments that were bequeathed from the colonial
period included a single track rail line built by the
British South Africa Company (BSAC) to link Cape
Province with Southern Rhodesia. There were very few
economic activities outside of pastoral and arable
farming. Manufacturing industry was almost non-
existent, and there was no viable indigenous capitalist
sector. Commercial activities consisted of a creamery,
and a bonemeal and animal fodder plant in Francistown
and an abattoir, Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), a
maize and malt mill in Lobatse, and small shops
scattered around the country. Other commercial
activities like wholesale and retail business
activities were few and far between and were controlled
by foreigners (Harvey and Lewis 1990).
The situation was even more hopeless in relation to
human resources. In a population of about 549,000 at
independence, there were only 71,546 children in
primary schools, and 1,531 in secondary schools. There
were only nine secondary schools with only two offering
O'levels. Of the only forty three secondary school
teachers with university education, only six were
Batswana. At Independence the country was believed to
have about 100 people with secondary school leaving
certificate, that is, junior certificate and O'ievels.
At Independence, Botswana had only twenty kilometres of
bitumen road. The rest of the road network, about 7000
11
km long, was just dirt tracks. The budget at
Independence in 1966 was P13m, but revenues were only
P6m, and Britain had to provide grants in aid to
balance the budget and pay civil servants salaries.
Compared to the other British colonies of Lesotho and
Swaziland, Botswana was worse off, in the sense that
these countries could at least boast of some modicum
of commercial activities that were taking place in and
around their administrative headquarters. But Botswana
was administered from outside her borders (Harvey and
Lewis 1990)
A question may be posed as to why Botswana was treated
so differently by Britain, and no efforts were made to
develop minimum infrastructure. According to Coiclough
and McCarthy (1980), Botswana differed from the
classical type of a colony in the sense that Britain
was not attracted to Botswana by the availability of
raw materials and other economic resources that she
could exploit, but because of military and strategic
considerations. Halpern (1965a) points out that the
strategic importance of Botswana lay in its being what
Cecil Rhodes called the "Suez Canal to the North".
According to Halpern, the colonisation of Botswana was
therefore to secure Botswana as a link to Cairo in an
unbroken imperial line. Inside South Africa, Britain
was facing rebellious Boers. In fact Britain was
defeated by the Boers at the First Anglo-Boer War in
1880. Externally, Britain was also facing military
12
challenge and feared that the Germans in South West
Africa (Namibia) and the Portuguese in the eastern
part, Mozambique, and the land hungry Boers who had
already annexed the southern part of Botswana, might
between them annex the central part of Southern Africa,
where Botswana is, and close the British route from its
base in the Cape Colony to Central Africa. As a result
of this, Britain instructed its representative in the
Cape, Sir Charles Warren to inform Botswana Kings that
their country had now become a British protectorate.
This was the area up to latitude 22 degree south
(Coiclough and McArthy 1980).
Because of its economic unattractiveness, Botswana
remained just a buffer zone between tthe Germans and the
Portuguese, and no economic development took place.
Colciough and MacArthy argue that the British attitude
was to keep the financial cost of their involvement in
Botswana to a minimum. The governor of Cape Colony is
reported as having said that the British government
would do "as little in the way of administration or
settlement as possible" (Coiclough and McArthy
1980:12). In order to balance the cost of administering
the country from local sources, the colonial
administration introduced a Poll Tax in the territory.
Although Botswana was supposed to be a "protectorate",
and not a "colony" in the classical sense, some of the
actions by Britain in its relations to the local
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political structures did not differ from actions of a
colonialist state in a classical colony. For example in
1890 Britain extended its jurisdiction beyond 22 degree
latitude up to the Zambezi River and in 1893 annexed
Tati Concession, a part of Matebeleland and made it
part of Botswana. Inside the country Britain was busy
carving up the country and redesignating the fertile
parts of Botswana like the Tuli Block, Molopo Farms,
Gaborone and Lobatse into the so-called "Crown Lands",
and demarcating "tribal reserves" for the indigenous
people (Coiclough and McArthy 1980).
In 1934, Britain introduced the Native Administration
Proclamation to curtail the juridical powers of the
chiefs, and to give the colonial state authorities the
power to suspend chiefs if they were not performing
their duties satisfactorily (Crowder 1988) . In 1954
Britain banned Seretse Khama, who was to become the
first President of independent Botswana, from returning
to Botswana after he married a white Briton. The
ostensible reason given was that Seretse Khama's wife
was not acceptable to his own people and that this
might cause "tribal animosity". However, it has now
emerged that the British government was under pressure
from the apartheid government in South Africa which
regarded the Khama marriage as bad example (Dutfield
1990)
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Other colonial state actions included the Credit to
Natives Proclamation which restricted the borrowing
capacity of Batswana to €35 a year, restricted
Batswana's economic activity to agriculture, and
reserved modern commercial activities to Europeans and
Indians only [3]. The absence of any industrial or
manufacturing base resulted in the establishment of a
nationwide migrant labour recruitment network after the
introduction of the Poll Tax by the colonial state. As
a result of this, many able bodied young men,
especially from poor families who could not produce
surplus to meet their tax obligations, were forced to
go and make a living from South African mines. The
migrant labour system became a traditional source of
wage employment in colonial Botswana in particular and
Southern Africa in general.
At the time of independence, about 30 percent of
Batswana between the ages of 20 and 40 were working in
South Africa mines, manufacturing industries, farms or
as domestic labourers (Harvey and Lewis 1990; NDP
7:11) . But even then, the migrant labour system, which
was organized on a contract basis of six to twelve
months, could not, for obvious reasons support trade
union activity in the territory. The work place and the
home of the "contract" worker were geographically
separated, and this section of the working class
remained in disarray. In any case apartheid laws in
South Africa did not allow black workers to form trade
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unions. This remained the situation until 1965 when
Botswana was granted self-government. Independence came
on 30th September, 1966.
1.5 Post-Colonial Developments
Since independence the country has undergone rapid
economic transformation. There have been significant
changes in the country's social, economic and physical
landscape. Important indicators of these structural
changes include the growth of formal sector employment,
urbanisation,	 the building of good roads and
telecommunications network, the creation of an
educational and health infrastructure, and an improved
standard of living for most people, especially those in
urban areas (Harvey and Lewis 1990; NDP 7). In 1990,
Eotswana's per capita income was P3000 and foreign
reserves stood at P5 billion.
This economic performance has triggered numerous
positive commentaries about Botswana: some economists
have characterised Eotswana as an African, and
sometimes even as a Third World economic success story,
alongside Taiwan, Korea, Singapore (National
Development Plans NIJP's 4-6; World Bank Annual Reports;
Colcough and MacArthy 1980; Lewis and Sharpley 1988;
Harvey and Lewis 1990). The most recent of these
glowing commentaries on Botswana has come from Stedman
(1993:1) who argues that:
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At a time when Africa's dismal economic
performance and political corruption and
mismanagement have given rise to a new
intellectual movement called Afropessimisrrt,
when analysts create generic models of African
governments that include "lame leviathans",
"swollen states", "kieptocracies", and "vampire
states", Botswana stands out as an example of
economic development, functioning governance,
multiparty, liberal democracy. It is... a
country akin to Switzerland, an exception that
confounds generalizations, but whose very
exceptionality prompts analysts to see it as a
hopeful model for other societies [41
Stedman, like most commentators on Botswana, then goes
on to give a description of Botswana's economic
growth, increase in per capita income and growth in the
gross domestic product. Some political scientists (Good
1992) have described Botswana as a shining example of
liberal democracy in a continent notorious for one
party states and or military dictatorship.
My dissatisfaction with all these commentaries is that
they are partial, tendentious and have looked at
Botswana superficially. They have looked at economic
growth and structural transformation as if these
processes take place in a vacuum, and have left out of
the analyses the relations of production that are
inscribed in the process. Class formation is simply
referred to as employment creation, the repressive
state policies that have been created to control the
working class have been left out of the analyses, and
the state is rewarded with praise. For example, Harvey
and Lewis (1990:275-310) cite the growth in formal
sector employment, investment in social infrastructural
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development in areas such as health and education,
rural water supply, and even drought relief and drought
recovery programmes as examples of how the benefits of
rapid economic growth were distributed through out the
society. They also point out that between 1974 and 1986
formal sector employment increased by 150 per cent
while the population only increased by 65 per cent, and
that this was a major gain in welfare because even
rural households could benefit from the growth of
employment through remittances from household members
with urban jobs. They also cite as an example of the
benefits of rapid economic growth the fact that only a
small number of Batswana are still going to South
Africa from employment. They argue:
So rural household gained not just from the
absolute increase in the opportunity to get
employment, but from a shift in the composition
of job opportunities to working in Botswana
rather than under the conditions of apartheid
[p 277]
Whilst I acknowledge the empirical facts concerning
economic growth and structural transformations, my
argument is that in fact it is the function of the
state to secure the production and reproduction of the
society. The post-colonial state involvement in the
economy must be seen within this context. It is not as
if the Botswana state was doing the society a favour by
its interventionist policies of creating the necessary
infrastructure.
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The new dimension that I raise in this study is to draw
attention to class contradictions that have emerged. My
argument is that in a class divided society, where
private capital accumulation is seen as the best way of
securing social production and reproduction, class
contradictions inevitably arise because of the
relations of productions embedded in this process are
conflictual. The development path adopted by the post
colonial state, and the state's reliance on private
capital accumulation, necessitate the political control
of the working class. To this end the state create
structures of repression in order to trammel organised
labour. However, as both the economy and organised
labour grow quantitatively and qualitatively, these
structures will be challenged by the working class.
1.6 State-Society Relations in Botswana.
Freund (1988:95) points out that Botswana is a country
unusual in its tolerance of autonomous civil
institutions by African standards. As we shall see in
the chapters' that follow, such characterisation of the
Botswana state is too generous. It is true that unlike
most independent African countries, Botswana has
continued to adhere to a liberal democratic
constitution inherited at independence, in 1966.
Elections have been held regularly at five year
intervals since 1965. The post-colonial state has
allowed for the existence of multi-party system. There
19
are six registered political parties, but only two
major ones, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP),
and the main opposition, the Botswana National Front
(BNF) [5) . If all goes well, Botswana will go to the
polls again in 1994 for the seventh time since
Independence.
The state-society relation in Botswana is, however, a
complex mixture of repression, corporatism and
paternalism. This itself is the result of a combination
of several factors: a liberal democratic constitution
that guarantees fundamental human rights and freedoms;
and the populist nationalism of the BDP, which,
although a strong advocate of capitalism, has been able
to maintain its hegemony on Botswana's body politic.
But as some commentators on Botswana like Molutsi and
Hoim (1990:327) have pointed out:
[Botswana] Government is assuming some
corporatist characteristics: policy initiation
takes place within government ministries;
persuasion is presented as consultation; limits
are placed on participation in politics;
government dominates communication processes,
and ministries create and control most
organised groups.
Molutsi and Hoim further point out that the government
restricts political communication through its hold on
Radio Botswana and proposals for private radio stations
have been rejected; the official media avoids
politically controversial issues, while the private
newspapers are hamstrung by fear of financial and legal
sanctions by the government or those associated with
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the ruling party. The idea that organs of civil society
should lobby political parties and form alliances is
officially discouraged, even though not prohibited by
law, and the term "politics" refers only to the
activities of political parties, while pressure
groups, such as trade unions, are expected to take
their problems to civil servants, rather than lobby
politicians and seek to influence government action
directly (Molutsi and Hoim 1990)
Some of the researchers who have so fulsomely praised
Botswana's liberal democracy and successful capitalist
development have to a large extent ignored some of
these issues. To me this is a serious omission and a
gap in knowledge that has to be rectified. The post-
colonial state's relationship with the labour movement
forms a part of the picture that has not yet been
critically analysed. What is often ignored in most
analyses about Botswana is that the attainment of
independence left the post-colonial state with an
urgent need for accelerated economic development. Like
most third world countries, Botswana could only achieve
this by creating repressive structures, at both
political and ideological levels, to control the trade
union movement and make it acquiescent or supportive.
As I will show below, at the time of independence in
1966, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the
world. The country had few resources. There was a need
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to develop as fast as possible and the post-
independence political authorities felt that the only
way to do this was to mobilise international capital
and create conditions for the growth of domestic
capital. The political elites called on the trade
unions to join the government in the quest for national
development, and dictated that the interests of the
trade union movement in advancing the interests of
their members should be subservient to the "national
interest". Trade unions were treated as junior partners
in the development process, and their role was seen as
"cooperating" with government. This inevitably created
tension between the unions and the state. As Damachi
(1974) argues, the tendency in Africa is for
governments to develop firm control over trade unions
as part of a broad political effort to establish state
supervision and management of conventionally autonomous
structures. The control and supervision of trade unions
is supposed to be done in the national interest for the
sake of attracting investment.
The State-labour relation should, however, be viewed
dialectically. In other words, much as the state tries
to repress, regulate and dominate labour on behalf of
capital, labour also puts up its resistance to such
repression, regulation and domination. The working
class, by its demands and resistance to certain forms
of labour control, affect state policies, and force the
state to formulate new policies. In this regard, Clark
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and Dear (1984:4) point out though the state maintains
the capitalist system, the state is not the exclusive
domain of the capitalists, but interacts with society
in a continuous spiral of responses and counter
responses which in turn move the society toward some
further development, generating new difficulties and
leading yet to a further round of state intervention.
1.7	 Summary.
I begin this study by critically exploring some of the
Marxist debates on the state. My intention is to
develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of the
state-labour relation that is based on historical
experiences, rather than logically derived from the
capitalist mode of production. In so doing I hope to
shift the focus from the top-down state-centered theory
of the state onto a society-centred theory which views
the state-labour relation interactive terms.
In Chapter Two I argue that although the state in
capitalist countries may be regarded as capitalist,
this is not because the state is determined by the
economy, but rather because the state objectively
organises the conditions indispensable to capital
accumulation. Capitalism is predicated on the
autonomisation of politics and the state. This
autonomisation creates a space for the working class to
struggle for its interests. However, these struggles
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take place within the parameters defined for them by
the state, as the guarantor of the process of private
capital accumulation
In Chapter Three I use the same mode of analysis to
examine the state in peripheral capitalist countries. I
challenge those theories of the state in peripheral
capitalist countries which view the state as a mere
instrument of the local capitalist class in
collaboration with international capital. I argue that
this view of the state is predicated on the contestable
premise that the state is determined by the economy. I
draw a parallel between the state in developed
countries and the state in peripheral capitalist
countries. Whilst acknowledging the fact that in
peripheral capitalist countries, the state in much more
involved in the economy than is the case in developed
capitalist countries, this involvement must nonetheless
be seen in the same light as the state's involvement in
the economy anywhere, namely to secure the conditions
of production and reproduction of society. What is
important are the relations of production under which
such process of production and reproduction takes
place. Like in developed capitalist countries, the
state in peripheral capitalist countries also defines
the parameters of working class action. But what the
working class can do within those parameters depends on
the conjunctural terrain: the international situation,
that is the pressures of the international capitalist
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political	 economy,	 the	 local	 state,	 and	 the
organisational strength of organised labour.
In Chapter Four, I give an analysis of the class
character of the Botswana state, and show that the
roots of the present political elite go back to the
pre-independence period. I also give an empirical
overview of economic growth and structural
transformation that have taken place in Botswana from
Independence to 1990. In this chapter I show how the
post-independence state has been in the forefront of
the economic development through direct investment in
infrastructural development and in the establishment of
public enterprises. It is argued that these are
functions of the state to create the necessary
conditions for production and reproduction of the
society. The class character of the state and its
functions lead us to the examination of the form of the
Botswana state.
In Chapter Five I examine the capitalist form of the
Botswana state. The form of this state is revealed in
the state's relationship to labour. The organising
principle of capitalism is the exploitation of wage
labour by capital. This exploitation is defined as the
ratio of unpaid to paid labour, whereby profits to the
capitalists accrues from the surplus value withheld
from labour. This system of exploitation of labour has
been maintained through a policy of wage restraint
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which has led to higher per capita income, but very
unequal income distribution and poverty wages for the
workers. This reveals the capitalist form of the
Botswana state.
In Chapter Six, I examine the state's restructuring of
the trade union movement, and the ideological
habituation of the working class. These actions by the
state against the working class derive from the state
as the disciplinarian of labour on behalf of capital.
It is argued that like in other parts of Africa, even
in Botswana the primary role of state intervention in
industrial relations is to restructure and remodel the
trade union movement to make organised labour more
amenable to state control. The working class has to be
habituated to accept the existing exploitative relation
of production through the ideology of national interest
etc. It is hoped that in this way, the working class
will become supportive or at least acquiescent.
In Chapter Seven I turn to the examination of labour
law in post-colonial Botswana. Habituation is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure
workers submission to capital. Other structures of
control have to be created to ensure that where
ideology is insufficient to ensure submission, legal
repression will. This chapter demonstrates how
Botswana's post-independence labour laws have weakened
the trade union movement organisationally, and disarmed
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it politically. As it will be shown in the analysis,
the state gave with one hand and took away with the
other. Whilst the state has created a floor of rights
for the workers, and a trade union does not have to
negotiate for recognition with an employer once it is
registered, trade unions have not been allowed to
organise in full freedom, and workers in the public
sector, who comprise a large percentage of the working
class in Botswana, are denied the right to form and
belong to trade unions. Although collective bargaining
is accepted in principle, the employers are not under
any legal obligation to disclose information to the
workers side for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In Chapter Eight I examine trade union growth and
development in post-colonial Botswana. It is pointed
out that one of the characteristics of the development
of capitalist relation of production is the growth in
formal sector employment as labour released form the
previously non waged economic activities are absorbed
in formal sector employment as wage labourers. I
examine the numerical growth of the working class,
disputes settlement and collective bargaining. It is
argued that are integral part of the growth of trade
union consciousness.
In Chapter Nine I examine the working class action
within the parameters imposed by the state and argue
that despite these limitations. It is argued that the
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working class is by no means hapless and helpless
victim of this repressive structure. I show how the
working class in Botswana has grown restive, assertive
and increasingly militant in its demands and had
resorted to illegal strike actions and deliberately
disregarded laws outlawing strikes. It is argued that
these are indicative of the fact that workers are
becoming more and more aware of their class position.
These issues are germane to class struggle.
In Chapter Ten I examine the future state-labour
relationship in the l990s. I point out that
restrictions on the labour movement are still in place.
This poses new problems for the labour movement. I
conclude the analysis by making a case for the need for
social movement trade unionism to counteract new forms
of labour repression in Botswana. Social movement
unionism as distinct from political unionism is the
most viable strategic option. I argue that Botswana's
liberal democracy, even if just formal, nevertheless
creates a political space for the labour movement to
form strategic alliances with other democratic
organisations and push the state towards more reforms,
not only in the industrial relations field, but in the
society as a whole. It is argued that organised labour
remains the most important component of civil society,
and that its struggles are part of the main struggle
for social democracy.
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This study is not a theoretical work, but a
theoretically structured empirical analysis of the
state-labour relation in the development of a
peripheral capitalist economy. The aim is to provide
knowledge about the limitations of Botswana's liberal
democracy and a basis for a new form of trade unionism
required to by the working class in the future.
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NOTES and REFERENCES.
1. See Central Statistics Office (CSO) Report on
Population and Housing Census, Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, Gaborone
2. A citizen of Botswana is Motswana. Batswana is the
plural form. Setswana is the national language.
Botswana is largely homogeneous and Setswana is the
langauge of about 85 percent of the people.
3. See The Bechuanaland Protectorate Credit Sales to
Natives Proclamation, No 38 of 1923, Her Majesty
Stationery Office, London.
4. In 1992, some ministers were implicated in
corruption by the Kgabo Commission on Land Allocations
in Pen-Urban Areas and by the Christie Report on the
Operations of the Botswana Housing Corporation. Peter
Mmusi, the National Chairman of the ruling Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP), and the country;s Vice
President, and Daniel Kwelagobe, the Secretary General
of the party and the Minister of Agriculture, and
Ronald Sebego, Assistant Minister of Local Government
were forced to resign. Michael Tshipinare, another
Assistant Minister in Local Government and Lands was
fired from cabinet, and served a term of imprisonment
for receiving a bribe of P500,000. Joe Letsholo, the
late manager of Botswana Housing Corporation, as saiô
to have kept close to P250,000 in a safe in his
office. The Christie Comrnision also alleged that the
deceased had in a very short time built an estate of
over P3 million.
5. I use the concept of liberal democracy with caution,
because although the constitution of the country has
all the outside trappings of liberal democracy, what
happens on the ground is quite different.I will give
only three examples. First, the ruling party has also
monopolised the use of state resources like Radio
Botswana and Botswana Daily News, an 8 page tabloid,
which are being used as a party and state organ of
persuasion with BDP party political broadcasts being
presented as government "consultation". Airtime for the
opposition is minimal and there is always a risk that
opposition party broadcasts can be taken off the air by
a simple ministerial instruction to the radio station,
which is manned by civil servants. Foreign journalists
have been expelled under Presidential Decree. Secondly,
the Botswana state machinery is centralised in a top
heavy bureaucracy based in Gaborone, especially in the
Office of the President, which has all the executive
powers, with several line ministries, such as the
Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL), which is
responsible for Local Authorities, charged with the
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responsibility of implementation of The National
Development Plan projects and programmes. Since the
opposition started winning the urban councils, the
Government has resorted to a policy of cutting down
financial grants to local authorities or councils that
are under the control of the opposition, a practice
that shows that the electorate is being penalized for
voting opposition parties. Thirdly, the ruling party
has always	 "specially elected"	 councillors and
parliamentarians, usually people who have been
unsuccessful in the elections, to increase the number
of BDP representatives and overturn the opposition
majority.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORISING THE STATE-LABOUR RELATION.
Introduction
The analysis that follows is primarily concerned with
the relationship of the state to organised labour in a
eveloping country. This relationship between state and
labour cannot be understood without analysis of the
state itself. In most Marxist theories of the state,
the state has been viewed in terms of its relation to
capital rather than labour. The state is often
conceived as an instrument that can be wielded by the
capitalist class, or more specifically in the case of
Third World countries by the capitalist class in the
'centre' together with its allies in the 'comprador' or
'national' bourgeoisie.
These approaches to the state are inadequate and
partial because they present a top-down theory of the
state in which the other classes of civil society,
especially the working class, have no effectivity in
determining the form of the state. My purpose here is
to develop a critique of prevalent Marxist theories of
the state with a view of arriving at a more dialectical
understanding of the state-society relation and
especially the state-labour relation.
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My starting point is to look at the functions and forms
as analytically distinct, though closely related
aspects, of the state. My argument is that the function
of the state in every society is to secure the
conditions of production and reproduction. How the
state organises this process is largely determined by
factors such as the development of productive forces,
class formation, class struggles, and the need to
balance conflicting interests while at the same time
guaranteeing the long term interests of capital
accumulation. It is the constellation of these factors
which I argue determines the form of the state. Whereas
the state intervenes in the social and economic life of
the society in which it resides, its form is determined
by factors which are independent of its functions.
In my analysis then, I will highlight the interactive
relationship of the state and society with specific
reference to organised labour. In this way, I hope to
overcome the artificial division that has been created
in the theorisation of the state in developed and
developing countries, by highlighting the fact the fact
that in both situations it is the imperatives of
production relations that shape the behaviour of the
state to labour. Secondly, in linking this theoretical
discussion with my main thesis, I will show that
whilst the structures of repression, which are
maintained by political power and legitimated by
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ideology, are real enough, there is always a space for
struggle within the limits of those structures. In
other words, organised labour is not an impotent
plaything of the "capitalist state".
I shall start in this chapter by briefly examining some
of Marx and Engels' theories of the state, developed in
the context of Europe, which may be regarded as the
precursors of the modern Marxist theories of the state.
I then move on to an examination of the state-labour
relation in developed capitalism and show how the
labour movement has been able to struggle within the
structures imposed by capitalist relations of
production to influence the state, thus making an
impact on the form of the state. Whilst I agree that
the state in a capitalist society always acts in a
manner that will secure or attempt to secure the long
term interests of capital accumulation, this action by
the state is circumscribed by the balance of class
forces, that is, by the strength of other classes, not
just the interests of the "bourgeoisie" alone (Fine
1984; Kelly 1987) . Therefore the state cannot be seen
as a mere instrument of class rule.
My approach to the question of the state is influenced
by what I take to be the historical materialist method.
My starting point is that the motive force of the
development of modern society is the division of
society into classes and in particular the struggle
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between labour and capital. My contention is that the
form of the state is determined by the relations
between classes and not by the ruling class alone. The
form of the state is not predetermined by is decided on
the conjunctural terrain, which is a field of
objectively possible outcomes of class and political
relations in the course of the on going struggles [1]
2.1 Marxist Theories of the State.
I have chosen the above sub-heading, Marxist theories
of the state, quite deliberately for the following
reason. Classical Marxism contains a very incomplete
analysis of the state. In fact Marx and Engels did not
provide any systematic or coherent theory of the state
and politics, but offered a variety of theoretical
perspectives which coexist in an uneasy and unstable
union (Jessop 1982). Their analyses of the state and
politics are subsumed under their general critique of
political economy of capitalism, and most importantly,
their unit of analysis was the capitalist mode of
production. However, the historical materialist method
provides very useful guide-lines to be followed in the
analysis of the state and its relation to civil
society. [2]
The "classical" Marxist theory of the state is
predicated on certain "key statements" on the state by
Marx and Engels. Marx's key statement (Marx 1981:20-21)
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appears in a celebrated passage in the Preface to a
Contribution to the Criti que of Political Economy , in
which Marx argued that people enter into social
relations that are independent of their will and that
these relations are only appropriate to a given stage
in the development of material forces of production:
The totality of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society,
the real foundation, on which arises a legal
and political superstructure and to which
correspond definite forms of social
consciousness.
This statement has attracted a charge of "economic
reductionism" because it ultimately reduces the actions
of the state, the legal and political aspects to the
requirements of the economy. In fact in a well known
statement in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels
(1968b) put it bluntly that the executive of the modern
state is but a committee for managing the common
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. The implication here
is that at least the executive of the state can be
wielded by the capitalist class in pursuit of its own
interests. The actions of the state executive are seen
to flow directly from the requirements of capital.
This formulation seems to suggest that the economic
base is self-sufficient, that its development is the
determinant of social evolution, and that its
reproduction does not depend on factors outside its
control. But as Jessop (1982:77) points out, to argue
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that the transformation in the superstructure follows
changes in the economic foundations is to imply that
political action cannot alter the economic base or even
the nature of class relations until economic factors
themselves permit or require such alteration.
Engels' key statement on the state has not been spared
the charge of instruxnentalism. In this statement, which
appears in the The Oriain of the Family , Private
Prp ertv and the State, Engels links the emergence of
the state to the inception of private property and the
resulting breakdown of a previously "harmonious"
communal society. According to Engels (1968a:586-587),
the state is a product of society at a certain stage of
development of society and has arisen to moderate the
conflict engendered by conflicting economic interests
in a class divided society. According to Engels, the
emergence of the state
is the admission that this society has become
entangled in an insoluble contradiction with
itself, that it has spilt into irreconcilable
antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel.
But in order that these antagonisms and classes
with conflicting economic interests might not
consume themselves and society in fruitless
struggle, it became necessary to have a power
seemingly standing above society, that would
alleviate the conflict, and keep it within the
bounds of "order"; this power, arisen out of
society, placing itself above it, and
alienating itself more and more from it, is the
state.
Engels argued further that because the state arose in
the midst of the conflict of classes, it is, as a rule
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the state of the most powerful, economically
dominant class, which through the medium of the
state becomes also the politically dominant
class and thus acquires new means of holding
down and exploiting the oppressed class.., and
the modern representative state is an
instrument of exploitation of wage labour by
capital (emphasis added).
These approaches have been under sustained attack
especially because of their apparent determinism or
reductionism. It is difficult to sustain the view that
the state always acts in accordance with the interests
of the capitalist class, especially in developed
capitalist countries which have strong organs of civil
society, like trade unions and other pressure groups. I
shall return to this issue later, suffice to note here
that the charge of reductionism or instrumentalism is
not sustainable. The formulation that the state actions
are always in the interests of the economically
dominant class is not so much false as it is
incomplete. It seems to me to ignore Engels's later
clarifications of their position on the state. Engels'
'key statements' on the state must be read critically
and in conjunction with other statements made by Engels
to counter the charge of economic reductionism that had
been made against him and Marx.
Although Engels argues in the above passage that the
state is "the state of the most powerful, economically
dominant class", and that the modern representative
state is an "instrument" of exploitation of wage labour
by capital, he also argues that the role of the state
is to "alleviate" conflicting economic interests so
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that the antagonists, the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat, do not "consume" themselves and society in
an endless struggle. Put in other words, although the
state may be an "instrument" of class rule, how this
instrument is actually used, that is, its form, is not
something that inheres in the nature of the state, but
is determined in the course of the class struggles.
In a letter to J. Eloch, Engels (1968b:692-693) argued
that the charge of reductionism or determinism is an
accusation unfairly levelled against him and Marx. In
this letter he argues that, though the determining
element in his materialist conception is production and
reproduction in real life, that is, in the economic
"base" of society, various elements of the
superstructure in turn exercise their influence upon
the course of the class struggle; he includes here the
poliiical forms of the class struggle, constitutions
established by the victorious class, and political,
legal, philosophical and religious theories. He argued
in this vein that, although economic conditions are
ultimately decisive, political conditions and
traditions also play a part in historical materialism.
Engels further pointed out that people have sometimes
laid more stress on the economic side than is due to
it. But, he argued
We had to emphasize this main principle in
opposition to our adversaries who denied it,
and we had not always the time, the place or
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the opportunity to give their due to the other
elements involved in the interaction. (ibid.)
It is also worth noting what Marx said about the state
in some parts of Europe and North America; this is
important because it further underlines the uneasiness
and instability of "Marxist" theoretical perspectives
on the state. In this regard, Badie and Birnbaum (1983)
and Jessop (1982) argue that all the states Marx
referred to, like the Prusso-German Empire,
Switzerland, England, and the United States, had
capitalist economic systems but different state forms.
According to Marx (cited in Badie and Birnham 1983:7),
in the United States the state was weak and subordinate
to civil society; the Prussian state was "nothing but a
police-guarded military despotism, embellished with
parliamentary forms, alloyed with a feudal admixture";
and the French state was dominated by
the executive power with its enormous
bureaucratic and military organisation, with
its ingenious state machinery.., a host of
officials numbering half a million, besides an
army of another half a million, [an] appalling
parasitic body [thatl enmeshes the body of
French society like a net and chokes all its
pores.
Ziernann and Lanzendorfer (1977:150) have interpreted
these remarks to mean that there is no Marxist theory
of the state. They argue that:
What is presented as "the classical Marxist
theory of the state" consists of a series of
analyses and views by Marx and Engels on
current political problems, indications,
hypothesis, fragments and affirmations of a
materialist theory of the state which often
contain little more than a catalogue of
queries, preliminary assumptions and axioms.
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I disagree with these authors when they argue that
these apparently contradictory remarks are "only
indications going beyond the level of political
analysis and they are not put in the economic and
social context" (ibid.). It is due to the different
economic and social contexts within which these
apparently conflicting theories of the state were
articulated that Marx and Engels rightly took
cognizance of the concrete situation. Their
"contradictoriness" is derived from the fact that Marx
and Engels were trying to explain a phenomenon that was
spatio-temporal in its materiality. They were well
aware that state forms differ.
I agree with Jessop (1982:9-12) when he argues that
there are present in both Marx and Engels a wide
variety of themes and approaches which are capable of
independent or even contradictory theoretical
developments, but which are combined in various ways in
their empirical studies of particular societies and
political conjunctures. They occasionally receive an
exclusive and one-sided treatment, but are generally
articulated in a way that ensures their mutual
qualifications in a state of theoretical tension. As
Miliband (1989) argues, what is more useful is not to
compare text with text, but text with historical and
contemporary reality itself. Whether the state is seen
as an instrument of class rule, a factor of social
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cohesion or an institutional ensemble, all are present
in the classical works [3]
The question that arises is, what do these apparently
"contradictory" statements tell us about the Marxist
theory of the state? More specifically, what are the
implications of these theories for state-labour
relations. This is the point to which I now turn.
2.2 State-Labour Relation.
Industrial relations systems of developed capitalist
countries differ; for instance the British industrial
relations system is characterised by 'voluntarism',
whilst in the United States and Germany there is said
to be extensive state intervention through legislation.
Nonetheless, there remain major common characteristics
(Bean 1985). According to Bean, the main activities of
the state in all these countries consist of acting as a
third party regulator promoting a legal framework which
(a) establishes general ground rules for union-
management interaction, (b) makes statutory provisions
relating to minimum conditions of service, and (c)
provides services for conciliation, mediation and
arbitration with a view to facilitating the settlement
of industrial disputes. The state is also a major
employer in the public sector, and as a result, has
influence in bargaining developments and agreements,
and in the regulation of incomes. Bean argues that:
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In many countries incomes policies have been
used in an attempt to modify or neutralise the
results of collective agreements, and public
sector workers, whose wage increases are highly
visible, are recuired to conform to the
government pay guide-lines in order to
influence private sector wage settlements
(emphasis mine) (p.101).
Some Marxists (notably, Aithusser 1971; Altvater 1978)
have argued that in developed capitalist countries, it
is the state that maintains wage labour as an object of
exploitation, reproduces general conditions of
production, including labour power, and maintains legal
relations. According to Althusser:
The reproduction of labour power requires not
only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at
the same time, a reproduction of its submission
to the rules of the established order, i.e. a
reproduction of submission to the ruling
ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of
the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology
correctly for the agents of exploitation and
repression, so that they, too, will provide for
the domination of the ruling class "in words"
(p127-128)
Althusser argues that the state apparatuses function by
both repression and ideology, only with the difference
that repressive apparatuses function predominantly by
repression whereas the ideological apparatuses function
predominantly by ideology. He argues that the state is
involved not only in securing the material conditions
of production, but also in securing the conditions of
the reproduction of relations of production. The latter
is ensured in part by the control and manipulation of
trade unions. The two are unified in the bourgeois
ideology of "national interest", "democracy" and "rule
of law".
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Altvater (1978) argues that there are other conditions
that private capital can not meet, because their
production implies non-capitalist forms of production
which are nonetheless crucial for capitalism as a mode
of production. In order to secure the overall
preconditions of capitalism, the state intervenes in
the provision of physical infrastructure development,
invests in the fields of education and health, and
establishes the legal relations through which relations
of legal subjects in capitalist society are mediated.
The state also regulates the conflict between wage
labour and capital and if necessary, uses repression
against the working class through the law as well as
the police and the army. The state also safeguards the
existence and the expansion of total national capital
on the capitalist world market through its military
forces.
Both Aithusser and Altvater show that the state-labour
relation is mediated by definite political forms and
ideologies. Though the state, or at any rate its
executive, would seek to secure the long term interests
of the bourgeoisie, it does not and cannot do so in any
way that it pleases. The state has to appear to be
above the fray of class antagonisms for it to be able
to keep the antagonism within the bounds of "order".
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The strength of Aithusser lies in the fact that his
approach to state-labour relations goes beyond simple
reductionism and! or instrumentalism. In particular, he
shows that state control of labour is not just
repressive but also ideological. His weakness is that
his account is too structuralist. He assumes that
whatever the state does, functions perfectly for
capital and does not give space to organised labour or
class struggle. For example, Aithusser (1971:127-128)
argues that the reproduction of labour power consists
of learning rules of good behaviour, that is
the attitude that should be observed by every
agent in the division of labour, according to
the job he is "destined" for: rules of
morality, civic and professional conscience,
which actually means rules of respect for the
socio-technical division of labour and
ultimately the rules of the order established
by class domination.
According to this view, therefore, the capitalist state
is omnipotent, and the human agents, including
organised labour, are impotent automatons manipulated
by the state. Altvater does not give labour or class
struggle any space either. He also sees state-labour
relations in a top-down fashion in which the form of
state determines its relationship to labour, rather
than the form of the state being determined by the
balance of forces in which the labour movement plays a
part.
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2.3 challenge of the Labour Movement.
The role the state plays in industrial relations in
developed capitalist societies can be properly grasped
in the context of concrete historical phases in the
development of capitalism. Indeed, the history of
capitalism is replete with examples of how industrial
relations have changed over time as a result of class
struggles. Let me refer to some important antecedents.
According to Gregory (1979), labour repression in
England goes as far back as 1349 when an Ordinance of
Labourers was enacted specifically to hold down wages
in the face of an acute shortage of labour that was
brought about as a result of the Black Death. The Act
decreed that all men and women under the age of sixty
must work for any master who wanted their services, and
made it an offence to offer higher wages as this would
entice workers to leave one master for another. The Act
remained in place for many centuries and was used to
fix wages and ensure that the law of supply and demand
did not apply to the labour market.
The advent of the bourgeois revolution demanded new and
different forms of production and reproduction of
labour power. At the level of social relations this
meant the workers could now enjoy certain rights,
including the right to enter into contracts of
employment with the employer as formally equal legal
agents. Formally, workers could now work under
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conditions acceptable to them. At the same time,
production requirements ushered in by the factory
system made it possible for workers to form trade
unions.
Though the state initially curtailed this right by the
promulgations of the Combinations Act, the Act was
repealed in 1875 and in 1906 the British Parliament
adopted the Trades Disputes Act. This was not an act of
goodwill on the part of the state. Kelly (1988:21)
argues that this change was brought about by trade
union pressure channelled through the Trade Union
Congress, which was by then the largest and most
powerful in Europe.
This legalisation was not a final victory. Gregory
(1979:19) argue that even with the repeal of the
Combinations Act, the English courts still felt
impelled by tradition to rest their disapproval
of strikes on some formal legal grounds, they
decided to dress it up for public consumption
in what they called the doctrine of criminal
conspiracy
The courts disregarded the statute law, and relied on
common law. The workers, who had won a victory over the
Combinations Act, were now hemmed in by conspiracy
charges. The courts felt that the united concerted
efforts of the workers to refuse to work or challenge
conditions of work were a criminal conspiracy to
restrain trade.
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In the United States, a change in labour law only
occurred in 1935 with the adoption of the National
Labour Relations Act, commonly known as the Wagner Act.
According to Klare (1982), the Wagner Act initially
aroused fierce opposition from the capitalist class
which saw it as a concession to the labour movement by
the state. The Act was even labelled by one newspaper
as the most objectionable as well as a "revolutionary"
piece of legislation ever presented to Congress that
would "out-soviet the Russian soviets". Kiare argues
that the American capitalists feared that legalising
collective bargaining would mean their loss of control
over the production process, and that by promoting
unionism the Act would encourage radicalism and class
conflict.
Overtly repressive forms of labour control have
gradually been replaced by less repressive forms. The
reason is largely due to the growing strength of the
working class itself, not the benevolence of the
capitalist class or the state. As Zeitlin (1980)
argues, the state is the product of the historically
specific constellation of class relations and social
conflict in which it is implicated, and if it is not to
rest on its monopoly of the means of coercion alone, it
must incorporate within its structures the interests
not only of the dominant but of the subordinate classes
as well, and that state policies are impelled by and
49
are the distorted reflection of the struggle between
labour and capital for the realisation of their
contradictory interests through the state, that is,
they are a response to both popular struggles of the
subordinate classes and contradictory demands of
capital.
Kelly (1988:247) points out that in the decade after
1968, the advanced capitalist countries were shaken by
strike waves which saw two British governments go down
in electoral defeat, and in other European countries
government enacted major concessions to restore social
order. In 1968, France introduced the Grenelle
agreement which gave the trade unions the rights to
organise at the work place, collect dues and attend
training courses without loss of pay. In Italy, the
1970 Labour Statutes established trade union right to
organise and hold meetings at the work place. In 1972
Federal Republic of Germany introduced Works Councils
and granted legal recognition of trade unions at. the
work place. In 1973 and 1974, the British government
enacted the Work Safety Act and the Security of
Employment Act, respectively and Sweden enacted the law
on Joint Determination.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we see what is
called the 'relative autonomy' of the state. This
relative autonomy, however, does not mean that the
state is neutral or above class antagonisms. Rather the
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manner in which particular interests are represented in
the state institutions of intervention is based on the
balance of class forces on the ground. The
representation of some interests does not preclude or
exclude others, but rather it is a question of
preponderance, that is, there is an asymmetrical
representation of interests.
Clarke (1991:6-9) argues the state has "selective
mechanisms" through which to filter the demands placed
upon it by various competing interests. What this means
is that the state has to carefully balance the
interests of capital, namely securing the conditions of
sustained accumulation, and avoid compromising its
legitimacy by identifying overtly with the interests
of any particular class. Within the limits of the need
to sustain the accumulation of capital as a whole, the
particular policies pursued by the state and the
particular interests served by those policies will be
contingent on its own political priorities.
Strinati (1979) argues that the form and content of the
state intervention in the economy is shaped by class
struggles mediated through political organisations.
According to Strinati, capitalism is predicated upon
and distinguished by the institutional separation of
the polity and economy. He argues that the capital
relation requires the autonomisation of politics and
the state from the economy. This autonomy is, however,
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more apparent than real. Historically, economic
processes have been dependent upon specific modes of
state intervention, such that these apparently
autonomous economic processes have been shaped by
conditions of existence that the state actually
provides. This does not mean that the state can be
regarded as a mere instrument of class rule. Strinati
(1979:193) argues that the state is capitalist only in
so far as it has structural connections with the
capitalist economy and its own internal structures and
modes of operations serve to secure the conditions of
existence of capital accumulation. He argues:
The capitalist state is such a state not
because it is determined by the capitalist
economy but because it objectively organises
structures indispensable for the functioning of
the capitalist economy: the circuit of capital,
the production, realisation and appropriation
of the surplus value, generalise commodity
production and exchange, the reproduction and
restructuring of capital and labour power, the
conditions that allow the circuit of capital to
exist.
According to Strinati, industrial relations systems
reflect forms of state involvement in the economy on an
axis from interventionism to laisser faire. An
industrial relations system should, therefore, be seen
not as a hermetically sealed or self-sufficient entity,
but as a central element in the social structure of
capitalism, and in particular it is one of the ways in
which class struggles are expressed in capitalist
countries.
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2.4 CONCLUSION
In capitalist countries, there is a fundamental
structural connection between the state and the
capitalist economy. The state creates conditions that
are indispensable to the process of capitalist
accumulation. How the state does this, however, is
decided on the conjunctural terrain. Both the
capitalist class and the working class make demands on
the state. These demands are by no means evenly
represented, but since the state cannot use coercion
all the time, it is forced to make concessions to the
working class.
These concession point to two issues: (a) the state, is
institutionally separate from the economy, and has its
own identity. But because of the structural connections
between the state and the capitalist economy, the state
is not neutral; (b there is a need to balance the
conflicting interests in society. This "balancing act"
is carried out within the parameters of securing or
attempts to secure the long term interests of private
capital accumulation, that is, in order to perpetuate
the capitalist mode of production.
The parameters of this process are not defined by the
state alone, in whichever way it likes, but are a
result of class struggles and compromises. In its
intervention, the state has to take account of the
balance of class and political forces at any one point
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of time, reflecting the need for the state to
continually readjust its position in order to maintain
its hegemony and the cohesion of the social formation.
Hegemony is maintained not by coercion alone but also
by securing the consent of the dominated class by means
of political and ideological dominations, to the extent
that particular interests of the capitalist classes are
successfully presented as the general interests of all.
This involves taking systematic account of popular
interests and demands, shifting position and making
compromises on secondary issues to maintain support and
alliances in an inherently unstable and fragile system
of political relations, and organising support for the
attainment of national goals which serve the
fundamental long term interests of the dominant class
(Jessop:1990a) . The extent to which this conclusion is
applicable to a peripheral capitalist state is the task
to which I shall turn in the next chapter.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES.
1. Imperialism and cold war rivalry have been very
crucial factors in peripheral capitalism. Imperialism
has always intervened militarily, politically and at an
ideological level, on the side of the peripheral
capitalist state to defeat working class struggles.
However, these defeats do not always end in surrender.
The working classes of peripheral capitalist societies
continue to engage their class opponent in the on-
going struggles for better conditions of service and a
more equitable distribution of social wealth, even if
these struggles are carried within the framework of the
existing exploitative social relations.
2. For an extended discussion of these guide-lines, it
is useful to refer Jessop (1982), Chapter 5.
3. Jessop, B (l990b) identifies six approaches to
Marxist theory of the state: (a) the state as a
parasitic institution that plays no essential role in
economics production or reproduction, (b) the state as
an epiphenomenon of the system of property relations
and the resulting class struggle, (C) the state as a
factor of social cohesion regulating class conflicts in
the interests of the dominant class, (d) the state as
an instrument of class rule which can be captured by
the dominant class, (e) the state as a set of
institutions and (f) the state as a system of political
domination with specific effects on the class
struggle.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE STATE REGULATION OF LABOUR: THE AFRICAN CONTEXT.
Introduction.
The state in peripheral capitalist societies has not
received the same kind of rigorous analysis as it has
in developed capitalist countries [1] . There are
several points that can be raised in connection with
this. The first is that the state has always been
analysed against the backdrop of the existence of an
economically dominant class, "the bourgeois class",
that is, that class that was characterised as the
"conquering bourgeoisie", which has captured for itself
in the modern representative state, "exclusive
political sway" (Marx and Engels 1968b:35-38)
In peripheral capitalist societies, however, this class
exists only in a formative or inchoate form. As a
result, it has often been the state, rather than the
capitalist class, that has been spearheading the
process of economic development in the post-colonial
period. Some have argued that the state has actually
replaced the bourgeoisie (Evans 1982).
The second point concerns the complexity and enormous
variety of economic and political systems in these
countries. In the first place, most of these countries
are economically poor, and are characterised by extreme
inequality in incomes and asset distribution, high
unemployment, debt burdens, inadequate or virtually
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non-existent social services (housing, health and
education) and backward productive forces. The majority
of the people still live in rural areas in subsistence
agriculture (Bean 1985; Chazan et al 1988; Todaro
1992)
The third point is that most peripheral capitalist
countries are under either a one-party system or a
military administration, or sometimes even a bit of
both. Generally organisations of civil society such as
trade unions, the media and various types of pressure
groups are weak as compared to state organs like the
army, police and civil bureaucracy.
The fourth point is that most analyses of peripheral
capitalist societies, especially neo-marxist dependency
theory variants, have been conducted on a gzireL'
economic terrain, the major preoccupation being to show
the effect of international capitalism on peripheral
capitalist economies.
All these factors add to the difficulties in theorising
at a general level the nature and structure of the
state and politics in peripheral capitalist societies.
Pinkney (1993:2) argues in this vein that:
It is these social economic circumstances,
together with an unequal relationship with the
"developed" world outside and in many cases, a
recent experience of colonial rule, which help
give Third World politics its distinctive
flavour, even though there is much diversity
between the individual countries.
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The contributions in the last two decades by several
scholars, (notably Alavi 1972; Ziemann and Lanzendorfer
1977; Leys 1976; Beckman 1981) have made valuable
attempts to analyse the state in peripheral capitalist
formations. In my view, these debates have not broken
out of the instrumentalist problematic of the state
theory. The common thrust of these approaches is
twofold: first, they reduce the form of the peripheral
capitalist state to the requirements of the economic
interests of imperialism and its local allies, defined
variously as the national bourgeoisie or national
comprador class; second, these theories are state-
centred and ignore impact of class struggles on the
state.
Though the forms of the state in peripheral capitalist
economies reveal some marked distinctions from those in
advanced capitalism, the functions of the state for the
reproduction of class relations are similar. To be
sure, in the case of the peripheral capitalist state,
the pressures of the global capitalist economy are more
intense than in the centre; yet even in peripheral
capitalism workers' struggles affect the form of the
state . As in developed societies, so too in peripheral
capitalism, the form of the state is determined by,
amongst other factors, relations between classes and
the need to maintain the cohesion of society in that
context. The peripheral capitalist state tends to
employ coercion rather than compromise on secondary
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issues in order to control labour, not only because of
international pressures but also because of the under-
development of labour struggles.
3.1 The Theories of the Peripheral Capitalist State.
Flamza Alavi (1972) led the debate in his article on
the state in Pakistan and Bangladesh. He argued that
the original base of the state in peripheral capitalist
countries lay in metropolitan countries and did not
rest on the support of any of the indigenous classes;
instead it subordinated all indigenous classes to the
requirements of metropolitan capitalism. For this
reason, he argued, the state jn perIpheraL capitalist
societies was "overdeveloped". Alavi advanced two
theses: first, that the peripheral capitalist countries
have inherited an "overdeveloped" state in the form of
a huge military-bureaucratic machinery; second, and
flowing directly from the first, that this
overdeveloped state has often pursued its own
particular agenda and appropriated a large part of the
economic surplus for itself. He argues:
The apparatus of the state, furthermore assumes
also a new and relatively autonomous economic
role, which is not parallelled in the classical
bourgeoisie state. The state in post-colonial
society directly appropriates a very large part
of the economic surplus and deploys it in
bureaucratically directed economic activity in
the name of promoting economic development.
These are the conditions which differentiate
the post-colonial state fundamentally from the
state as analysed in classical Marxist
theory . (p62). (emphasis in the original).
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The most sophisticated critique of the peripheral
capitalist state theory in general and Alavi's thesis
in particular has come from Ziemann and Lazendorfer
(1977). The key point which they make concerns the
potentiality of the peripheral capitalist state to
promote national economic development. They doubt
whether this can be achieved under conditions of
peripheral capitalism. In their attempt to go beyond
Alavi, Ziemann and Lanzendorfer (1977:155) posit that:
With the expansion of trade into world trade
and the rise of the world market, there has
developed, since the days of European colonial
expansion, an international economic system in
which the production and reproduction of all
societies in the world are integrated... With
the spread of the dominant reproduction dynamic
to world level, the pre-colonial self-centred
development of the peripheral societies was
blocked, being transformed, in regionally
differentiated scope and form depending on the
previous historical and natural conditions,
into a complementary and subsidiary system
attached to the metropolitan system (emphasis
added).
According to Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, the condition
for the integration of the peripheral capitalist
societies in the world market is the imposition on
these societies' inner structures of the dominant
reproduction dynamic of metropolitan capitalism. The
result of this economic relationship is the development
of the metropolis and the under-development of the
periphery as two sides of a common process, that is,
accumulation on a world scale. The independent
development of the peripheral societies is blocked, and
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their inner structure is adapted to the reproductive
needs of the metropolis.
Ziemann and Lanzendorfer's argument (p.160-2) is that
the peripheral state must be seen as an institution
which serves the international economic system. At the
economic level the peripheral capitalist state aims at
linking the world market with the national economy by
breaking down the political frontiers between the world
market and the national economy; for example, through
its policies on imports and exports, foreign investment
and exchange rates.
According to Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, the peripheral
capitalist state aims at securing the existence and
expansion of the world market in the national economic
arena, through the reproduction of both internally
operating foreign capital and national capital oriented
to the world market. To this end, the state guarantees
private property rights and repatriation of profits,
the extended reproduction of national capital on the
home market, infrastructural development, and the
reproduction of the labour force. One aspect of this is
the state policy by which trade unions are turned into
a political instrument for keeping workers on a leash,
since their independence could be a barrier to
accumulation.
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In a similar mode to that of Ziemann and Lanzendorfer,
Amin (1987) has argued that the decisive quality that
distinguishes the state in the capitalist centre from
the state in peripheral capitalism is that in the
centre the bourgeois nation state has crystalised and
its essential function is to fulfil the conditions that
make possible autocentric accumulation; the state can
subordinate external relations to the logic of that
accumulation. On the other hand, the peripheral state
cannot control local accumulation but is subject to the
demands of "globilised accumulation"; the direction it
takes is determined by the direction taken by the
central powers, especially through their instruments of
intervention, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
Muthunga (1980) also argues along these lines when he
makes the point that Kenya is an exploited society
dominated by American, British, French, German and
Japanese imperialism. Muthunga (1980:3) gives an
extreme and somewhat eccentric view when he states:
That is our economic base. Our neo-colonial
state is in fact part and parcel of the
international states of the bourgeoisie. The
ruling comprador bourgeoisie are an agent of
the international bourgeoisie. Our laws express
the will of the international bourepisie first
and foremost. the interests of the comprador
bourgeoisie being championed because they
primarily serve those of the former. Any
interests derived by the Kenyan petty-
bourgeoisie under this set of affairs are
simply incidental and accidental too (sic). Our
political institutions, religious institutions,
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correspond to bourgeois view and ideology. That
is our suDerstructure (emphasis mine).
Finally, Beckman (1981:39) has also argued in this
paradigm that the Nigerian state is a comprador state,
its institutions and officials operating as agents of
imperialism. He wrote that:
The contemporary Nigerian state can... be
described as a comprador state: state
institutions and state officials operate as
agents of imperialism. The real ruling class is
the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries.
It is not the indigenous businessmen and
bureaucrats, who merely masquerade as the
"national bourgeoisie". They are allowed to
play this role by their foreign paymasters. In
fact they are performing a vital ideological
function as their nationalist rhetoric conceals
the true class nature of the state. When they
travel to international conferences attacking
"imperialism" and clamouring for a "new
international order", they simultaneously take
the opportunity to check their international
bank accounts which are regularly replenished
by their foreign friends.
The basic thrust of this argument is that because the
class that has the greatest economic interests is
externally based, the Nigerian state is therefore a
mere "instrument" of that class and the indigenous
capitalist class is a mere conveyor belt of
imperialism. Beckman (1981:42) acknowledged that the
fact that imperialism "ultimately comes out on top
should not allow us to ignore the strength and
organisations of the forces which it incorporates, co-
opts or subdues". These forces and their composition,
however, are not analysed; I can only assume that they
that they involve the working class.
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In Chapter Two I argued that the major weakness of both
Althusser (1971) and Altvater (1978) was to relegate
working class struggles. In their eyes it seems that
the working class is determined, but with little or no
effectivity in the determination of the state actions
(Fine 1984). The major weakness of Ziemann and
Lazendorfer, Zmin, Beckman and Muthunga is to repeat
this structuralist error in another form: by denying
the effectivity of all indigenous social classes and
the nation-state itself. In their view, the external
pressures of international capitalism make any thought
of indigenous accumulation fanciful. it is on the basis
of this that I find Alavi's argument more persuasive in
that he at least recognizes the fact that the state has
played and continues to play an independent role in
national economic development of peripheral capitalist
societies, and has gone some way towards creating
viable national economies despite imperial constraints.
Ziemann and Lanzendorfer's critique of Alavi is based
on a polar oppositions: either there has been
accumulation or there has not; if there has been
accumulation, it is either for national capital or
international capital.
In the case of Botswana, attempts to theorise the post-
colonial state have been offered by, among others,
Pickard (1987) who characterises the Botswana state as
an administrative bureaucratic state in which resources
are allocated by the bureaucratic elite, authority
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flows downward from the rulers to the ruled and the
bureaucratic elite have complete control over decision
making. Pickard (1987:123-124) argues that the Botswana
state is developed at the centre and underdeveloped in
the periphery, and that the centralised bureaucracy is
a major factor in the policy making process. This
bureaucratic state is defined as:
a state of apolitical bureaucratic dominance
exercised by an integrated ruling elite of
senior civil servants and political leaders
that are not controlled by any segment of the
population.
In its own way, this account also buries the
relationship between the state and class relations. I
shall show below that the claim that the state elite is
not controlled 'by any segment of the population' is
not sustainable.
In order to clarify empirical situations that do not
fit existing conceptual frameworks, a number of ad hoc
concepts have been developed to characterise the ruling
elites in peripheral capitalist countries. In the
African context, Forrest (1987) has identified at least
six such concepts:	 "organisational bourgeoisie",
"public	 sector	 bourgeoisie",	 "administrative
bourgeoisie", "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" "state
bourgeoisie" and "managerial bourgeoisie". All such
elites have one thing in common: they are all pursuing
capitalist strategies of development. But they may take
different political forms, varying from civilian-
military dictatorship in Pakistan, to military rule in
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Nigeria, one-party rule in Kenya, and liberal
democratic capitalism in Botswana. The various forms of
state in these countries will affect relations between
capital and labour in different ways [2]
The question that arises at this juncture is what are
the implications of all these theories for state-labour
relations in peripheral capitalist countries? The
central defect of all these theories of the peripheral
capitalist state lies in their failure to address class
relations between capital and labour which are a
crucial determinant of the forms of the state. In fact
all these theories are all state-centred and ignore
labour.
As in developed capitalist countries, in peripheral
capitalist countries the labour movement is one of the
major determinants of the form of state. In its
overarching function to secure the reproduction of the
society under conditions of capital accumulation, the
peripheral capitalist state also has to take cognizance
of the interests of organized labour, and develop
appropriate mechanisms of control in order to maintain
the cohesion of the social formation in which it
resides. These mechanisms are both coercive and
ideological. This is the point to which I now turn.
66
3.2 State-Labour Relation in Peripheral Capitalism.
The problems of economic underdevelopment provide the
context in which to analyse the state-labour relations
in peripheral capitalism. What are the options
available for the post-colonial state in the struggle
for economic development? This question poses for the
post-colonial state a choice of development strategy.
Whilst the process of economic development may be a
goal of all human societies, the strategies adopted to
realise this goal are decided at the political level.
Most post-colonial governments have chosen a capitalist
strategy which emphasises production and economic
growth rather than social equality, and the belief that
production can best be stimulated by the institutions
of private property and the market. They stress
reliance upon foreign capital and expertise to
modernise the economy, as well as encouraging
indigenous enterpreneurship (Sandbrook and Cohen
1975:5-6) . Its premise is that the goal of economic
growth can be achieved through private capital
accumulation, with the hope that in the long run the
increased output will permit more social welfare and
enhanced social justice (Sandbrook 1975).
There are two points to note at this juncture. The
first is that the adoption of such a strategy of
development is not a voluntary option but an outcome of
indigenous class struggles. I shall demonstrate this in
Chapter Four when I discuss the class character of the
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Botswana state, and the regional and international
factors that were implicated in Botswana's
decolonisation process. The second point to note is
that capitalism is an economic system where the means
of production are privately held and where legally free
but 'capital-less' workers sell their labour power for
wages and production decisions are made on the basis of
realising surplus value (Nafziger,l988). In a situation
where the government has adopted this capitalist road,
the state now becomes the guarantor of private capital
accumulation, and private capital accumulation becomes
the material base of the state.
While economic growth and development remain the goal
of this strategy, the mechanisms designed to realise
this goal determine its class content. The process of
production is geared towards profit inaximisation by
those who own the means of production and the
consequent distribution of social wealth is unequal.
Since the state has to maintain this social
relationship, this is what influences its relationship
to the working class. The state is called upon to
regulate class antagonisms, particularly as expressed
in the relation between emergent trade union movements
and the requirements of capital accumulation.
This regulation by the state is by no means neutral. In
an economic system which emphasises private capital
accumulation and private ownership of the means of
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production, the state will come to depend on those that
who own the means of production and can sustain the
state through taxes and other revenues. When
governments in post-colonial Africa started to treat
the trade unions as junior partners in the process of
development and at the same time to restrict the
actions of trade unions, this was in order to safeguard
the process of capital accumulation and by extension
the material base of the state itself (Sandbrook and
Cohen, 1975)
Since post-colonial states believe that unrestricted
trade unions would adversely affect foreign capital
investment and economic growth, the state develops
various mechanisms of labour control through which
unions can be subordinated to a governmentally-defined
"national interest"	 [4]. As Sandbrook and Cohen
(1975:196) argue:
The economic justification governments have
provided to trammel labour organisation include
charges that the unions' ability to raise wages
faster than GNP aggravates inflation,
exacerbates balance of payment difficulties,
limits the potential rate of economic growth by
reducing savings and creates massive urban
unemployment by widening urban-rural
differentials, [and that] strike action and
worker indiscipline retard productivity and
discourage foreign investment.
Gladstone (1978) is in agreement with this perspective.
He argues that in a sense the role of trade unions is
"pre-ordained": the trade union movement affects the
development process and is in turn affected by the way
the economy works. What lies at the heart of all this
is the industrial relations system. As Gladstone
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argues, an economy beleaguered by industrial strife
cannot perform at its optimum, and a development plan
that calls for wage restraint will have a greater
chance of success only if the trade unions are
sutoortive or ac quiescent. Gladstone points out that
the recognition of the vital role played by the trade
unions in development has prompted governments to seek
to influence, dominate or co-opt the trade unions. In a
later essay Gladstone (1979, ix) added the following:
This increased role of the state in industrial
relations has taken a number of forms. In
certain cases, efforts have been made to
rationalise or restructure national trade
unions movements (and to make them more
responsive to the professed national interest)
and to influence the choice of leadership.
Collective bargaining and agreements in a
number of countries have been made subject to
approval by official authorities (usually under
an official incomes policy aimed at checking
inflation and effecting a certain
redistribution of national income). Industrial
courts or tribunals coupled with compulsory or
near compulsory dispute settlement procedures
have been instituted.
Notwithstanding the diversity in Third World economies,
there is one thing that seems to set these countries
apart from industrialised capitalist countries in the
field of industrial relations. In peripheral capitalist
economies, the state plays a more dominant and
interventionist role.
Kassalow and Damachi (1978) point out that in
peripheral societies the functions of trade unions have
been defined and redefined according to the perceived
needs of national development; in the process trade
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union freedoms have been restricted and collective
bargaining has been "hemmed in" on several sides. Bean
(1985:212-213) also points out that the state in these
countries plays a much more active and interventionist
role in the industrial relations than was traditionally
the case in the developed capitalist countries.
This role is strengthened by the fact that
policies are guided by the requirements of
national growth oriented development plans and
the state itself is much more central to the
development process... Governments in the Third
World countries maintain that industrial
relations have a direct bearing on the
development process since industrial conflict
may adversely affect productivity and
exports... Also strikes are not likely to
provide a climate which is conducive to the
welfare of capital and the attracting of
foreign investment.
Bean points out that in peripheral capitalist
countries, the process of collective bargaining becomes
"trilateral" as opposed to "bilateral" in that wage
fixing has to satisfy the objectives not only of
management and the unions, but also of the government,
because the position of the state as the biggest single
employer gives it an additional interest in regulating
industrial relations.
This has led to promulgation of restrictive labour laws
to control and supervise trade unions or to make them
subordinate and acquiescent junior partners. In some
cases the policy has been to subordinate the labour
movement and "guide" it through legislation towards
consensus on the national interest. In such cases legal
recognition of trade unions has also been a form of
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social control in which the labour movement is
subjected to all manner of legal rules and regulations.
In other words, legal recognition of trade unions and
the establishment of procedures for the settlement of
disputes not only provide the trade unions with
legality, but also for a lesser or greater degree of
state control. The aim of legal recognition of trade
unions is to orient the trade union movement towards a
quiescent and economistic trade unionism rather than
political unionism (Gladstone 1980).
These restrictive structures of state control,
supervision and regulation of labour, may differ in
form but are similar in their objectives: to inculcate
capitalist labour discipline and to subordinate labour
to capital. This substance cuts across nation states
regardless of their political form, be it a military
government such as Ghana, a one-party civilian
dictatorship such as Kenya, a "humanistic" capitalist
regime such as Zambia, or a formally liberal democratic
regime such as Botswana.
There are three dominant areas of state regulation of
labour that can be found in most peripheral capitalist
countries in Africa: (a) compulsory registration of
trade unions that offers sticks and carrots as
conditions of legal acceptance; (b) restructuring and
forced amalgamation of trade unions and the creation of
central bodies or national centres, sometimes imposed
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from above, sometimes "voluntary" and (c) the creation
of compulsory arbitration procedures to deal with
bargaining deadlocks. These forms of labour control
stem from the belief by the state that the fragmented
nature of trade unions is not conducive to the
attainment of a high degree of state regulation and
influence and would threaten the development effort by
exacerbating labour unrest via inter-union rivalry
(Gladstone 1980:55; Bean 1985:218-219)
Thus in Ghana, immediately after independence, the
post-colonial state passed an Industrial Relations Act
which rationalised union structures by amalgamating
house unions into industrial unions, made provisions
for a check-off system to ensure stable sources of
finance for the unions, and compelled the private
sector to collectively bargain with the unions (Kraus
1979a)
In addition the Act created a set of mediation-
conciliation-compulsory arbitration procedures to deal
with bargaining deadlocks. These procedures made
strikes effectively illegal. The powers of the state
over unions were significantly increased through the
imposition of the Secretaries General of the TUC by the
state. Kraus points out that the Act was maintained by
the National Liberation Council (NLC), which used the
Act to control workers, arguing that strikes were
damaging and wasteful.
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In Kenya, the formation of the Central Organisation of
Trade Unions (COTU) in 1965 came as a result of the
compulsory amalgamation of the rival Kenya Federation
of Labour (KFL) and Kenya African Workers Union (KAWU)
two years after Kenya's independence. COTU came into
existence as a result of an official decree by the
President (Sandbrook 1975). The decree also annulled
trade union affiliations to international organisations
and provided for the appointment of the General
Secretary of the national centre from a list of three
names submitted to the President.
Iwuji (1979) argues that it was hoped that these
measures would contribute not only to the stability of
industrial relations, but also towards re-invigorating
the economy as whole. According to Iwuji, the
Registrar's role was to regulate the formation of trade
unions, supervise their activities and ensure
compliancy. Iwuji also argues that in colonial Kenya
the policy of registering trade unions was designed to
dissociate them from politics through legal
restrictions and the threat of cancellation of
registration, and prevent legal recognition of some
unions. Chenge (1987) points out that in 1969 the state
ordered the teachers and civil servants union to
disaffiliate from COTU, and in 1980 the state
deregistered the Civil Service Union, and the
University Staff Union. Machajo-Omid (1992) argues that
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the Kenyan government still uses the system of
mandatory registration to decide which unions to
register, de-register or refuse registration to.
After independence the Kenyan government moved
aggressively to demobilise the trade union movement.
According to Sandbrook (1975) the KFL policy statement
in the early 1960s on the role of trade unions in post-
independence Kenya asserted that the trade union
movement would remain independent of government and
employers, would formulate its own policies and not
limit itself only to matters concerning terms and
conditions of employment, but would also address
questions of human rights, economic policy, housing
policy, education and welfare policy. In addition the
Federation had pledged that its own existence as a free
and independent movement would be maintained.
In 1966 a new COTU constitution was prepared by the
Attorney General and imposed on the trade union
movement. It effectively demobilised the working class.
The constitution entrenched state supervision of the
federation: COTU's Governing Council, Executive Board
and Finance Committee had to include government
representatives. In 1968, an amendment stipulating that
no quorum on the Governing Council or the Executive
Board would be reached without government
representation was added to COTTPs constitution.
Subsequently, the government started exhorting union
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leaders to discipline their members, restrain wage
demands and refrain from strike action. Union leaders
were also asked to re-educate the attitudes of their
members towards employers who were now seen as
colleagues of the government.
In Zambia Bates (1971) has argued that the control of
copper miners was a crucial political task of the new
Zambian leadership. He argues that the state sought to
control industrial conflict in particular by utilizing
the ideology of nationalism: workers were exhorted to
restrain wage demands, eschew strike action, work hard
and defer to the authority of their supervisors. He
argues that the post-colonial government sought to
convert the trade union movement into an organisation
that governed the behaviour of its members in
conformity with public policy, rather than articulate
the demands of its members.
Gertzel (1979) argues that since independence Zarnbian
industrial relations have been characterised by the
progressive subordination of the trade union movement
to government. The government's control of trade union
activity and government intervention in industrial
relations has gone hand in hand with formal re-
affirmations of the principles of freedom of
association and collective bargaining, and in certain
circumstances the right to withdraw labour.
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Gertzel argues that the Industrial Relations Act of
1971, while on the surface giving the employees and
employers the right of association and freedom of
organisation, greatly extended government control over
the trade unions. For example, all unions had to
affiliate to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU), which was given powers over the unions by the
state. The Act gave effect to government policy of 'one
industry, one union', laid down procedures for dispute
settlement and made conciliation procedures mandatory.
Whilst the right of workers to strike was recognized in
law, it was significantly restricted by an extensive
definition of essential services which covered a much
wider area of the economy than basic community needs.
The Act also stipulated that the legal requirements for
settlement of disputes and the mandatory grievances
procedures had to be exhausted before any strike action
could be taken. The role of the Industrial Court, made
such action well-nigh impossible.
According to Gertzel, the policy of one industry, one
union resulted in considerable reorganisation of the
labour movement. For instance, in 1967 the three unions
in the mining industry merged to form the Mineworkers
Union Of Zambia (MUZ), and two of the railway unions
also came together to form the Zamnbian Railway
Amalgamated Workers Union (ZRAWTJ). In 1969 the civil
service unions merged to form the Civil Service Union
of Zambia, and in 1971 the National Union of Local
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Authorities' Workers became the sole union representing
local authority workers. The number of trade unions was
also reduced from twenty four unions with a membership
of around 100,000 in 1964 to only eighteen unions with
a membership of 184,000 in 1973. At the same time craft
unions disappeared completely.
This interference in the affairs of organised labour is
not confined to a few Sub-African countries, but seems
widespread amongst many peripheral capitalist
countries. Epstein (1989) argues in the context of
Latin America that trade union autonorrry has been
subjected to considerable pressure from virtually all
governments regardless of their particular ideological
inspiration. Typical legislation includes regulation
concerning the types of workers eligible for trade
union membership, the minimum requirements to form
officially recognized trade unions, obligations to
submit detailed financial records to regular state
scrutiny, procedures and conditions for leadership
elections, rules f or collective bargaining, minimum
time limits for engaging in government supervised
conciliation of differences, procedures for compulsory
arbitration, and conditions under which a legal strike
could occur. He argues:
Democrats and authoritarians; conservatives
reformers and radicals; populists and
technocratic elite all have felt that organised
labour occupies too strategic a place in the
economy to be allowed unrestricted use of its
major means of influence, the threat to strike(p.276)
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What I have described thus far is the manner in which
the peripheral capitalist states have sought to control
labour movements, usually on the grounds that it is in
the interest of the nation to do so. However, these
control measures only impose limits on the actions of
the trade union movement; they are not in themselves a
demonstration of the impossibility of trade union
action. Trade union actions of various sorts are still
possible even within the limits of these state
restrictions, and sometimes the labour movement
develops its own counter-ideologies to resist or defy
the authority of the state. Labour control and labour
resistance comprise the dialectic of structure and
action. This is the point to which I now turn.
3.3 The Challenges of the Labour Movement.
Chenge (1987) has calculated that in Kenya between 1974
and 1983 some 363,444 days were lost to industry due to
strike actions. According to Chenge, most of the
strikes were about pay. Chenge argues that although
there is a positive correlation between declining real
wages and strike activity, the strikes did not solely
arise from falling real wages, but included such
factors such as violation of conditions of service,
unfair dismissals, poor industrial relations and racism
on the part of management.
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According to Chenge, strike days lost were due to both
prolonged strikes in a few industries and nationwide
general strikes lasting short periods. In 1974, which
saw a record 127,951 days lost, 50 per cent of strike
days were accounted for by the white collar Bank
workers union. In 1978, seventy two per cent of strike
days were accounted for by the largely multinational
dominated manufacturing industry, and in 1981, sixty
one per cent of strike days were lost to the
agricultural sector. The general tendency of Kenyan
strikes, Chenge argues, is that they involved white
collar workers, perhaps demonstrating that it is the
more educated workers who are most strike prone.
According to Liato (1989), the Zarnbian state's policy
of engaging working class support, ostensibly for
development, goes beyond mere control of the trade
union movement and is intended to cultivate workers'
support for government policy as a means of enhancing
the legitimacy of the regime and the hegemony of the
Zambian bourgeoisie, whose interests the state
represents. She argues that the Zambian government went
beyond mere legislation in its attempt to gain control
of the labour movement. It embarked on a policy of
promoting a cadre with the "right ideological
orientation" into influential position in the labour
movement.
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Liato argues, however, that different perceptions and
expectations of what independence promised to deliver,
and the divergent interpretations of the role of trade
unions in an independent state, led to conflicts
between the ruling party and the trade union
leadership, which has since the 1970's been made up of
"economistically" oriented leaders. This cadre of
leaders placed emphasis on the economic interests of
workers and on the need for the trade union movement to
maintain its organisational autonomy. Heightened
tension between labour and the state induced both
further incorporative efforts by the state and
restiveness on the part of the trade union rank and
file, undermining the strategy of 'worker acquiescence.
According to Liato (1989:160-164), in Zambia there was
an average of 109 strikes a year between 1966 and 1985.
Between 1966 and 1983, the agricultural sector, which
employs 9.43 per cent of the Zambian work force
accounted for 8.64 per cent of strike actions; the
manufacturing sector , with 11,74 per cent of
employment, had the highest number of strikes,
accounting for 32.07 per cent of the total. The mining
sector, which employs 15.92 per cent of the work force
accounted for 12.61 per cent of the strike activities.
She points out that between 1980 and 1985, there was a
total of 495 strikes, with a total of 809,201 strike
days lost to industry. Most of the strikes were of an
economic nature, motivated by disputes over wages.
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Other strikes were caused by grievances related to
economic issues such as disputes over collective labour
agreements, unfair dismissals, unfair labour practices
by management, and the use of insulting or abusive
language.
One thing is clear. In the context of peripheral
capitalism workers are just as prone as elsewhere to
resist their reduction to the role of mere producers of
surplus value for capital. Strike actions are an
indication of the awakening of the working class.
3.4. State-Labour Relation in Botswana
The state-labour relation in Botswana has not received
the same kind of attention as in the three countries
that I have mentioned. This is the subject matter of my
work, and I shall be discussing it in the chapters that
follow. In this section I shall give a resume of the
small amount of literature that is currently available
concerning this topic. As in the other countries that I
have looked at, state-labour relations in Botswana are
characterised by a high degree state of regulation,
control and supervision. As in the other peripheral
capitalist countries the reason given for this is the
need for economic development. The trade union movement
in Botswana has also had its rights hemmed-in in a way
similar to that of non-democratic regimes and usually
for the same reasons; Botswana's liberal democracy has
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merely concealed the system of labour repression that
is typical of so many developing countries.
Cooper (1978) has demonstrated how the Botswana
government was prepared to use security forces to quell
a strike in Selibe Phikwe, a mining town which has been
built by the state with the assistance of international
capital. Phikwe mine production is undertaken by the
Bamangawato Concession Limited (BCL) which is owned 15
percent by Botswana government, and 85 percent by
Botswana Roan Selection Trust (BRST). BRST is owned 30
percent by an American multinational, Amax, 30 percent
by a South African multinational, Anglo American and 40
percent by several small shareholders based mostly in
the USA.
When negotiations between a delegation of the mine
workers and BCL management ended in a deadlock, mine
workers responded by closing down the main gates, and
evicted expatriate technicians from the smelter plant.
The workers smashed windows and assaulted some
expatriates. Not only was the strike forcibly
suppressed, but sixty workers later faced criminal
charges of rioting, intimidation, and malicious damage
to property and sentenced to imprisonment.
There are those who have expressed skepticism about the
ability of Botswana's labour movement to challenge the
state or capital. Nengwenkulu (1980), writing five
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years after the Selibe Phikwe strike, argued that the
development of trade unions in Botswana has been
accompanied by what he calls a process of
"depoliticizat ion, deradicalizat ion and
stultification", which negatively affected the birth
and growth of class consciousness among the workers. He
argued from a far left position that Botswana workers
lacked what he called "revolutionary and political
consciousness", that economism was rife, and that
"proletarian ideology" had been subordinated to the
ideology of nationalism. Whilst there may be some merit
in Nengwenkulu's analysis, it both lacks theoretical
perspective and a comparative approach, and the
analysis has not taken into account the context of
state-labour relations under capitalism in general.
As Kraus (1979a) has argued, following Independence
virtually all African states moved to delegitimate the
liberal conflict model of industrial relations and to
articulate in its place a "corporate nationalist" model
of industrial relations which emphasises the common
interests of the state, capital and labour. This
industrial relations model makes strikes illegal or
virtually so. This model aims to do precisely what
seems most to irritate analysts like Nengwenkulu, that
is, blunt trade union militancy through legal and other
restrictions. But these restrictions only limit trade
union action, they do not make it impossible.
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3.5 Conclusion. Towards a Theoretical Framework.
These challenges to capital by the working class need
to be situated in a broader perspective of state-labour
relations. There are two central issues that
characterise this relation: those of labour control
and labour resistance. Labour control refers to the
activities of the representatives of capital to assert
authority over labour and thereby incorporate it into
capitalist relations of production. Labour resistance
refers to the activities of representatives of labour
to defy the authority of capital, assert the autonomy
of labour and obstruct its incorporation into
capitalist relations of production (Crisp 1984:1-6)
According to Crisp, capital seeks to maximise surplus
value appropriation by habituating workers to the
unequal distribution of the product of their labour and
to the unequal distribution of effort and authority in
the work place. In order to achieve these objectives,
capital will seek to minimise the resistance of the
workers by controlling their political activity. To
protect capital and safeguard its privileged status,
the state elite is able to use a wide range of
legislative measures to obstruct the unionisation of
workers and restrict the financial and administrative
autonomy of established unions.
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Workers also use a variety of methods to confront
capital and the state. The methods of resistance can be
informal, collective or institutional: they include
familiar ones such as strikes and go-slows, and less
familiar and less visible ones like malingering,
absenteeism, theft, sabotage and restricted output.
Workers respond to strategies of control imposed on
them by taking their own initiatives, shifting between
modes of resistance and forcing capital and the state
to respond with new strategies of control.
The foregoing analysis of the state-labour dialectic
provides the context within which I shall undertake the
analysis of state-labour relation in Botswana. What is
of particular significance in the case of a liberal
democracy like Botswana is that the government has
often used its electoral mandate to give repressive
labour laws some legitimacy. It has then exhorted the
labour movement to obey "the rule of law". But as
Crouch (1977:4) points out, the core of industrial
relations in a capitalist social formation is the
economic relationship of domination and subordination
expressed through the employment contract, which
compels the worker to accept a subordinate and junior
role in the organisation of work.
In these circumstances, Fine (1984:157) argues that the
law appears as a neutral arbitrator between rival
claimants, whereas it in fact puts its social weight
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behind one claimant or another and so "resolves"
disputes by virtue of its power rather than its
impartiality. The "rule of law" does not concern itself
with the content of any particular law, or necessarily
mean that the law is just, fair neutral or even
legitimate. It merely means that the consequences of
the infringement of law are known in advance, are
predictable and certain, and will be visited upon the
dissident or the recalcitrant regardless of their
class position (Collins 1982:12)
From the foregoing discussion of the state-labour
relation, state emerges as complex entity which cannot
just be regarded as an instrument of the bourgeoisie.
Historical materialist analysis does not focus on the
structures of repression alone, which undoubtedly
imposes limits, but also on the tactics, strategies and
actions of the working class and other social forces.
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NOTES and REFERENCES.
1. I use the term Peripheral Capitalism, Third World
and Developing Countries interchangeably to refer to
all United Nations member countries that are outside
Europe and North America. Most of these countries are
located in Africa (excluding South Africa), Asia
(excluding the so called newly industrialized countries
of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) and in
South America. I follow the accepted UN usage of these
terms and do not accept the perjorative meanings that
have been attributed to these by the Western press.
(See also endnote in Todaro l989:xxxvi)
2. The meaning of economic development is by no means
uncontestable. My definition of economic development
follows therefore closely the definition given by
Todaro (1989).
3.However, as researches from other parts of Africa
show that the state regulation of labour is not new,
and that there are discernible continuities with labour
policies from the colonial period (Damachi, Seibel and
Trachtman,l979; Iwuji, 1979; Freund,1988; Gertzel, 1979
and Sandbrook, 1975).
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PART THREE.
THE BOTSWANA STATE: ITS RELATION TO ORGANIZED LABOUR
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CHAPTER 4.
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE: THE CASE OF BOTSWANA
Introduction.
In Chapters Two and Three I built a theoretical
framework within which to analyse the state-labour
relation in both developed and peripheral capitalist
societies. One of the main points raised in these
chapters is that it is the function of the state in
every society to secure the conditions of production
and reproduction of that society. However, the manner
in which the state goes about this task is largely a
question of the mode of production. Included in this
are the nature of the state, the level of the
development of the productive forces and the
constellation of class forces.
In a capitalist system, where the means of production
are privately owned and private capital accumulation is
regarded by those in control of the state as the most
effective way of generating the society's material
wealth, the state serves to secure the interests of
private capital accumulation. The state assists in
securing the conditions of capital accumulation by
performing functions which private capital cannot or
will not meet but which are nonetheless vital for
capitalism as a mode of production. These functions
include infrastructure development, the reproduction of
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labour through the provision of basic education,
training, health care, and general social welfare. The
state also assists private capital accumulation through
fiscal and monetary policies and state regulation and
political and ideological domination of labour.
The object of this chapter is to analyse the manner in
which the post-colonial state in Botswana, a society
with its own historical and social and economic
peculiarities, has set about this task. I start first
by examining the historical emergence of the post-
colonial Botswana state. I show how the roots of the
petty bourgeois elite that controls the Botswana state
go back to the pre-colonial period. I then examine the
economic growth and structural transformation of the
political economy of Botswana in the post-colonial
period, a process that was spearheaded by the new state
leadership. By investing in infrastructural
development, the modernising elite which controls the
Botswana state was performing a necessary function
vital for the reproduction of the capitalist system.
Economic growth has indeed taken place in Botswana, in
that there has been an increase in economic output
measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product and Per
Capita Income. Yet this process was marked by uneven
development. Some sectors of the economy grew faster
than others, and other sectors like agriculture
experienced decline both in relative and in absolute
91
terms. Some people's wealth and power have increased
while the majority of the people's wealth and power
have declined. The development process in Botswana was
accompanied by a particular process of class formation
and class contradiction.
As in most capitalist countries, the intervention of
the Botswana state in the economy was not exceptional.
What was important were the specific relations of
production that characterised this process. It is
necessary to start this analysis with the examination
of the character of the present Eotswana state because
the character of the state gives vital clues about its
functions and policies. This is the task to which I now
turn.
4.1 The Class Character of the Botswana State.
Botswana was a class divided society before the advent
of colonialism. The traditional Tswana social structure
was organised on a system of merafe or nations, each
with its own Kgosi or king who was patrilinially
descended from the morafe's founder. Social
differentiation was based on both economic position and
status. At the top of the social hierarchy was the
Kgosi and his closest relatives. These made up the
royal household. After this came the layer of Dikgosana
or the aristocracy. This layer was made up of the
king's other relatives like uncles and cousins. The
third layer was that of sechaba or commoners or
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ordinary people. Below the layer of the commoners was
that of bafaladi or immigrants, and below the layer of
immigrants were babihanka or hereditary serfs. All of
these classes had different privileges and obligations
[11
The highest organ of the state was the Kgotla or
assembly, which was presided over by the king, who was
a "presidential monarch" (Crowder 1988:22). The Kgolla
made all the political, administrative and judicial
decisions. The king exercised his powers through a
hierarchy of relatives, close advisers and headmen,
whose authority was exercised within JJikgollana,
specific geographical spaces which resembled boroughs
or wards but which were inhabited by related households
within the village (Parson 1984). These boroughs or
wards were the lowest organs of the state and could
also make political, administrative and judicial
decisions, subject to approval by the Kgosi and the
Kgotla.
Although theoretically every adult male had the right
to make a contribution to the deliberations at the
Kgobla, it was in practice dominated by a few members
of the royal family, the aristocracy and the king's
advisers. These men were also substantial cattle owners
who because of their wealth had considerable political
influence. Gossett (1986:103) argues that the actual
level of participation in the debates at the Kgotla was
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subject to all factors which affect participation in
any democracy, such as wealth, status and the ability
to articulate thoughts.
There is a famous proverb in Botswana which says Kgosi
ke Kgosi ka batho, that is, the king rules by the will
of the people. The Kgobla was therefore also used by
the Kgosi to gauge the public mood and popular
sentiments. Although the king had "executive powers",
and the advise of the Kgotla was not binding, to ignore
it would be unwise and a calculated risk which at times
led to assassination or banishment of the Kgosi
(Gossett 1986) . As Gossett further points out, at the
same time the king was only too aware of the potential
threat posed by other members of the royalty or
aristocracy, who were in the line of succession and
could possibly challenge the king for his position.
Parsons (1977:115) has recorded some seven coups and
counter-coups in Bamangato territory between 1834 and
1875.
Although Botswana was a part of the British empire,
British interests were primarily in Central and South
Africa, and the country was not viewed as being of
primary importance. The British wanted to keep the
country as a secure buffer zone between the Boers of
the Transvaal and the Germans in South West Africa
(Gossett 1986) . According to Parson (1984), Botswana
had to be self-supporting and not become a permanent
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ward of the British treasury. In order to meet the
administrative costs locally, the colonial state
imposed a Poll Tax, which resulted in many Eatswana
migrating to South Africa to seek employment. The
British introduced what was called "parallel rule", a
form of indirect rule based on the assumption that
Botswana was being "protected from external threat"
posed by the Boers and the Germans, and that the
British administration would have no effect in the
internal affairs of the country. According to Pickard
(1985:11) the basic principle of the system of parallel
rule was that:
The European administration would exist to
regulate the affairs of traders, missionaries,
and other Europeans in the district, and the
magistrates would mediate in terms of the
relations between the chiefs and the outside
world.
However, this principle seems to have been honoured
more in breach than in observance. Ever since 1895, the
colonial administration created structures to help it
govern the colony effectively. In 1919 they created a
Native Advisory Council, which was a forum for all the
Batswana traditional rulers. In 1920 the colonial state
created the European Advisory Council to represent
about 2,000 traders in the so-called Crown lands, and
in 1950 the colonial administration created a Joint
Advisory Council.
These councils lacked legislative powers and were used
mainly as forums for the colonial administration to
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announce its plans. The Native Advisory Council was
especially used to try to persuade the traditional
leaders to accept their subordinate role (Parson 1984).
According to Crowder (1988), the establishment of the
Native Advisory Council was the major objective of the
colonial administration of Resident Commissioner Lt-Col
Charles Rey who had long felt that the traditional
leaders were too autocratic. The colonial
administration plans to gradually take away the powers
of the traditional leaders reached their climax in the
1930's, when Charles Rey promulgated the Native
Administration and Native Justice Proclamations. The
Native Administration Proclamation established Tribal
Councils to "advise" the king on the affairs of the
society.
The colonial administration also introduced salaried
staff to run the "tribal" administration, created
"tribal treasuries" and introduced financial
procedures. The Native Justice Proclamation sought to
remove the judicial powers of the Kgobla and create a
system of "tribunals" in which the king would now be
assisted by only two assessors. These two proclamations
were fiercely opposed by the traditional leaders who
realised that they were about to lose power, as they
would no longer be the final arbiters of matters
political, administrative and judicial (Crowder,1988).
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There were two factors that were crucial to the
development of nationalist politics in Botswana later.
The first concerned the relationship of some members
of the aristocracy to the colonial administration and
the second concerned the relationship of the
aristocracy to the king. As I pointed out, the
aristocracy was made up of men who were substantial
cattle owners. Because of their wealth, they were also
relatively educated people, some with matriculation,
and one, K.T. Motsete, had three B.A. degrees and a
Master's degree in Philosophy from the University of
London (Halpern 1965b) . Motsete, as we shall see later,
was undoubtedly the most educated man in Botswana at
that time, and played a very crucial role in
nationalist politics. One of his abiding contribution
to Botswana's nationalism was to compose Botswana's
republican national anthem, Fatshe Leno La Rona, whose
English translation is "This Land is Ours".
At the same time that the colonial administration was
trying to curb the powers of the traditional rulers, it
also antagonised this group of the aristocracy, first
through Credit Sales to Natives Proclamation of 1923.
This Proclamation restricted Africans in Botswana from
engaging in commerce. The Proclamation restricted the
emergence of the indigenous commercial sector so much
that as late as 1949 there were only ten shops owned by
Batswana, as opposed to the 155 European-owned shops
(Parson, 1984) [2]
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Secondly in 1924, the Union of South Africa government
imposed a trade embargo in the form of weight
restrictions on the importation of cattle from Botswana
to South Africa. This trade embargo denied this group,
which owned large herds of cattle, access to beef
markets and also affected their capacity to accumulate.
The suppression of the growth of indigenous capital
alienated this group from the colonial administration.
Although this group was made up of men of aristocratic
or royal background, with wealth and good education,
some of them were not in a position of power and
influence within the traditional political structure.
Although they were not happy with the colonial
administration's position regarding African commerce
and trade, they seemed quite prepared to collaborate
with the colonial administration to curtail the powers
of the traditional rulers (Crowder, 1988). According to
Crowder some of these men supported the colonial state
in its endeavours to curb the powers of the
traditional leaders whom they saw as autocratic and
feudal. They also gravitated more towards a kind of
"bourgeois nationalism" and saw the need for the
country to move towards a western type of parliament
(Pickard, 1985) . Crowder (1988:47) argues that like
educated elites elsewhere in Africa, the elite in
Botswana "resented the power of the traditional rulers
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and saw themselves, rather than these heirs to the
past, as the future leaders of their people".
This group, however, remained politically unorganised
until the early 1960's when they coalesced into a
political party, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party
(BDP). The manner in which this group emerged is of
interest because it was in this group that the colonial
state found local allies against the radical
nationalist Botswana People's Party (BPP). The BDP came
about as a reaction to the emergence of the BPP which
was formed in the aftermath of the banning of black
political organisations in South Africa, including the
African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress
and the multi-racial Communist Party of South Africa.
The BPP was formed by a group of more radical
nationalists, some of whom had been political activists
in South Africa before the bannings. The BPP demanded
early independence, Africanisation of the civil service
and nationalisation of the land. According to Halpern
(l965b:287), the BPP was also strongly anti-tribalist
and critical of chieftainship, which it referred to as
a "an ancient institution" that had no place in
present day Botswana. It denounced tribalism as a form
of "communal chauvinism" characterised by "belief in a
mythical hereditary divine right of precedence" and
demanded that political office should be based on merit
alone.
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The main players were K T Motsete, who was the
president of the Party, Philip Matante, the Vice-
President and Motsamai Mpho, as the Secretary-General.
The BPP was however, an uneasy alliance. Soon the
ideological differences that had led to the split in
the black opposition politics in South Africa and to
the creation of the Pan-Africanist Congress, were
reproduced within the BPP (Gossett,l986). According to
Gossett, the internal dispute in the BPP concerned
mainly two issues. First, there was an anti-communist
pro-PAC faction led by Phillip Matante, and the pro-ANC
faction led by Motsamai Mpho. The pro-PAC faction, with
the support of some PAC elements started accusing the
pro-ANC faction of being a front for white Communists,
and its leader Motsamai Mpho, of being an Communist
agent. Secondly, at about the. sace. tce. that the.e.
allegations were going on, some monies donated by the
Africa support groups based in Ghana went missing. Mpho
reacted by expelling Matante and Motsete from the Party
for failing to account for the missing funds. Matante
also announced that he had expelled Mpho.
Despite the fact that the BPP had split up into
factions, its nationalist rhetoric had sufficiently
alarmed the colonial administration and spurred it into
looking for alternative nationalist leaders to lead
Botswana to independence. According to Gossett (1986),
the colonial administration had warned London that the
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BPP posed a serious threat to British interests in the
colony, and that the only satisfactory opposition to
the BPP would be a party headed by Seretse Khama.
The BDP was officially launched on the 27th of
January, 1962, as a counter weight to the BPP, which
was seen by the colonial government as too radical
because of its ties with the African National Congress
of South Africa (Motshidisi 1975; Gossett 1986) . With
the formation of the BDP, the class of petty bourgeois
nationalists broadened its social base to include
European commercial farmers and Asian traders. Pickard
(1985) argues that after its formation, the BDP
received unqualified support from the colonial
administration, and received financial and
organisational support from the financially influential
European and Asian communities which feared the more
radical BPP coming to power.
After it was formed, the colonial administration
allocated the party ten seats in the Legislative
Council, and Seretse Khama, its leader was appointed
to the position of Government Secretary. According to
Pickard, the BDP was in fact treated as the de facbo
government and was the incumbent party in the 1965
elections. The party won the 1965 elections, and its
leader, who was also the leader of the Legislative
Council, became the first Prime Minister and later the
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President of the Republic of Botswana. Gossett
(1986:248) argues:
In effect, by commanding the support of the
majority of the unofficial Legco members and
having the sympathy of the [colonial]
administration, the BDP became the ruling party
without ever having fought an election or waged
a nationalist struggle.
Admittedly, at the time of independence, the petty
bourgeois class that coalesced into the BDP was only
strong at the political level. It was in control of the
"new state" but had no firm economic base. I have
already mentioned the causes: restrictions on beef
exports to the South African market and on commerce and
trading locally. It was therefore necessary that this
petty bourgeoisie should transform the process of
accumulation in such a way that it would generate a new
centre of economic ownership and possession. The
absence of developed forces of production necessitated
an alliance with international capital.
The present strategy of capitalist of development
should therefore be seen as an expression and outcome
of specific class interests, whose roots go back to
pre-colonial days. The decolonialisation process of
Botswana and the colonial administration's support for
the BDP, indicate that political independence for
Botswana was a result of a strategic compromise of the
colonial power to transfer power to a local petty
bourgeoisie that would safeguard the interests of
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metropolitan capital. According to Amilcar Cabral
(cited in Harris 1975:22)
The objective of the imperialist countries [in
granting political independence] was to prevent
the enlargement of the socialist camp, to
liberate the reactionary forces in [these]
countries, which were stifled by colonialism,
and to enable these forces to ally themselves
with	 the	 international	 bourgeois.	 The
fundamental objective was to create a
bourgeoisie where one did not exist, in order
to specifically strengthen the imperialist and
capitalist camp.
As some of the post-independence state policy
pronouncements have made clear, the infrastructural
developments undertaken by the state since Independence
were in order to create favourable conditions for the
private sector to invest. These policies have, however
been couched in the ideology of "national development",
underlining the argument that each new class is
compelled merely to carry its aims, to represent is
narrow interests as the common interests of the whole
nation (Marx and Engels 1970). According to National
Development Plan 5:
The Government is committed to actively
interventionist economic and social policies.
The progress that has been made since
Independence is the result of active Government
efforts and careful planning. The government's
commitment to planning is not intended to
stifle private initiative, but to create
favourable conditions in which the private
sector can contribute to Botswana's
development. The government's role in the
economy is a broad one. It provides the basic
infrastructure of the country... [and] takes
responsibility for educating the labour force
that the economy requires.. .The government also
sets the legal, fiscal and monetary framework
with which all sectors operate and is
responsible	 for	 securing	 favourable
international	 economic	 arrangements	 for
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domestic	 producers	 and	 consumers	 (p.61)
(italics added)
But where do state policies come from, and how are they
determined? Who makes up the private investor in
Botswana? In the context of Botswana, can we speak of a
class or alliance of class fractions whose influence is
so pervasive and so strong that the state may be
regarded as its "instrument"?
The answers to these questions will emerge in the
various parts of this analysis. Suffice it to point out
here that for the class forces that emerged politically
victorious in the run up to Botswana's independence in
1966, that is, for the class of petty bourgeois
nationalists who are represented politically in the
ruling Botswana Democratic Party, the post-colonial
economic policies and strategies were a class project
for private capital accumulation. The petty bourgeoisie
who gained control of the post-colonial state had a
vision of where it wanted to lead the country.
The economic policies of the post-colonial period were
a means of getting there. As Sandbrook (1982:81-82)
points out, a development strategy is at the same time
a class strategy. It indicates the general orientation
of a regime with respect to the accumulation function.
A development strategy also indicates which class or
class fractions will take the main responsibility for
expanding the economy, and hence benefit from the
104
accumulation of capital. At the same time, the
accumulation process engenders class formation, and
aids the emergence of a class or class fractions with
the economic power to ensure that the state henceforth
represents primarily their interests.
As Alavi (1972) has argued, one characteristic feature
of the colonial state is that it did not rest on the
support of any of the local classes, but instead
subordinated all the indigenous classes. The political
independence of Botswana that came in 1966 marked the
political restoration of a previous ruling class that
had been living under colonial domination; the
nationalist demands for independence in the 1950s and
1960s represented above all a resurgence of this class
(Mogalakwe, 1983)
Having been denied the opportunity to accumulate during
the colonial period, the petty bourgeoisie entered into
an alliance with international capital to enhance its
economic position. At independence, it adopted a
liberal bourgeois constitution which gave the citizens
all the democratic rights and freedoms associated with
bourgeoisie democracy. It can be argued that this was
partly because of the influence of the British. But it
was also due to the fact that the new men in power
wanted to end what they considered a backward political
system based on royalty. Another reason why a liberal
democratic constitution was adopted came from
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Botswana's own version of democracy, which was based on
a form of consensus, albeit one based on domination.
Having delineated the class character of the Botswana
state, I turn now to the examination of the functions
of this "new state".
4.2 The Post-Independence Economic Growth Strategy.
As I pointed out in the Introduction, at the time of
Independence, Botswana was among the poorest countries
in Africa. Botswana's Gross Domestic Product was the
equivalent of £ 12 million and the income per capita was
equivalent of £25.00. The exports totalled the
equivalent of £6 million. The bulk of the exports
consisted of meat (carcases), which amounted to the
equivalent of £3 million a year; this was followed by
the export of labour (deferred pay and remittances),
hides and skins and canned meat. The import bill was
the equivalent of £7 million in food, clothes and
textiles, building materials, machines, equipment,
chemicals and drugs [31. In a population of 650,000
only 14,000 were in formal sector employment. There
were 32,000 Batswana migrant workers in South Africa.
In order to transform the economy of the country, the
government enunciated four economic planning
objectives around which future development plans would
be based. These four objectives were (a) Rapid Economic
Growth,	 (b) Economic Independence,	 (c) Sustained
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Development and (d) Social Justice [4] . I will briefly
surnmarise each of these development objectives in
turn.
(a) Rapid. Economic Growth: it was the objective of the
post-colonial state to ensure that the growth of the
productive base of the economy would exceed population
growth in order to sustain an increase in the average
standards of living. To this end the new state sought
to encourage production with more direct intervention
in selected areas of the economy.
(b) Economic Independence: Botswana was a small
landlocked country bordering a large and economically
developed country, South Africa. Botswana therefore had
to lessen its vulnerability and dependence by
mobilisation of internal resources, diversification of
the economy and emphasis on training and localisation.
Externally Botswana had to diversify its communication
routes, its trade and investment partners and its
sources of aid. According to the National Development
Plan 5:
Economic independence therefore became for
economic as well as political reasons, a major
objective and one that has to temper the quest
for rapid economic growth (p.58).
(c) Sustained Development: The pattern of development
was to be sustained by reinvesting resources generated
from non-renewable sources in order to enhance the
economy's long term potential,
	 and to exploit
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agricultural resources in such a way that they would
not be destroyed.
(d) Social justice: Economic growth was not to be an
end in itself but a means to other ends. A more
productive economy was needed as the basis for the
improved standards of living for Batswana, especially
through employment.
4.3	 Economic Growth and Structural Transformations
(1966-1990)
According to Colclough and MaCarthy (1980), the
government's revenue from domestic sources increased
from P4.5 million to P28,1 million in 1972/3. This was
the first time that the recurrent budget was balanced
since independence. Over the same period, public
development expenditure increased sixfold, from P5m to
almost P30m, of which more than 10% were financed from
domestic resources. In 1972/73 domestic production,
measured in constant prices had almost quadrupled,
allowing income per capita to triple over the same
period. According to Coclough and Macarthy, the rate of
economic growth was about 15 per cent per year between
1966 and 1973. The years from independence up to 1990
also saw very rapid economic growth and structural
transformations in the country's social and economic
landscape. These changes are summarised in Tables 4.1
and 4.2 below.
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TABLE 4.1
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 1966-1991
ECONOMIC	 1965	 1975	 1985	 Most	 Year	 Growth
INDICATORS	 Recent	 p.a.
Estimate
GDP pm,
1988/89 prices
GDP per capita, Pula
1988/89 prices
Formal Employment( '000)
Domestic
Abroad
I NFRASTRUCTURE
Kin, of tarred road
No. of motor vehicles
Electricity Generated,
Million Kwh
1 SOCIAL INDICATORS
284	 1284	 3666	 4988
	
88/89	 13.0%
	
537	 1793	 3364	 4115	 88/89	 8.8%
	
14	 57	 117	 176	 1989	 11.1%
	
31	 n.a	 32	 24	 1990	 -1.0%
	
1966	 1975	 1985	 Most	 Year	 Growth
Recent	 p.a.
Estimate
	
20	 219	 1885	 2664	 1990	 22.6%
	
4500	 15400 51700
	 75000	 1989	 13.0%
	
5	 270	 457	 845	 1989	 25.0%
	
1966	 1971	 1981	 1991	 Year	 Growth
p.a.
Total Population ('000)	 541	 597	 941	 1334	 (Est.)	 3,7%
Life expectancy
at Birth	 48.0	 55.8	 56.3	 60.2	 (Est.)	 0.9%
Death Rate
(per '000)	 n.a	 14.5	 13.9	 11.5	 (Est.)	 -0.4%
School enrolments:
Primary ('000)
	 72	 116	 234	 293	 1990	 6.0%
Secondary ('000)
	
2	 12	 32	 55	 1990	 16.0%
Teacher Training
Colleges	 293	 489	 1188	 1356	 1989	 6.8%
University	 22	 n.a	 1022	 3133	 1989/90	 21.9%
Health:
Doctors per 100,000 pop. 	 5	 11	 16	 17	 1989	 5.7%
Nurses per 100,000 pop.	 6	 86	 143	 179	 1989	 15.9%
SOURCE: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, (1991)
TABLE 4.2
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1966-1988/89 (selected years)
1966	 1977/78	 1982/83	 1988/89
	
pm share	 pm share	 pm share	 pm share
%	 %	 %	 %
Agriculture	 124 39.6	 309	 19.9	 153	 5.8	 149	 3.0
Mining	 -	 -	 241	 15.5	 815	 31.2	 2542 51.0
Manufacturing	 25	 7.9	 106	 6.8	 165	 6.3	 209	 4.2
Water &
Electricity	 3	 0.8	 44	 2.8	 65	 2.5	 93 21.9
Construction
18	 5.7	 73	 4.7	 142	 5.4	 166	 3.3
Trade, Hotels
	
58 18.6	 311	 20.0	 556	 21.3	 818	 16.4
Transport
Finance	 13	 4.1	 65	 4.2	 66	 2.5	 82	 1.6
Government	 21	 6.6	 129	 8.3	 174	 6.6	 263	 5.3
Social	 52 16.7	 253	 16.3	 451	 17.2	 638	 12.8
Services
Dummy sector	 -	 -	 65	 4.2	 87	 3.3	 118	 2.4
-	
-	 -42	 -2.7	 -58	 -2.2	 -91 -1.8
Total GDP	 313 100.0	 1554 100.0	 2613 100.0	 4988 100.0
GDP per	 578	 1982	 2677	 4115
capita, Pula
SOURCE: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 7 (1991-1997)
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Table 4.1 gives development indicators of physical,
economic and social transformations that took place in
Botswana since independence. The Table takes 1965, the
year in which Botswana was given self- government, as
the base line. The striking features of the table are
the very high levels of growth in most areas of the
economy. GDP per capita increased from P537 in 1965 (in
1988/89 prices) to almost P4000 in 1988/89, an increase
of 8.8 percent per annum. In the same period formal
sector employment increased from about 14,000 to
176,000 in 1988/89.
The other striking feature about formal sector
employment is that employment abroad, mainly in South
Africa, actually fell from 31,000 in 1965, a figure
twice as high as employment inside the country, to
24,000 in 1990. According to Harvey and Lewis (1990),
in the mid-1960s there were three Batswana employed
outside the country for every one person employed in
the formal sector. By the mid-1980s that situation had
been reversed: there was a 20 percent fall in the
recruitment of Batswana to work in South Africa. This
was caused by two factors, the most important of which
was the rapid growth of employment in Botswana. By 1986
employment within Botswana was five times larger than
the number of Batswana employed outside the country.
Harvey and Lewis argue that since 1987, the population
of the young school leavers of working age was
increasing by more than 20,000 each year; the job
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market could not absorb the new entrants. The problem
of unemployment is therefore still very much around in
Eotswana, despite all the post-independence economic
achievements.
Other notable infrastructure developments include the
building of a network of tarmacked roads, from a total
length of 20 kilometres at Independence to more than
3000 kilometres in 1990, and provision of rural water
supply. There have also been significant improvements
in the transportation and communications network,
including the national micro-wave telephone network and
earth satellite link with most parts of the world (NDP
7). Education is another sector where there have also
been major improvements. Primary school enrollment has
increased from 72,000 in 1966 to 293,000 in 1990, and
secondary school from 2,000 to 55,000. University
enrollment increased from 22 to 3,133 students.
According Table 4.2 , the biggest economic growth was
in mining, which grew from zero at the time of
independence to 51 percent in 1988/89, contributing
more than half of the GDP. Agricultural production
declined from 39 percent to 3 percent during the same
period. This means more people were now looking to
formal sector for employment. Although mining alone
accounts for more than 50 percent of the G]JP, other
sectors also grew significantly in real terms. The
comnmnercial sector (trade and hotels) followed mining,
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accounting for 16.4 per cent of the GDP, followed by
the public sector (government) which accounted for 12.8
per cent of the GDP. In terms of employment, the public
sector has been, and is still the largest employer.
4.4 The State Institutions of Intervention.
The economic growth and structural transformations in
the physical, economic and social landscape of Botswana
just described can be attributed to two factors: (a)
the discovery and profitable exploitation of diamond
mining which increased government revenues and enabled
the state to intervene indirectly through
infrastructure developments; and (b) direct state
intervention in the economy through the establishment
of public companies. Though the Botswana state is
committed to capitalism, and has been pursuing an
overtly capitalist oriented strategy, the state has
also been involved in a joint venture with the giant
South African multinational, De Beers. Botswana has
acquired a 50 percent equity in the diamond mining
company, Debswana, with IDe Beers being the other
partner. At the end of 1990, diamond mining contributed
60 per cent of government revenue and more than 50
percent of the gross domestic product (Harvey and
Lewis, 1990; Jeffries 1991)
Besides direct involvement in mining through Debswana,
another area of significant state intervention was
through the establishment of a number of public or
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state-owned corporations, known in Botswana as
parastatals. The main ones are: the Botswana Meat
Commission (formed in the mid_19501s), the Water
Utilities Corporation (1970), the Botswana Power
Corporation (1970), the Botswana Development
Corporation (1970), the Botswana Housing Corporation
(1971), the Botswana Livestock Development Corporation
(1971), the Botswana Housing Corporation (1971), the
Botswana Livestock Development Corporation (1972), the
Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (1974) and the
Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (1980). Other
parastatals are the Bank of Botswana and Air Botswana
(NDP 7) . These state enterprises were created to fill
the gap in private sector provision, and their origin
is related to the post-colonial economic development
initiatives of providing the much needed infrastructure
for the economy (Jeffries, 1991) [5] . As already noted,
at the time of her formal independence, Botswana did
not have the infrastructure capable of sustaining a
modern society. In fact Botswana was even considered
not ready for independence because of this lack basic
infrastructure [6] . Because of the limitations of
space, I shall concentrate here only on one parastatal,
the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), chosen
because of the prominent position it occupies within
the public enterprise system in Botswana.
The BDC is the country's primary development finance
institution, with major shareholdings in joint ventures
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with a variety of firms across the economy (NDP 7;
Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Jef fries, 1991). The BDC was
incorporated on the 15th April, 1970 and started
operations in 1971. Its inception followed the
recommendations of a team of management consultants
from London. The consultancy report was based partly on
a study of public corporations in seven newly
independent countries, namely Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania,
Zambia, Malawi, Ghana and Lesotho.
The objectives of the BDC are as follows: (a) the
infusion of share capital, short and long term loan,
and loan and overdraft guarantees; (b) procurement of
industrial land and buildings, technical and managerial
support; (c) promotion and development of new projects
in the national interest; and (d) the provision of
expert business advice and guidance. The state owns all
ordinary shares and the BDC's international partners, N
F M (Holland), International Finance Corporation (World
Bank), Commonwealth Development Corporation (British)
and D.E.G. (West Germany) own preferential shares [7].
According to Harvey and Lewis (1990), the BDC's primary
function is to identify and participate in the
direction and control of viable enterprises, and is not
just a passive loan giver or sleeping partner. The BDC
is an active participant in joint ventures with
international capital, and supplies equity, loans, or
debentures, as and when it judges necessary or
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desirable on purely commercial calculations. Since its
inception the EDO has acted as a partner with
international capital in most industrial and commercial
activities, and has acted mainly in a commercial and
profit seeking way. According to Harvey and Lewis, the
role of the BDC, whether as a partner with the private
investor or as a provider of services, could thus be
seen as supporting the private sector as much as
threatening it as a rival. In 1983 the EDC consisted of
twenty seven subsidiaries, which in turn owned a
further fifteen subsidiaries. In addition BDC held
shares in eleven associated companies and financed four
others directly by way of long term loans (Harvey and
Lewis, 1990)
In 1989, the BDC Group underwent an organisational
restructuring. The BDC Group now consists of two very
huge departments: the Projects and Operations
Departments. The Projects Department is responsible for
developing new projects and serves as the first point
of contact between a project sponsor and the
corporation. It evaluates investment proposals,
negotiates investment terms and supervises the
implementation of projects and the disbursement of loan
and equity funds granted by the BDC. The Project
Department is involved in 25 projects, ranging from
crocodile farming and the production of semi-face clay
bricks, to international hotels and a private hospital
in Gaborone. The Operations Department is also active
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in various sectors of the country's economy, and is
responsible for the monitoring and development of the
investments. The Operations Department is organised in
six divisions, all corresponding to the key sectors of
the economy. These are: (a) Industrial and Commercial
Divisions, (b) Agriculture, (c) Transport, (d) Hotels
and Tourism, (e) Property Management Development, and
(f) Financial Services Division [8]
The Botswana state has been able to make these
interventions in the economy largely because of the
revenues that accrued to state coffers from diamond
mining. Indeed the mining industry has had a positive
knock-on effect on the country's economy in the sense
that the state had enough revenues to develop the
infrastructure. These in turn provided propitious
conditions for private sector investment and
development. To a large extent the overall objective of
the post-colonial state of providing the necessary
support for private sector development has been
realised.
This has led some analysts to argue that it was the
discovery and profitable exploitation of diamond mining
that was at the centre of Botswana's development and
that diamond mining had become "the engine of growth"
and "a launching pad" (Coiclough and Macarthy, 1980;
Harvey and Lewis,1990; Stedinan, 1993) . Whilst there is
much truth in this argument, the question that remains
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unanswered is this: since the diamond revenues were
mostly invested in infrastructure development, where
did the profit for private sector employers come from?
The manner in which the analysis of Botswana's
political economy has been conducted leaves one with
the impression that all is well as long as necessary
infrastructure is created and factories are built. For
these analysts, the means of production are everything,
and the relations of production nothing. Because the
key link for these analysts is not class struggle but
the technical means of production, there is a lack of
discussion of social relations and the working class
appears as an aggregate number of employees. A detailed
analysis of how labour actually contributed to the
development of the country is undertaken in Chapter
Five. Suffice it to point out here that to look only at
mineral revenues alone in accounting for Botswana's
post-independence economic performance, and to
disregard the part played by labour is in my view
inadequate and incomplete analysis of the political
economy of a country.
4.5 The State and Development. Some Observations.
There is an on-going debate as to whether countries at
the periphery of capitalism can succeed in transforming
their economies towards a more modern industrial
societies. As Lubeck (1987:1) argues, this debate has
focussed on the degree of autonomy possible for
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indigenous accumulation under the external structural
constraints imposed by the capitalist world economy and
the state system.
Taylor (1977) argues that the economic penetration of
the Third World by capitalism has resulted in an
economic structure whose development is both highly
uneven and necessarily restricted to particular sectors
of the economy. He argues that in peripheral capitalism
production for export is greater than production for
domestic consumption and the domestic sector is
characterised by low level technology which results in
a low level of productivity; by contrast the export
sector is characterised by high levels of productivity.
According to Taylor Il977:53), the effects of these
forms of penetration are that the possibilities for
directing production towards the requirements of the
indigenous economy have been restricted.
Warren (1980) argues that it should be possible to
attain some economic development amidst these
constraints, and gives examples of some countries from
Asia and Latin America which in his view have succeeded
or are on their way to some capitalist development.
Kennedy (1988) puts the blame for lack of economic
development in the African countries on the doorsteps
of the post-colonial state in Africa. He argues that
since independence, African governments have tended to
act in ways that obstruct rather than encourage African
119
capitalism because of the failure to provide assistance
and to create favourable national economic climate
within the limitations set by the international
situation. He argues that the state and politics have
had a particularly profound and often retarding effect
on indigenous economic activity of all kinds, including
emergent capitalists and that the state's own economic
activities have stifled enterprise investment.
In his criticisms of Botswana's political economy,
Parson (1980) starts by analysing what he identifies as
the limits of capitalist transformation imposed on
Botswana by South Africa. He argues that the limits to
Eotswana's ability to generate an autocentric process
of development arise from its constitution as a
particular kind of dependent capitalist country, a
significant component of which has been its
geographical position on the periphery of South Africa,
and that the development efforts of a developing
country are subject to the vagaries of the world
economy.
It will be fair to put Taylor (1977) in the category of
world system theory and Parson (1980) in that of
dependency theory. This school of thought tends to
place undue emphasise on a country's external linkages
(external determination) especially if those linkages
are of a dependent or unequal nature. The role of the
state in redirecting the process of accumulation is
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given a secondary consideration. This is a pessimistic
view which also has serious flaws for analysing a
country such as Botswana. As we have seen, the state
has made significant advances in modernising the
economy by transforming a backward agrarian economy
into a fairly modern one within a space of 25 years.
On the basis of the empirical overview of the
Botswana's political economy that I have given, I find
the gloom and doom scenario of Taylor and Parsons
difficult to accept. But at the same time, Warren
(1980) who represents the more orthodox Marxist
approach (internal determination), expresses a rather
optimistic view which is also based on a limited number
of countries. On the other hand, Kennedy stands on his
own. Contrary to what he argues, in Botswana the
transformation of the economy has been spearheaded by
the state in alliance with both indigenous capital
interests and international or multinational capital.
Lacking in technical and managerial expertise,
marketing channels and resource, the state and
indigenous capital have deeply involved themselves with
South Africa, United States, Britain and German
capital. The beginning of the 1990's saw the arrival of
more multinationals from South Korea, France, Kuwait,
Lebanon and Peoples Republic of China (NDP 7).
It may argued that the presence of international or
multinational capital in Botswana serves to highlight
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the pessimism of the dependency theorists. But in the
current phase of internationalisation of capital, it
may be naive not to expect indigenous capital to engage
in joint ventures with international capital. It is
only through joint ventures that both the state and
indigenous capital can acquire the technology and the
organisational expertise to deepen the level of
indigenous capital accumulation. Lubeck (1987:12)
argues that the seminal question should be how the
group identified as the national bourgeoisie is
involved in the national economy, and iow its
participation transforms the economy and alters the
balance of class forces in the society.
I have already shown how the state has helped create
the necessary conditions for private capital
accumulation. I have also argued that the structural
transformations that took place in the various sectors
of the economy have resulted in class formation. It is
important to say something about some of the actors
who comprise what can be termed the emergent national
indigenous bourgeoisie to illustrate my argument. This
is the point to which I now turn.
4.6 The Emergent National Bourgeoisie.
The term 'national bourgeoisie' is used here to refer
to the class or alliance of classes of national
entrepreneurs who collectively pursue an economic
strategy that increases the national share or control
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of the local economic processes. Depending upon
particular conjunctures this class of national
entrepreneurs may be in alliance with multinational
capital or in competition with it (Kitching 1987) . My
task in this section will be restricted to identifying
the emergent national bourgeoisie in Botswana, by
looking at areas of their participation in the local
economy, that is, their main economic activities. Other
characteristics of this class, such as its relative
strength vis-a-vis foreign capital, its cohesiveness or
lack of it, its political influence, if any, or whether
it is a "comprador" "bureaucratic", "managerial" or
whatever bourgeoisie, is a task that will be left to
future research.
As pointed out in the preceding parts of this chapter,
colonialism stifled the growth and development of
indigenous entrepreneurial activities. The emergence of
indigenous capital in Botswana is therefore a post-
colonial phenomenon. This is not to say that there were
no propertied class in pre-colonial or colonial
Botswana. As I have pointed out in Chapter 4.1, the
aristocracy in Botswana were substantial cattle owners.
Commercial ranching was, however, confined to Europeans
farmers in the so-called Crown Lands. These were
fertile parts of the country that were designated by
the colonial administration to resettle white farmers.
But it was cattle farming that provided an impetus for
capital accumulation even for indigenous Batswana.
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Efforts to augment indigenous capital accumulation in
the agricultural sector started in 1975 with the
introduction of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP).
Under the TGLP, the state gave incentives to large
cattle owners to leave communal grazing areas and
commercialise livestock industry, which had hitherto
been the domain of white Batswana. The TGLP was
launched ostensibly for environmental reasons: to stop
degradation of the land in communal areas. TGLP was
viewed as a process of change from traditional and
subsistence production of livestock towards a greater
degree of market-oriented production; a movement from
relatively lower level of production and low returns,
to a relatively higher level of production and
productivity and higher returns (NIJP5, p.18). The new
commercial farmers were given incentives such as soft
loans for fencing and borehole drilling and equipment.
This assistance was, however, only for farmers with
more than 200 herd of cattle.
The TGLP was introduced against the background of the
Rural Income Distribution Survey of 1974. Some of the
finding of the survey were that only 5 percent of the
rural population own more than 50 percent of the
national cattle herd, and that 20 percent of the
population did not own any cattle at all. In 1980 fewer
than 28 percent of the rural household owned no cattle.
This figure rose to 38 percent in 1988. Rural
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households with less than 40 cattle declined from 51
percent in 1980 to 48 percent in 1988, and those with
between 40-100 cattle declined from 14 percent to 9
percent in the same period (NDP 7)
The TGLP scheme therefore benefited only a small
section of cattle owners. These were the big the
traditional cattle owning class of petty bourgeois
nationalists. These are the people who have, together
with the white commercial farmers, dominated beef
production and benefited from the guarantied European
market. For example, from 1979 to 1989, beef production
from commercial farms accounted for about 42 percent of
sales at the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC). The
average price per beast slaughtered at the BMC rose
from P303.00 in 1985 to P653.00 in 1989 (NDP7,p.253)
Under the Lome Convention, Botswana was entitled to
export up to 19,000 tonnes of beef per annum to the
European Economic Community (EEC) on preferential
terms. In so far as the domestic production of beef for
world market was concerned, the national bourgeois has
managed to exert significant control and derive large
benefits.
Accumulation in other sectors of the economy has also
proceeded apace, although it is not as impressive as it
is the commercial agricultural sector. In 1968, of the
439 shops registered in Botswana, only 31 percent were
Batswana owned (Best,1970). By 1984, local ownership in
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the commercial sector had improved quite considerably.
Of the 2,616 businesses in the commercial sector, 85
percent were owned by Batswana, and only 15 percent by
foreigners (Selabe:1988:92)
However these were very small undertakings like bars
and bottle stores (off-licence), small general dealers
(corner shops) and petrol stations. Dube-Jones
(1992:163) argues that having entered the already small
commercial sector rather late, indigenous Batswana were
operating under considerable disadvantages in terms of
their late entry and due to constraints inherent in
Botswana's economic position in southern Africa. As a
result, Batswana businesses tended to lag behind those
of the Europeans and Asians in size, sophistication,
profit making and expansion possibilities.
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TABLE 4.3
OWNERSHIP OF' MANUFACTURING FIRMS BY CITIZENSHIP
(SELECTED YEARS)
TYPE	 OF	 OWNERSHIP	 CITIZEN
TOTAL	 OWNERSHIP
YEAR	 AS%OF
Citizen	 Joint	 Foreign	 TOTAL
Venture
1979	 15	 26	 47	 88	 17.0
1984	 32	 55	 122	 209	 15.3
1989	 160	 150	 190	 500	 32
SOURCE: SELABE, 1988:92; JONES-DUBE, 1992:116; NDP 7:158
Ownership in the manufacturing sector gives important
clues about the nature of capital accumulation. The
progress made by Batswana petty bourgeoisie in this
sector of the economy has not been very impressive,
although by no means insignificant, considering where
they were at the time of independence. In 1982 the
post-colonial state started a scheme called Financial
Assistance Policy (FAP). FAP has been described as a
package of incentives for national and international
investors to stimulate investment and create employment
opportunities (NDP7:165) . Businesses could receive FAP
support for small scale project with fixed capital
investment of up to P25,000; medium scale project of
between P25,000 and P900,000; and large scale projects
with fixed capital investment in excess of P900,000.
Between 1985 and 1990, FAP financed 1,184 businesses to
the tune of P258 million. About 73 percent of the
projects financed under this scheme were small scale
projects and accounted for only 3 percent of total
investment. About 83 percent of FAP funding, accounting
for about 26 percent of the projects, went to medium
scale projects in urban and pen-urban areas. Large
scale projects accounted for only one percent of the
projects but for 14 percent of the FAP funding
(NDP7:l65-166)
According to Table 4.3, by 1979 citizen ownership in
the manufacturing sector stood at 17 percent. By 1984,
128
there were 209 businesses in the manufacturing sector,
but citizen ownership had fallen in relative terms to
15.3 percent. By 1989 the number of manufacturing
businesses had gone up to about 500. Out of this 190 or
38 percent of businesses were foreign; 150 or 30
percent were joint ventures and 160 firms accounting
for 32 percent, were Batswana owned. Employment in
manufacturing also increased from about 9,500 in 1984,
to about 22,000 in 1990, accounting for about 12
percent of formal sector employment (NDP7:158-9)
Although the participation of Batswana in the local
economy has not grown by Leaps acc. bc
countries where there has been an unambiguous
"affirmative" action for indigenous capital, for
example Kenya, such participation has been growing
steadily over the years. In order to promote such
participation, the state passed the Trade and Liquor
Act of 1986 to reserve certain businesses such as fresh
produce, filling stations, bar and bottle stores, for
citizens. The hope is that participation in these
businesses can be a launching pad for bigger things. It
is now said that the Government is concerned about the
limited participation of Batswana in large undertakings
like wholesale trade, chain store, hotel and import and
export business, which continue to be dominated by non-
citizens. Thus it will be the major challenge for the
government in 1990s that more Batswana break into these
relatively advanced business activities, which require
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greater	 financial	 and	 managerial	 capabilities
(NDP7 :162)
4.7 CONCLUSION.
In the foregoing empirical anlysis, I have provided an
overview of the political economy of Botswana from
independence to about 1990. First I gave an account of
the class character of the post-colonial Botswana state
and then proceeded to delineate the functions of this
state, especially with regard to social and physical
infrastructure development. I have argued that these
are the traditional functions of the state. Every
society has to reproduce the conditions of production
at the same time as it produces and a society that does
not do this will not last. In order to achieve this,
the state in capitalist society intervenes to provide
the necessary conditions for economic growth and
development.
This process has resulted in class formation. During
this process, some groups of people have been able to
increase their wealth and power, whilst others' wealth
and power declined. A large class of the urban
proletariat has emerged alongside a small class of the
petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. The petty
bourgeoisie are those involved in small businesses and
the bourgeoisie are those who have been able to break
into the manufacturing sector and in commercial
agriculture. As I pointed out, these two classes have
been benefited directly from the state policies such as
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Trade and Liquor Act, Financial Assistance Policy and
TGLP. It is on the basis of this that it can be argued
that state policies only appear neutral, whilst in
practice they help sortie sections of the people at the
expense of others, usually the majority.
The Botswana state has also been involved in
infrastructural development and in the management of
the economy through the BDC. Admittedly, in Botswana,
as in most peripheral formations, the state's
involvement in economic management tends to be much
more direct and obvious. But even in developed
capitalist countries, the state is also involved in
economic management or development. Duncan (1989:3)
argues that in the 1980's, public sector spending in
OECD countries accounted Eor 4 	 et cent c
economic activity, reaching up to 67 per cent in the
case of the Netherlands. The involvement of the state
in economic management and development is therefore a
common phenomenon in both developed and developing
countries. The emphasis on economic growth and economic
independence helps the national bourgeoisie and
enhances national sovereignty.
The involvement of the state in economic management and
development and in infrastructure development in
Botswana is a long term strategy by the petty bourgeois
who control the post-colonial state, to create what
they describe as "favourable conditions for private
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sector development". This means securing conditions for
private capital accumulation. This is what makes the
Botswana state a capitalist state. The state was
"capitalist" in the sense that it has structural links
with the economically dominant classes, and because it
is actually helping nurture private capital
accumulation through schemes such as TGLP and FAP. The
state was also capitalist, first because it happens to
be largest single employer of labour; secondly, as a.
partner with international capital it was involved in
the valorisation of capital. The form of the Botswana
state as a capitalist state is, however, revealed in
its relation to labour. This is the point to which I
now turn.
132
NOTES and REFERENCES.
1. The traditional Tswana society was comprised of
several merafe (sometimes called tribe, nation or
kingdom), each living in large villages within a given
geographical space described as kgaolo or district.
Each morafe was headed by a Kgosi (also called a
chief or a king), or a presidential monarch with
executive powers. The social patterns and institutions
of all Batswana, regardless of the geographical space
they occupy, are similar.
2. See the Bechuanaland Protectorate Credit Sales to
Natives Proclamation No 38 promulgated on 3rd August,
1923.
3. Transitional Plan for National Development, 1966,
p3.
4. National Development Plan 5. p 2-5.
5. Needless to say,it is an understatement to say that
Botswana's take off for industrial development has
come very late in the day.Most of the developed
capitalist countries started their industrialisation
about 150 years ago.For instance Britain started in
the 1790's. Other countries like France started in the
1830's, USA	 in the 1840's, Germany 1850's; Japan,
1870's; and Canada, 1890's. Amongst developing
countries are Argentina (1935), Turkey (1937) China and
India (1952)
6. Seretse Khama's address to the workers at Selibe
Pikwe, 19th, December, 1975.
7. Botswana Development Corporation Annual Reports,
1988
8. Annual Report, op cit.
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CHAPTER 5.
The Post-Colonial Wages Policy.
5.0 Introduction.
Capitalism is predicated on the institutional
separation of the polity from the economy in such a way
that the state appears autonomous or removed from the
economic processes on the ground. These economic
processes, however, depend upon specific modes of state
intervention in the economy, such as infrastructural
development, and other conditions that the apparently
autonomous state provides. The inability of capitalism
to guarantee its economic self-generation, and the
reliance of the state on the revenues from private
capital imply a symbiotic relationship between the
state and capital. It is this structural link between
the state and capital that reveals the state as a
capitalist state.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse specific
mechanisms used by the Botswana state to secure pre-
conditions of existence of capital accumulation in the
post-colonial era. The state set about this task first
formulating a wages policy that made otswana a low
wage economy. The state also created the necessary
state apparatuses for the monitoring and implementation
of this policy. It was this low wages policy that
revealed the Botswana state as a capitalist. It is
argued that though this low wages policy may have led
to a higher per income capita and facilitated the
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economic growth, it also led to very unequal income
distribution and the maintenance of poverty wages for
the majority of wage earners in Botswana.
5.1 Post-Colonial Wages Policy (1972-1990).
As already indicated, at the time of independence
Botswana was an economically backward and poor country.
Soon after Independence, the state embarked on a policy
of industrialisation and rapid economic growth. The
National Development Plan (1970-75) stated that the
major economic goals for the country were: Ci) to
secure the fastest possible rate of economic growth and
to secure a rapid expansion of employment opportunities
and (ii) to achieve financial independence, such that
recurrent Government expenditure is covered by revenue
generated within the country.
In 1970, Professor Dharam Ghai, a Nairobi based
economist, was engaged to study Botswana's economic
position and to make necessary recommendations. The
consultant's terms of reference were:
To study the present structure and level of
salaries, in Botswana, and to draft a long term
wages policy, consonant with the National
Development Plan. The wages policy should
include criteria for establishing recommended
wage structure, minimum wage levels and wage
differentials.The expert must bear in mind
Botswana's need to retain a competitive
economic	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 its
neighbours, and that labour 	 costs are a
critical aspect of this problem [1]
Ghai noted that Eotswana was a very poor country, even
by standards of developing countries in Africa, which
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themselves were among the poorest in the world. Ghai
pointed out that the 1968 figures show that the country
had a per capita income of only R67.00, and that if the
salaries of expatriates were discounted, the per capita
income would come down to a mere R50.00. Since the
economic objectives were already clearly set out in
the NiJP, the consultant advised that Botswana could
take one of two options: either to have a small but
relatively highly paid labour force in the modern
formal sector, or a larger but lowly paid labour force.
He argued that:
socially higher wages will have the effect of
reducing employment, at a given level of
income, forcing employers to use labour force
more efficiently, leading to higher
productivity per employee; lead to a reduction
in the labour force due to mechanisation and
other labour saving devices; stimulate
migration from rural areas [and that] high
costs of labour will lower profitability of
investment, and lead to reduced investment
through reduction in the inflow of foreign
capital; retard the industrial development of
the country and limit the expansion of exports
where prices are determined in the world
market.
The second choice was one that:
will have the opposite effect to those of the
high wage economy. It will lead to a less
efficient use of labour, with lower
productivity, higher volume of employment,
lower unemployment, lower rural-urban income
gap, reduced migration from rural ares, higher
levels of investment, and a more rapid
expansion of the quantity and quality of public
services [2]
Ghai further recorrirnended that in order to stop wages in
what he called "privileged highly capital intensive
industries to rise to excessively higher levels", the
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government should seek powers to approve all wage
agreements. Most of Ghai's recommendation were accepted
by the government, and in 1972 were translated into a
wages policy [3]
The wages policy stated that because there are certain
special skills that are vital to the economy, there
should be no competition for manpower amongst various
sectors of the economy. In other words, salaries and
wages should not follow the law of supply and demand.
It was felt that high wages offered by one sector of
the economy or by a particular employer will affect
the allocation of skilled labour by attracting workers
to that sector or employer, thereby cretix.g
in other sectors or enterprises. This situation was
found to be undesirable [4] . The state took steps to
ensure that the public and private sectors do not enter
into what was regarded as "unprofitable competition for
scarce resources". The policy emphasised that there
should not be any competition in the various sectors of
the economy for the inadequate pooi of trained workers
as this would force up wages and salary levels without
necessarily improving labour productivity [5].
To this end, the government moved on to fix minimum
wages for the unskilled labour force and maximum levels
for the skilled labour force. According to the wages
policy, minimum wages in the urban areas would be
equal to the average rural income of farmers, with an
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allowance for any differential in the overall costs of
urban living. In so far as salaries and wages for
skilled labour were concerned, the policy stated that:
Basic local wages and salary levels in the
private and parastatal sectors should generally
conform to, and on no account significantly
exceed those paid by government to comparable
grades of public employees. . .Government will
review wages and salaries in the public sector
on a regular basis, and the private sector and
parastatals sectors should not anticipate the
outcome of such reviews by granting premature
increases [6]
Though the wage and salary reviews to were supposed to
take into consideration such factors as economic
conditions prevailing at the particular time, proven
increases in the cost of living and increases in
labour productivity, the wages policy emphasised that
there could be no guarantee that wages and salaries
would be increased in step with inflation. This
"formula" remained the point of reference in all
matters of wage and salary determination in Botswana.
This policy lasted from 1972 to 1990, and marks a
period I characterise as the second phase of Botswana's
peripheral capitalist development.
From the time of the inception of the wages policy in
1972, until 1990, the state was the wage leader, and
public officer's wages and salaries were used as bench
marks to determine wages and salary structures
throughout the economy, influencing the wages and
salary structure in the private and parastatals
organisations. The state was also the largest single
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employer. The share of the state in total employment at
the time of the inception of the first incomes policy
was 33 percent. After increasing in the mid 1970's, the
state's share fell back to 33 percent in 1981. In 1985,
the state's share reached its peak at 39 percent, but
after 1985, with the private and parastatals sector
employment growing rapidly, the state's share declined
to 34 percent [7]
The question of the cost of public sector employment in
most developing countries has always been a very thorny
issue. The state develops a direct interest in
regulating industrial relations and outcomes, and its
predominance in the economy leads to the process of
collective bargaining becoming "trilateral" instead
"bilateral" in that wage determination is not a matter
for trade unions and management alone. The intention of
the petty bourgeois who control the state is to keep
the cost of the public sector employment deliberately
low so as to pay for infrastructure development.
In many developing countries this has become one way of
influencing wage trends: the state exerts indirect
pressure on the general wage level because of the
preponderance of the public sector employment, and most
undertakings model their wage structure on the public
sector wages and salary structure, and the decisions
taken by the state have a substantial effect on the
level of remuneration in the private sector. Its
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example becomes the standard bearer for the regulation
of employment in other sectors. (Sandbrook and Cohen,
1975; Caire,1977; Bean 1985)
As I have noted, infrastructure development cannot be
seen as an act of magnanimity or neutrality on the part
of the state because such infrastructure development
goes to benefit a minority of those who have the means
of production. What is more, infrastructure development
is a function that the state performs to secure the
general conditions of economic growth and development.
Under the conditions of capital accumulation, such
infrastructure development, and the attendant wage
policy will largely benefit owners of the means of
production. This further reveals the structural links
that exist between the post-colonial state and the
capitalist economy.
5.2 Framework For Implementation.
The White Paper (1972) advised that if the proposed
wages policy was to be enforced according to
government's wishes and intentions, there was a vital
necessity to monitor its implementation and to
establish machinery to coordinate and elaborate the
policy in all its details. To this end a tripartite
structure with token representation of workers were
created. This was the National Employment, Manpower and
Incomes Council (NEMIC). NEMIC comprised seven
permanent secretaries, four members from the private
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sector, two members from the trade union movement and
one member from public sector employees. Since its
creation in 1972, NEMIC has been under the
chairmanship of the Assistant Minister in the Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) [81.
The terms of reference of NEMIC were (i) to review the
overall trends in incomes, prices and profits in the
light of national policy and make recommendations as
appropriate; (ii) to review Government's 	 plans for
education and vocational training in the light of
present and projected national skilled manpower
requirements and make recommendations to the Minister
of Education. NEMIC made recommendations to the
government on proposed salaries and wages in the public
sector. Government would then announce its award to the
public sector employees. The private sector would then
adopt the same percentage increase with little or no
consultation with the trade unions (Frimpong and
Olsen, 1985)
NEMIC's terms of reference, however, did not contain
the mechanisms of determining wages and salaries, but
could only pronounce on matters of economic policy.
Since the question was beyond the terms of reference of
NEMIC, another structure, was created to process and
approve private and parastatal sector wages and
salaries. This machinery was the Wages Policy Committee
(WPC). Like NEMIC, it was also chaired by the Assistant
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Minister of Finance and Development Planning and its
secretary was a senior economist in the Employment
Policy Unit, MFDP. But unlike NEMIC, members of WPC
were all senior state officials and there was no
representative from the private sector employers or
trade unions. The membership comprised the following:
(1) Secretary for Economic Affairs, MFDP.
(2) Administrative Secretary, Office of the President.
(3) Deputy Director, DPSM,
(4) Deputy Permanent Secretary, MLHA'
(5) Commissioner of Labour.
(6) Job Analyst, DPSM.
The terms of reference of the WPC were: Ci) to review
proposals for increases in wages rates in the private
and parastatals sector, and to determine the extent to
which these may be justified in the light of the
incomes and localisation policies; (ii) to advise
employers of any modifications or additions to these
proposals that may be necessary; (iii) to advise the
Minister concerned on the need to establish wages
councils in any particular sector, and to review
existing wage regulation orders.
According to Coiclough and Olsen (1985) the WPC was
established as a "watch-dog" committee to monitor the
implementation of the wages policy, and ensure that
the private sector wages and salaries do not
significantly exceed those being paid in the public
sector. In July, 1974, following Wage Regulation Orders
promulgation, five wage councils were established to
supplement WPC. The five wages councils were:
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1. Building and Construction Wages Council,
2. Hotel and Catering Wages Council
3. Garage and Motor Trade Wages Council,
4. Wholesale and Retail, and Distributive Trades Wages
Council,
5. Manufacturing Trades Wages Council.
These councils, which were in effect WPC sub-
committees, met regularly to establish minimum rates
and hours of work for each of the five sectors. In
addition, the councils laid down regulations for annual
leave, overtime rates and public holidays. The councils
were consolidated by the 1982 Employment Act which
established a single Minimum Wages Advisory Board in
place of the five wages councils (Coiclough and
Olsen, 1985)
It would seem that the WPC has been effective in its
"mission" of wages and salary cuts. According to
Colciough and Olsen, between 1974 and 1980, WPC
reviewed the wages and salaries of some 30 private and
parastatals organizations including major mining
houses, commercial banks and a number of the large
manufacturing, retail and hotel organisations,
accounting for about 40 percent of non governmental
formal sector employment, and succeeded in bringing
basic wages and salaries into line with government's
and in accordance with the wages policy. In one case,
the WPC reduced a company's wage bill by about P78,000
a month.
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The cornerstone of the wages policy, and one which the
WPC adhered to very strictly, was the so-called job-to-
job comparison, in which the government insisted that
comparability must be maintained between a job in the
public sector and a "similar" job in the private
sector. The job-to-job comparison seldom took into
account factors such as technical complexity,
productivity, specialised nature of the job or its
level of responsibility (Presidential Commission,
1990). According to Frimpong and Olsen (1985) although
wages and salaries in some sectors like mining,
railway, meat processing and banking were re-negotiated
biennially, such agreement had to be vetted by WPC.
In its attempt to augment capital accumulation, the
state tended to be too enthusiastic and protective
towards the private sector. For example, Frimpong and
Olsen (1985) point out that in 1978, the Banks
management had to withdraw a salary deal with the
banks' supervisory and middle managerial staff under
pressure from the WPC. In 1983 the state rejected
recommendations of a review of the wages policy in
which the consultants had recommended that the
government should abandon the job-job comparison and
allow the private sector to determine salary grading
and structure for specific groups within approved
salary bands. According to the Presidential Commission,
recommendations, were rejected on the grounds that
their implementation will vitiate the wages policy [9].
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The enthusiasm to protect and nurture private capital
accumulation was, however, not always in the best
interests of individual accumulators because the policy
was applied strictly, without reference to a firm's
profitability or ability to pay, and compete. The
constraints of the policy were highlighted in a
conversation I had with one personnel manager of a
wholesale company. According to the personnel manager,
his company, Sefalana Sa Botswana, had advertised for
the position of a driver for one of their articulated
lorries. The advertisement stated the salary to be
offered. According to the manager, among the letters
that they received responding to the advertisement was
one from the secretary of the Wages Policy Committee,
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, objecting
to the salary offer on the basis that it contravened
the wage policy. According to the manager, what was
even surprising to them as the management was that the
government had objected without knowing what the job
actually entailed. As the manager pointed out:
The government objected to a driver being given
P900.00 per month, just because he is a driver.
But this driver was going to be driving a
truck worth hundreds of thousands of Pula, and
crossing the border carrying goods worth with
millions of Pula from South Africa. The company
was prepared to pay the driver that amount
because we did not want him to disappear with
our merchandise [10].
This incident shows the extent to which the state was
prepared to go to safeguard the interests of capital as
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a whole, even in cases in which such intervention was
not in the best interests of a particular capitalist.
The significance of the WPC as a state apparatus
charged with the responsibility of monitoring the wages
policy was not only in the fact that it was staffed
exclusively by senior state officials but that it
excluded the people whose interests it was supposed to
serve, the private sector employers, thus keeping the
competing interests of individual capital from the
state arena.
Several years later the Presidential Commission
(1990:66-69) observed that the wages policy had
restricted labour mobility, killed incentives, and
impeded the development of collective bargaining. It
pointed out that the policy was too rigid for the
dynamic economic developments in Botswana and advised
that greater flexibility in the setting of wages is a
necessary condition for expanding the quantity, quality
and efficient use of professional and technical skills.
5.3	 Salary Review Commissions.
In addition to the institutional structures that were
set up to monitor the observance of the wages policy,
the government had constantly reviewed the wages and
salaries of public sector employees, in keeping with
the spirit of the 1972 incomes policy. This was that
government will review public sector wages and salaries
on a regular basis, taking into consideration economic
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conditions of that time and proven increases in the
cost of living. From the time of the inception of the
wages policy, until the early 1980's, wages and
salaries of public sector employees were reviewed
through a series of Salary Review Commissions.
The first of such reviews was the 1974 Makgekgenene
Salaries Commission. This was followed in 1976 by the
Chiepe Salaries Commission. In 1978 there was the Mmusi
Salaries Commission, which was followed by the Meswele
Salaries Commission in 1980. The last salaries
commission was the Gasenneiwe Salaries Commission in
1982. The first four salaries review commissions were
chaired by cabinet ministers and the last one by the
chairman of National Development Bank. Like the NEMIC
and the WPC, the commissions were also dominated by top
civil servants, or managers of private sector and
parastatals organizations, again with only a token
representation from the labour movement. Since 1982 the
system of appointing salaries review commissions was
abandoned and replaced by a system of annual across the
board percentage increases, or annual inflation
adjustment (Coiclough and Olsen 1985).
In 1989, the government appointed a Presidential
Commission to Review the 1972 wages policy. The
Commission was chaired by Minister GKT Chiepe and out
of the eighteen members of the Commission, only four
were from the labour movement. The rest of the members
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of the commission were politicians, senior civil
servants,	 government consultants,	 private sector
representatives and managers of parastatal
organisations [11]. The Commission presented its
findings in 1990. One of its major recommendation was
that the 1972 wages policy should be abandoned and that
the government must deregulate the labour market. This
marked the beginning of a new phase in Botswana's
peripheral capitalist development. The analysis of the
implications of this phase for the labour movement is
undertaken in the final chapter. For the moment I would
like to turn to a discussion of the effects and impact
of these economic growth and wages policies or inccte
distribution and social inequality.
5.4 Income Distribution and Social Inequality.
It is characteristic of bourgeois economists to measure
economic performance of a country only in terms of
Gross Domestic Product and per capita income levels.
Countries with higher levels of GDP or per capita
income are seen as performing well economically. It is
important, however, to realise that neither of these
measurements adequately addresses questions of
distribution or social equality (Thirlwal 1989;
Nafzifer 1988). For example, GDP is a measure of the
total output of goods and services which encompasses
income earned within a country's boundaries. What can
be misleading for a Third World country like Botswana
is that such a measure includes income earned even by
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foreign residents and companies, even if this income is
transferred abroad. At the same time, per capita income
is a measure of the average social wealth and does
not address the problem of distribution.
It is therefore important that these measures are used
with caution, especially because both can grow side by
side with growing social inequalities. In other words,
social inequalities and poverty are not incompatible
with high levels of growth of the GDP. Whilst higher
levels of GDP and per capita income may make a country
look respectable on paper, this does not necessarily
mean the position of its citizens is any better. For
instance, as Table 5.1 illustrates, although in all the
sectors of the Botswana economy, people with the
highest salaries are expatriates, the calculation of
both the GDP and per capita income does not take this
into account. Consequently those not familiar with the
political economy of Botswana may expect the higher
levels of GDP and per capita income to reflect higher
levels of incomes. But as the table shows, the average
monthly earnings for Batswana workers was a paltry P566
per month compared to the average earning for an
expatriate at P2,762 a month.
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TABLE 5.1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE EARNINGS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND CITIZENSHIP OF EMPLOYEE
(MARCH, 1991)
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	 CITIZEN	 AVERAGE	 NON-CITIZEN	 AVERAGE
EMPLOYEE	 MONTHLY	 EMPLOYEE	 MONTHLY
EARNING	 EARNING
(PULA)	 (PULA)
Agriculture	 6,499	 216	 177	 3,575
Mining & Quarrying	 7,447	 733	 359	 5,850
Manufacturing	 24,803	 456	 1,220	 3,478
Electricity & Water	 2,397	 984	 115	 5,317
Construction	 31,272	 424	 2,558	 2,119
Commerce	 39,757	 378	 1,288	 2,398
Transport &
	
8,698	 761	 392	 2,216
Communication
Finance & Business	 14,352	 821	 1,792	 3,457
Services
Community &
Personal Services
	
7,931	 473	 675	 1,303
Education	 1,925	 869	 615	 3,562
Sub-totals:
Private	 133,828	 462	 8,673	 2,642
Parastatal	 11,253	 926	 521	 5,108
Central Government 	 62,466	 737	 12,079	 2,677
Local Government	 12,866	 596	 108	 2,170
TOTAL ALL SECTORS	 211,413	 566	 11,381	 2,762
SOURCE: Labour Statistics Bullentin 1991; Molutsi, Mogalakwe and Mufune, 1992
Though one of the guiding principles of the 1972 wages
policy was to achieve social justice and equitable
distribution of the country's income and wealth, in
practice, this proved to be nothing but a platitude.
What seems to be the case is that income inequality in
Botswana has increased as the country became richer. In
Eotswana, as in most peripheral capitalist economies,
the problem of distribution emanates from the pattern
of economic growth, rather than the rate of growth.
Though the levels of per capita income have actually
increased substantially since independence in most
Third World countries, the available evidence suggests
that growth and development that has taken place has
served largely to benefit the richest 20 per cent of
the population. Usually income inequality is considered
high if the income share of the bottom 40 percent of
the population is less than 12 percent of the GNP
(Sandbrook 1982; Thiriwall 1989).
The first income distribution survey in post-
independent Botswana was in 1974, when the Central
Statistics Office (CSO) carried out a Rural Income
Distribution Survey, commonly known RIDS (1974), the
results of which have been extensively used in the
debate about Botswana's income distribution. According
to RIDS, in 1974, about ten years after independence,
the poorest 40 percent of the rural households had
less than 12 percent of the national income whilst the
richest 20 percent of the rural households had 58
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percent of the national income. The Gini Coefficient,
the measure of inequality, was 0.052. Whilst this could
be explained away as a colonial legacy that had left
the country economically stagnant for eighty years,
income inequality has steadily increased.
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TABLE 5.2
CASH INCOME DISTRIBUTION
ALL	 AREAS
HEAD OF	 HOUSEHOLD
PULA PER MONTH
	
Male	 Female
%	 cum%
	
<0	 0.5	 0.2	 0.4	 0.4
	
0	 4.5	 7.3	 5.8	 6.2
	
0-	 25	 18.2	 21.6	 19.8	 26.0
	
25-	 50	 10.7	 13.3	 11.9	 37.9
	
50-	 75	 9.1	 11.9	 10.4	 48.3
	
75-	 100	 4.4	 6.1	 5.2	 53.5
	
100-	 125	 6.0	 7.0	 6.4	 59.9
	
125-	 150	 4.3	 5.9	 5.0	 64.9
	
150-	 200	 7.4	 6.5	 7.0	 71.9
	
200-	 250	 4.8	 4.2	 4.5	 76.4
	
250-	 300	 4.1	 3.2	 3.7	 80.1
	
300-	 400	 4.8	 3.4	 4.1	 84.2
	
400-	 500	 4.7	 2.4	 3.6	 87.8
	
500-	 750	 6.4	 5.1	 5.8	 93.6
	
750- 1000	 2.6	 0.7	 1.7	 95.3
	
1000- 2000	 5.1	 1.2	 3.3	 98.6
	
>2000	 2.3	 0.2	 1.4	 100.0
	
all	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICES HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURE SURVEY
198 5/8 6
In 1985, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) conducted
a more comprehensive national income distribution
survey, which covered both rural and urban areas. The
survey, Household Income and Expenditure Survey
1985/86, (hereinafter HIES) showed that the gap between
the rich and the poor in Botswana had continued to
grow, and had widened in the previous fifteen years,
despite impressive growth in the economy, as measured
by per capita income.
According HIES, the overall distribution of income
(that is, cash and income in kind) was such that the
poorest 40 percent of the population earned only 10,7
percent of the total national income; the next 40
percent earned 27.8 percent of the national income; and
the richest 20 percent of the population earned 61.5
percent of the total income. The Gini coefficient in
1986 was 0.56, up by four points from the 1974 level.
HIES revealed further that 12 percent of the national
income went to only 1 percent of the population, and
that 35 percent of the national income goes to only 5
percent of the population and further that the lower 10
percent of the population has only 3 percent of the
national income.
HIES also analysed income distribution by households.
The survey revealed that 73.9 percent of urban
households had an income of less than P500 per month,
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while on the other hand a mere 4.4 percent of the urban
households had income of P2000 or above a month. This
income inequality was greater in the rural households,
where only 0.3 percent of the households earned P2000
or more a month. Altogether, only 1.4 percent of all
the households in the country earned more than P2000
per month.
An independent study by the BFTU argues that the rate
of profit repatriation has been increasing over the
years. The report shows that there has been a heavy
annual flow of profit income from the economy, and this
flow has increased from 33.4 percent in 1978/79 to 43
percent in 1985/86. According to this study:
In 1978/79, for every one Pula entering the
economy in foreign investments. 0.6 Pula was
returned in repatriated profits. By 1982/83,
the situation changed drastically to where
every Pula entering was met by 1.5 Pula
leaving. The situation continued to worsen
until the most recent period, 1985/86, where
for every one Pula in foreign investment in
Botswana, 2.2 Pula was returned to foreign
nations in repatriated profits [12].
There has been, however, a small minority of workers in
both the public and the private sector employment who
experienced an increase in real wages over the years
(Table 5.3 illustrates). This minority of workers, in
senior management positions netted an increase of
between 12 percent and 24 percent between 1982 and
1986. The majority of the workers at the bottom of the
rung comprising some 94,646 or about 58 percent private
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or parastatal employment, experienced a loss of minus
10.3 percent in real earnings in the same period.
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TABLE 5.3
AVERAGE MONTHLY REAL EARNINGS OF CITIZENS BY OCCUPATION (ALL SECTORS)
EXCLUDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Average real monthly
earnings (in constant
1980 prices)
no. of
persons	 1982	 1986
per cent
change
Professional and
Technical
Administrative and
Managerial
Clerical
Sales
Service
Other
12,109
1,551
11,915
7,487
11,415
50,169
288.75
362.47
181.33
99.91
97.32
117.26
324.40
450.3
190.66
110.97
91.29
105.13
12.4
24.2
5.2
11.1
-6.2
-10.3
Source: LABOUR STATISTICS BULLENTIN 1986
This pattern of income distribution is quite consistent
with the assumption often made that workers do not
deserve higher salaries because of their natural
propensity to consume (Sandbrook,1982). According to
this economic logic, it is in the interest of the
nation (meaning employers, traders and property owners)
that more income should accrue to people who can save
and invest. The rhetoric justifying this, as in most
developing countries has been the need to create
employment creation and promote national development.
And this has been reinforced by the argument that
higher wages and salaries will drive away investors
because Botswana will become a high wage economy. The
trade union movement has also tried unsuccessfully to
fight against this position, arguing that there is no
evidence to support the argument that low wages create
jobs for the unemployed, or deprive the peasantry of
income, and that profit is only a potential source of
investment, not an automatic source [13]. This fact is
of course illustrated by the conspicuous consumption of
the business community in Botswana [14]. There seems to
be very little evidence that high wages will have a
negative effect on economic development, reduce the
volume of employment, slow its growth as unskilled
labour becomes more expensive and employers seek to
economise in its use by substituting machines for
labour, while some firms find it impossible to pay the
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higher wage rates and are forced out of business (Caire
1977)
The Presidential Commission (1990:28) noted this
problem of high inequality in income distribution in
Botswana, but reacted in a way that sought to explain
away the problem, by just blandly stating that
comparative household income distribution show that
Botswana is not to dissimilar to that for the other
African countries for which data are presented, and
that income in these countries is fairly inequitably
distributed.
Though the Commission did not indicate where it stood
in connection with this issue, it is worth noting that
conventional development economics wisdom always takes
as a given that it is natural and consistent with laws
of development economics that there should be a high
unequal distribution of incomes in developing
countries. According to this conventional wisdom, owing
to the dual character of the developing countries
economies, inequality follows an inverted U-shaped
curve, first increasing, and eventually decreasing with
economic growth. This is supposed to have happened to
the now developed capitalist countries of Europe and
North America in their earlier phases of development.
This conventional wisdom suggests that productivity and
therefore incomes are highest in the modern sector than
in the traditional sector, and that as the modern
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sector expands, more and more people will be absorbed
into it, start getting better income as a result of
their participation in the modern sector, and gradually
the inverted U-shaped curve of income distribution
skews to the right, and income distribution will become
less unequal, very much like in the developed
capitalist countries, where inequality of income
distribution is relatively low (Nafziger 1990:102-115)
However, even in the developed capitalist countries,
the income share of the bottom 40 percent of the
population has less than 20 percent of the gross
national product Nafziger argues that there is no
guarantee that as the country develops, inequality in
income distribution will lessen. He identifies
Argentina and Brazil as examples of countries where
inequality in income distribution has not come down
despite economic growth; and Sri Lanka as an example of
countries where income inequality has declined despite
low income levels. As Nafziger argues, the inverted U-
shaped pattern of income distribution, even if assumed
historically correct, is not inevitable, but a
consequence of economic growth policies that place the
highest priority on growth, while incorrectly assuming
that profits will trickle down to the poor.
5.5 CONCLUSION.
The organising principle of capitalism is the
relationship between wage labour to capital within a
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system of generalised commodity production and exchange
in which the materials and equipment are combined with
labour to produce outputs (goods or services) which are
sold by their owners for a profit. To realise profit,
the owner of the means of production must exploit
labour, that is to say, reward labour below its value.
Exploitation of labour is defined as the ratio of
unpaid labour to paid labour.
In the foregoing analysis, it has been revealed that
the Botswana state, through the low wages policy, and
the state apparatuses that it created to monitor the
implementation of this wage policy, was at the same
time sustaining the process of private capitalist
accumulation. The Eotswana state is therefore not a
neutral state. It is situated in capitalism and
sustains its logic by the maintenance of a specific
pattern of relations of production. The state is
therefore implicated in the generation and
distribution of surplus value. The Botswana state's
structural links with the capitalist economy serve to
secure the conditions of existence of capitalism not
only through the maintenance of this pattern of
ownership, but also through the ideological
manipulation and political domination of the working
class. This is the point to which I now turn.
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CHAPTER 6.
THE CAPITALIST STATE AND TRADE UNIONS
INTRODUCTION.
Capitalism is not just about the production of things,
but it is simultaneously the production of social
relations and ideas about those relations (Braverman
1974; Aithusser 1977) . To understand this process, one
should look at growth in employment not only in
quantitative terms where workers are discussed as an
inert category or aggregate number of employees in a
factory, but as part of a dynamic social process that
entails definite social relations of production.
This chapter examines the perception and attitude of
the post-colonial petty bourgeois state elites about
the role of the trade unions in development. This
perception of and attitude to the role of trade unions
in development should be placed against the class
character and the form of the Botswana state as a
capitalist state. It is argued that in order to
alleviate the class contradictions that have been
engendered by the post-colonial economic growth
policies, the petty bourgois state elite responded by
an attempt to inculcate in the minds of the workers a
labour discipline that will remove or at least minimise
the threat posed by the working class to the process
of capital accumulation.
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I start by discussing the strategies of the post-
Independence state to restructure and remodel the trade
union movement, the formation of the Botswana
Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), the role played by
some international labour organisations in inculcating
the capitalist labour discipline, and the exhortations
of the petty bourgeois state elites to the trade union
movement to accept sacrifice in the interest of
"national development". I shall also refer to speeches
and policy statements by the first President of
Botswana, Seretse Khama, and some of his colleagues, on
the role of the trade unions in development.
These speeches emphasise what I call four principles of
industrial relations in Botswana: wage restraint,
industrial peace, political stability an natioral
development. These principles give vital clues to the
post-colonial state trade union philosophy and the
model of trade unions that have emerged in Botswana.
This model can be characterised as a "corporate
nationalist" model, with its stress on the commonality
of interests between the state, capital, and labour.
Political activism by the trade union movement is
discouraged, strikes actions though legal, are
virtually impossible (Kraus 1979a).
The state has adopted a paternalistic attitude in the
name of "national interest" and "industrial peace" and
"social justice" by providing the so-called floor of
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rights and minimum legislation to protect workers. All
these points will be elaborated on in the chapters that
follow this one. Suffice here to point out that the
measures taken by the state against the trade unions
were motivated by the desire on the part of the state
elite to neutralise trade unions as possible centres of
opposition to the new economic and social policies
envisaged by these elites (Gladstone 1980)
These forms of control used by the state and employers
are often referred to in the current literature in
labour studies as "habituation". Habituation is a
process embarked upon to make the working class
acquiescent or supportive of the exploitative social
relations of production. It refers to the process of
forming a "new habit" in the worker, that is, adjusting
the worker to the labour process in its capitalist
form, in order to overcome resistance (Braverman 1974;
Crisp 1984; Cohen and Henderson 1991).
The state, as the guarantor of private capital
accumulation, seeks to control labour and to maxirnise
surplus value extraction through the control of wages.
This proceeds through making or persuading the workers
to accept the system of unequal distribution of the
product of their labour and unequal distribution of
effort and authority in the labour process (Crisp
1984:1-7) .	 Habituation	 also	 involves	 "interior
determination",	 a	 process	 which	 involves	 the
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transmission of elements of culture and ideology which
become accepted or even generated by the institutions
of proletarian culture itself. For example, work
orientations that inculcates "pride" in one's work,
such as the machismo of male workers, state welfarist
strategies such as pension, sickness benefits, improved
working conditions that include recreational
facilities, and the use of "model worker" (Cohen and
Henderson 1991:37-40)
For the purpose of this chapter, I will extend the
concept of habituation to include strategies of labour
control such as restructuring and remodelling of trade
unions, state's ideology or conception of the role of
trade union in "national development", in so far as
that can be seen as an attempt to gain the support or
at least the acquiescence of the workers for the state
defined economic goals. Even though these do not take
place at the point of production, they do affect the
behaviour of workers at that level. However, I hold the
view that habituation can not succeed entirely as it is
often resisted by the target group, the workers,
through various strategies (Braverman 1974; Crisp 1984;
Cohen and Henderson 1991; See also Chapter Nine).
6.1 Restructuring and Control. The Early Phase.
When Botswana became independent in 1966, there were
only four registered trade unions: the Francistown
African Workers Union (FAEU) and the Bechuanaland
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Protectorate Workers Unions (3PWTJ) . The two trade
unions supported the Botswana Democratic Party. On the
other hand there was the Bechuanaland Trade Union
Congress (BTUC) and the Bechuanaland General Workers
Union (BGWO) . These two trade unions were aligned to
the Botswana Peoples Part (BPP). These trade unions
were therefore split ideological lines. The pro pro-BDP
trade unions were more inclined to pure and simple
trade unionism, whilst the pro BPP trade unions
espoused a more radical nationalist line (Motshidis±
1975). The squabbles within the trade union movement
continued to fester, and by 1968 there were about 20
splinter unions with only a handful registered under
the Trade Unions and Trades Disputes Proclamation (see
Chapter 7). According to Motshidisi, most of these
unions existed in name only, and the whole trade union
movement had degenerated into what he called "personal
fiefdorns".
In 1968, three years after Botswana's independence,
there was an outbreak of waves of spontaneous wildcat
strike actions and work stoppages in such places as
Franscistown, Lobatse, and Gaborone. More than twenty
of these "industrial actions" of one sort or another
were recorded in a period of two years. The major ones
involved meat workers in Lobatse and government manual
workers in Gaborone. Most of the grievances were about
alleged unfair dismissals, unfair labour practices and
racial discrimination [1]. As I have noted in Chapter
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4, at this time, most businesses in Botswana were owned
by either Indians or whites. Trade trade union
consciousness therefore took the form of anti-racist
protests (see Chapter 8 below)
These strike waves must have sensitized the post-
independence state to the inadequacy of the existing
labour legislation [2] . To begin with, the state found
itself faced with a myriad of organisations and union
leaders in any trade dispute. These waves of industrial
actions and political factionalism within the trade
union movement prompted the state to take its first
steps to regulate labour by introducing two labour
laws, the Trades Disputes Act and the Trade Unions Act.
The two Act were enacted to "make provisions for the
registration and control of trade unions" [31.
The Trade Disputes Act laid down new procedures for
settlement of disputes and defined circumstances under
which a legal strike could occur. The Trades Unions Act
introduced the concept of industrial unionism and
stipulated a number of conditions to be met before a
trade union could be registered and become a legal
organisation. Among these conditions were that if a
union that represents similar interests already exists
and has been registered, no other union can be
registered. The Act also gave registered trade unions
automatic right of recognition if 30 workers or at
least 25 percent of the labour force in the same trade
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or calling, should want to form a union. As a result of
this Act most of the unions were forced to amalgamate
in order to meet the requirements of the new Act, and
some simply withered away (Motshidisi 1975). By October
1971, five years after Botswana's independence, only
eight unions from the original 30 unions remained.
These were :-
1. National Union of Government Manual Workers
(NIJGMU)
2. Botswana Commercial and General Workers Union(BCGWtJ)
3. Botswana Meat Industries Workers Union(BIIWU)
4. Botswana Construction Workers Union (BCWLT)
5. Botswana Local Government Workers Union(BLGWU)
6. Botswana Mine Workers Union (BMWtJ)
7. Botswana Bank Employees Union (BBEU)
8. Botswana Railway Workers Union (BRWtJ)
All of these unions, except the BCGWIJ, were
restructured and remodelled as horizontal industrial
unions in line with the requirements of the new Act
(Motshidisi 1975; Frimpong and Olsen 1985). Only the
BCGWtJ, which organised in the hotel, retail and
wholesale sector, was allowed to remain a general
union. This restructuring, and remodelling of trade
unions along industrial lines and the increased state
control of trade unions was very much similar to the
measures taken against the trade unions in other
developing nations like Zambia, Kenya and Ghana. The
important point to note is that these countries were
also one party states, or as in the case of Ghana, a
military	 government.	 But	 notwithstanding	 these
differences in the form of the government in these
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countries, the actions of the post-colonial states in
these counties were very similar. In Botswama, as it
was the case in these countries, it was the fragmented
nature and enterprise orientation of the pre-colonial
period that made it difficult for the state to
exercise any control over these multiple trade unions.
The state responded by restructuring, consolidating,
remodelling trade unions in order to maximise its
control and influence in the trade union movement.
These measures, however, did not completely eradicate
the trade union ideological rivalry of the pre-
independence era. In January, 1968, the Commissioner
of Labour, who was also the Registrar of Trade Unions,
Mr Peter Mrnusi called a meeting of all registered trade
unions in Botswana [4]. At this meeting, the
Commissioner of Labour argued that the continued
existence of ideological rivalries in the trade union
movement was indicative of a lack of elementary trade
union education on the part of the workers. It was
decided by the government, through the Commissioner of
Labour, that trade union education programme should be
started without any delay (Motshidisi 1975). To this
end, a labour education committee, called National
Labour Training Committee was set up 	 with G.M.K.
Mmusi, a representative of Botswana Federation of
Labour, as its chairman, and K. Motshidisi, a
representative of Bechuanaland Trade Union Congress, as
the Secretary. The Committee was also requested by the
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Commissioner of Labour to look into the question of
unity in the labour movement. It was also resolved that
unity talks between BTUC and BFL should be initiated.
But while the efforts of the Mmusi-Motshidisi coalition
were still under way to find an internal solution, the
government sought and received technical assistance
from the American African Labour Centre (AALC)
(Frimpong and Olsen 1985).
In 1971, AALC gave funds for the construction of the
Botswana Trade Union Education Centre (ETUEC) offices.
The Centre, which was staffed by kALC technical
advisers, was charged with the responsibIlity of
organising a trade union educational programme and to
work towards the establisbment o one national centre.
Thus the AALC technical assistance effectively removed
the task of building the trade union movement from
indigenous	 people,	 namely	 the	 Mmusi-Motshidisi
coalition. Between 1972 and 1974, over 2,000 trade
unionist participated in seminars and workshops
organised under the auspices of this project [5]. One
other area of AALC involvement in Botswana, like
elsewhere in the Third World, was through "leadership
training" courses in the United States, and several
members of the EFTU executive committees, have at one
time or another, been to the United States for a
variety of trade union leadership courses The AALC's
budget for trade union education for Botswana for the
172
year ended 1975 was US$61,275. (Thompson and Larson
1978)
6.2 Restructuring and Control. The Later Phase.
At the same time the state started to put pressure on
the trade unions to come together in a federation. For
instance Seretse Kharna, the first President of
Botswana, argued very strongly for the restructuring
and remodelling of the trade unions in Botswana.
Speaking at the ceremony to mark the opening of the
Eotswana Trade Union Education Centre (BTUEC), a trade
union centre run by the AALC, he stressed the need for
a central body representing all the registered trade
union in Botswana. He argued:
This should eliminate the dangers of rival
unions competing against each other in
destructive militancy and not protecting the
interests of their members in a responsible
way. The existence of industrial unions should
also help to eliminate the damaging personal
rivalries which used to handicap trade union
development [61
It was only in 1977 that the trade union movement in
Botswana came together to form the Botswana Federation
of Trade Unions (BFTU). Unlike in counties like Zambia,
Kenya, and Ghana, the formation of the national centre
was not imposed by the state, nor is it compulsory for
trade unions in Botswana to affiliate to EFTU. In fact
the BFTU initially comprised only four trade unions:
the Railway Workers Union, the Mine Workers Union, the
Bank Employees Union and the Diamond Sorters and
Valuators Union. However this apparently liberal policy
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does not depart from the main argument that the
creation of the BFTU was form of state control
envisaged by the state, as the following discussion
will elucidate.
The formation of the first BFTU executive committee in
1977 saw a power struggle between the remnants of BFL
and BTUC. A former Secretary General of BFTU has
pointed out that he and his colleagues had for some
time suspected that AALC and FEF were secretly involved
in lobbying and funding the elections for position of
the chairman and secretary general of the new
federation [7]. It would seem that some members of the
ruling party, AALC and FEF, especially one J Heifer,
who was the AALC Chief Representative for Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland, and a Dr Adams, FEF
representative in Botswana, who was also rumoured to be
a political adviser to the ruling BDP, were worried by
the influence of radical elements of from BTUC.
According to Mabiletsa, there were rumours that BDP-
AALC-FEF circle had a slate of candidates for the BFTU
leadership and that the top jobs in the federation,
that of the national chairrnn and the secretary general
were earmarked for BDP leaning unionists, namely
Gaotihaetse Matihabaphiri and Pelotelele Tlhaodi. After
some intense lobbying, the EDP candidates got the jobs.
This victory by the pro-BDP unionists led to another
round of power struggle as the radicals resurrected
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the old rivalries and campaigned among the rank and
file against the two. Matlhabaphiri was at this time
the chairman of the Diamond Sorters Union. Within about
six months of the election of the EFTU executive
committee, the federation almost split up, with the
rank and file members saying that they did not want
BDP party activists leading the federation, and by mid
1978, there were two "Secretary Generals", namely
Tlhaodi from BDP-AALC-FEF camp, and Ditiro Saleshando,
from the more radical faction.
This problem continued to fester until the end of the
Matihabaphiri and Tlhaodi term of office in 1980, when
the radical faction amended the BFTU's constitution,
removed the clauses that prohibited them from electing
their leadership in full freedom and elected a new
executive [8]. However, the Registrar of Trade Unions
refused to recognize the new executive on a
technicality, saying that their elections were illegal
because the elections were carried out before
amendments to the EFTU'S constitution were notified to
the Registrar as required by the Trade Unions Act. New
elections were held, and Ronald Baipidi, the present
secretary general, was chosen as a compromise
candidate. Matlhabaphiri later became a specially
elected Member of Parliament and Tlhaodi became a
specially elected councillor in Gaborone Town Council
[91
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Having delineated some of the problems that bedevilled
Botswana's trade union movement in its formative years,
especially during the immediate post-independence
years, and the reaction of the post-colonial petty
bourgeois state elite to increase its control of the
labour movement, I now turn to the role played by some
international labour organisation assisting trade union
development in Botswana. This is important to mention,
even if briefly, since their ideological position gives
us important clues about trade unionism in Botswana
and has implications for the direction of the trade
union movement in the country.
There are at the moment three international trade union
organisations operating in Botswana. These are the
ICFTU, a trade union internationaL thoe. 	 cteL
of f ice is in Harare; the African-American Labour Centre
(AALC), which I have already alluded to, and the
Fredrick Ebert Stiftung (FEF) a German organisation
with links to the Social Democratic Party [10]. The
WFTU presence in Botswana has never really been that
significant, and the ICFTU is not very active and less
involved in the day to day affairs of BFTU. The most
active of these organisatioris in Botswana today are the
AALC and the FEF [11].
The role of AALC in the trade union movement in
Botswana and in the Third World trade unions should be
examined within the context of the cold war rivalry
176
that plagued the international trade union movement. As
Thompson and Larson (1978) argue, the Third World
unions have been a site of clashes and rivalry between
the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU for the control of Third
World trade unions. Horbart Spalding a researcher on
the foreign policy of the American labour movement has
argued that:
AFL-CIO foreign policy flows from its domestic
position. Abroad it combats anti-capitalist
ideologies and organisations and it aids and
encourages pro-capitalist unions. It attempts
to influence existing unions and to form new
ones in its own image. Where interests overlap.
It works with US corporations, and in close
cooperation with their representatives, the
government. Disagreements between business and
labor bureaucracy in foreign policy matters, as
in internal affairs,
	 stem from tactical
questions,	 and	 not	 from	 philosophical
antagonisms [12].
Thompson and Larson (1978:1) quote George Meaney, a
long time the head of AFL, and later head of the
amalgamated AFL-CIO remark that "We are not about to
trade in our system for any other" that he believed
in capitalism, he is a member of a capitalist society
and that he was dedicated to the preservation of the
capitalist system which, he argued, rewards workers.
According to Thompson and Larson, in Africa, the AFL-
CIO operates through its Africa arm, the AALC. They
argue that the AALC seem to have got the upper hand,
while the ICFTU has had many doors slammed in its face,
because of the accusation that it is linked with the
CIA. They argue that in fact it is the AALC which is
linked with the agency. Thomson and Larson argue that
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the AALC has been able to glide with consummate ease
through several countries, because what it has got
behind it is money, the political support from the
State Department, and a way of organising trade unions
'that appeals to governments not noted for their
affection towards workers movements" (Thompson and
Larson 1978:48)
Having described the processes of restructuring and
remodelling, and retraining of trade union leaders, as
forms of state control of trade unions, I turn now to
yet another form of trade union control which can be
characterised as ideological habituation. This involves
the manipulation of trade unions through the ideology
of "national interest" or "national development". This
form of control is instilled through persuasion, or
ideological manipulation.Here the state or its
representatives attempt to represent the interests of
capital as the common interests of all, and attempts to
persuade the working class to accept the system of
unequal distribution of the product of their labour. By
so doing the state or the petty bourgeois state elite
try to adjust the workers to the labour process in its
capitalist form. This is the point to which I now turn.
6.3 Ideological Habituation of the Trade Unions.
Ideological habituation, 	 unlike other forms of
habituation such as restructuring, which involve an
element of legal coercion, is a form of labour control
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which functions predominantly by ideology. It seeks to
maximise surplus value extraction by making the workers
accept the system of unequal distribution of the
product of their labour for a reason such as "national
development". It can be directed at both the individual
worker, a group of workers, or the whole working class.
Thus for the most part of the post-independence period
the labour movement in Botswana has been reminded time
and time again of its responsibility to the nation. The
petty bourgeois state elite, specifically President
Khama and his cabinet colleagues, have on various
occasions stressed the need for "wage restraint",
"industrial peace" and "political stability" in order
to archieve "national development".
This perception of the role of trade unions in
development was first articulated by Seretse Rhama in
July, 1971. The President mentioned that while his
government recognized that trade unions have a role to
play in participatory democracy, workers must realise
that they have a responsibility to assist in the
development of the country. President Khama argued:
We in Botswana have given trade unions freedom
to represent their members' interests and guide
the aspirations of our workers so that they
make a productive contribution to national
growth... In return we expect the trade unions
and their officials to recognize that their
contribution must be made through these
channels and not by direct involvement in the
political arena... Equally workers must
recognize that if we are to attract industry to
Botswana in order to assist our development,
and create jobs for our people, we must make
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sure that the investment offers a reasonable
return [131
The President pointed out that workers were in the
minority and should exercise the freedom to bargain
collectively carefully, bearing in mind their
responsibility to the nation as a whole. According to
President Kharna, freedom carries with it
responsibility: "Your first responsibility is to assist
in the development of the country. This is the first
responsibility of all Batswana."
Again when he officially opened Orapa diamond mine in
1972, the President pointed out that workers must
understand that the "objective of an organised labour
movement is not just to promote the narrow interests of
its members", but has "a responsibility to the nation
as a whole" [14]. In his address to the Selibe Phikwe
mine workers, two months after Botswana's most violent
strike, the President, Seretse Khama, had this to say:
Botswana is a poor and underdeveloped country.
We all agree that this is so. And I am sure we
all agree that in order for meaningful economic
development to take place in the country, in an
orderly fashion, there is a need for industrial
peace and political stability.. . Even our
Independence was considered premature in 1966
since we did not have an industrial base from
which to develop our economy and thus ensure
our survival as a nation... It is well to
remind you that as a young developing country
we will for many years depend to a large degree
on external assistance for development funds.
This assistance cannot continue unless we
maintain peace and stability in our country.
Eotswana would lose its reputation as a stable
and safe country thereby scaring away
investors.., if every time there is some
grievance among workers, rioting takes place
with no regard whatsoever to the legal
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machinery provided for settling disputes
peacefully and amicably [15].
Again in 1977, at the first delegates conference of
BFTU, Seretse Khama told the delegates:
You do not live in isolation from the rest of
the country and its economic realities. Like
government you have a wider
responsibility. . .you are first and foremost
8atswana, and your first responsibility is to
assist in the development of the country [16]
Cabinet ministers have also argued on various occasions
that Botswana workers must recognize that if the
country is to attract foreign investment to assist in
national development and create jobs, and if investors
are to be persuaded to come to Botswana rather than go
elsewhere, Botswana must make it worth their while by
ensuring that their investments offer a reasonable
return. Ministers have also exhorted workers to work
hard, be disciplined and to exercise restraint on wage
demands and follow legal channels in the pursuance of
industrial disputes, and to avoid unnecessary strike
actions; that workers are a minority and should not
demand more than their fair share of the country's
wealth in wages; that workers must not hold the country
hostage by illegal strike actions, and that trade
unions must be responsible organisations that respect
the rule of law [17].
In Chapter 4 I have given an account of the role of the
state in fostering the economic growth of the country,
and in Chapter 5 I have examined some of the policies
adopted by the state towards that end. One such policy
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was the policy on wages. As I have already posited,
this policy that was structured in such a way that it
virtually ruled out collective bargaining as the
mechanism of wage determination in a market economy
[18]
The question that arises is, if it was solely diamond
mining revenues that were responsible for Botswana's
economic development, and not low wage policy, as some
of the analysts referred to want us to believe, then
what would have been the point all these exhortations
by the petty bourgeois state elite on the need for wage
restraint and industrial peace? What would have been
the point of clinging to a policy that, for all intents
and purposes was redundant? I want to posit, on the
basis of what I have discussed in this chapter, that
the low wage policy was never redundant or even made
temporarily irrelevant by the diamond boom. The wages
policy has always been used to control and hold down
wages even during this period of diamond boom.
The fact that the policy has never lost its relevance
conceded by the ruling party and government. This point
was illustrated succinctly by Daniel Kwelagobe in a
speech at the delegates conference of BFTU. According
to the Minister:
One reason why we [Botswana] have been able to
sustain this [economic] growth . . . and for this
the trade union movement must take a lot of the
credit- has been through the implementation of
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a policy of wage restraint. This policy does
restrict the ability of unions to bargain
freely with employers. We have never pretended
otherwise. It is, if you like Government
interference	 in	 freedom	 of	 collective
bargaining. Despite this restriction on
legitimate trade union aspirations, you have, I
believe understood and appreciated the economic
reasons behind the policy, and it is to your
credit that most workers in Botswana now accept
the policy. . .1 do not think there are many
countries in the world where workers would
accept a total pay freeze with the
understanding which the trade unions and
workers of Botswana [have] expressed.. . and an
appreciation of the economic conditions which
made the pay freeze necessary [19].
Minister Kwelagobe pointed out that though his party
supports a strong trade union movement in Botswana, the
interests of the workers should not take precedence
over what he called the interests of the country as a
whole, and that Eotswana's trade unions should develop
a role which meets the needs of the country and should
not adopt what he termed "an imported trade union
philosophy with its folk history and perceptions built
up over years of strife in Europe".
The other factor that points to the centrality of wage
labour in Botswana's development concerns labour
productivity. There has been in the last few years an
orchestrated campaign by the state and employers
accusing workers of low productivity [20]. What I wish
to point out, without going into all the arguments for
and against this accusation, is that it is not
surprising that it is labour productivity, and not
world markets, that should be singled out and blamed.
This supports my argument that it was a low wage
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policy, and not diamonds per Se, that played a crucial
role in the post-Independence economic development,
notwithstanding the valuable contribution of the
diamond mining industry. It is a point well worth
noting because even in the third phase of Botswana
development, the petty bourgoeis state elite still
maintains that Botswana must continue to seek foreign
investment as well as overseas aid to provide for all
the capital required to archive rapid growth. The
government has argued that such investments can only be
attracted to the country "if it is permitted a rate of
return not less favourable than normally
elsewhere", and that the basis of a policy of wage
restraint would be vitiated if the level of taxation or
profits in Botswana was raised to a point at which no
investor would take advantage of the comparative
advantages offered in Botswana (Government Paper No 1
of 1990)
6.4 Trade Unionism in Eotswana.
Trade unions have been variously defined as continuous
association of wage earners for purposes of improving
the conditions of working life or as independent
employee organisations whose main objective is to
negotiate with employers in order to regulate the pay
and conditions of its members (Farnham and Pimlott
1990). The capitalist mode of production, the
separation of direct producers from their traditional
means of production, the land, and the buying and
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selling of the commodity labour-power on a significant
scale are the antecedent material conditions for the
emergence of the trade union movement.
The trade union movement has historically evolved from
the development of wage labour which was ushered in by
industrial capitalism. In other words, trade unions are
a natural product of the capitalist system. In this
regard my discussion of the political economy of
Botswana in the preceding chapter, on the economic
growth policies of the post-independence state, the
consequent structural transformation, and class
formation, demonstrate this point. Like in other parts
of the world where capitalist relations of production
have emerged, trade unions in Botswana arose with the
main objective of fighting for the improvement of the
conditions of work, negotiating with the emplyers about
pay and conditions of service of their members, and
generally protecting the legal, social and economic
rights of workers.
Though there is little agreement on either the
functions or the substantive content of the theories
of trade unionism, Marxists have not been content with
just explaining the relationship between the labour
movement and capitalism, but have injected a more
normative element in their theorisation, and sought to
explain what the role of the labour movement ought to
be (Marshal et al, 1980). Thus Karl Marx had at times
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argued that the workers struggles against capitalism
was just the beginning of the process of working class
emancipation, and the formation of a new society. To
Marx, the first stirrings of the workers to be
emancipated was the trade union movement, which was
also an essential expression of the antagonism that
existed between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; an
antagonism that will lead to total revolution after
which all classes and oppression disappear (Moses
1990)
Marx's optimism about the revolutionary potential of
the trade union was cautious. He cautioned that trade
unions seemed to be too exclusively bent upon the
local and immediate struggles with capital, and have
not fully understood their power of acting against the
system of wage slavery itself. He argued that the
future of trade unions lay in then learning to act
deliberately as organising centres of the working class
in the broad interest of its complete emancipation He
put this point more emphatically in Value Price and
Profit when he pointed out that workers must not
exaggerate their everyday struggles with capital
because in these struggles the workers are fighting
with effects, and not causes of those effects; they are
merely retarding the downward movement, but not
changing its direction, and are just applying
palliatives, and not curing the malady (Marx 1968b)
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Lenin (1902) was more skeptical about the revolutionary
potential of labour organisation. He acknowleged the
necessity of trade union movement. But he argued that
the the history of several countries showed that the
working class tends to develop only trade union
consciousness, that is, the conviction that it is
necessary to fight employers and strive to compel the
state to pass necessary legislation. Lenin argued that
revolutionary consciousness can not develop out of the
spontaneous economic struggles of trade unions, but
must be brought from outside the sphere of relations of
production. These two statements by Marx and Lenin lays
the contours within which the organisation of the trade
union movement varies. That is, the exclusive bent on
local and immediate struggles with capital, on the one
hand, and the struggles for the "complete emancipation"
of the working class as a whole. This is the context
within which I want to locate trade unionism in
Thotswana today.
The aims and objectives of the labour movement in
Botswana can be inferred from the constitutions of the
trade unions. The constitution of the BFTTJ best sums up
the aims and objectives of the labour movement in
Botswana and reflects what I call trade unionist
consciousness as opposed to revolutionary
consciousness. The BFTU constitution has been greatly
imbued with the doctrine of liberal democracy that is
contained in the constitution of Botswana. The
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constitution the BFTU state that Botswana workers
believe that freedom of thought, expression and
association, guarantied by the constitution of Botswana
must form the basis of relationship between the workers
organisation and the employers and the state. EFTU
proclaims the goals of the trade union movement to be
to fight for the rights of the worker to adequate wage
to give a decent living wage of the worker and his
family; hours of work that will give the worker the
opportunity of enjoying proper leisure, recreation and
cultural development; security of employment, free
collective bargaining and protection and maintenance of
agreement arising from collective bargaining. In
pursuance of these goals, the BFTU seeks to maintain
good relations between employers and employees through
collective bargaining; make representation on labour
and trade union legislation and other matters affecting
trade unions and workers in Botswana; secure adequate
representation on state apparatuses dealing with labour
legislation, and actively participate in the
development of Botswana in accordance
with Botswana's national principles and objectives
[211
The constitutions of most trade unions in Botswana
emphasise welfarism. For example, Manual Workers union,
the most militant of Botswana's trade union aims to
obtain and maintain just and proper rates of pay or
remuneration, security of employment and reasonable
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hours and conditions of work for its members. The
constitution of the Botswana Bank Employees Union
(BBEU) also has this objective. In addition the BBEU
constitution points out that it will pursue joint
consultation with the management at all levels in order
to secure the greatest possible measures of effective
participation by the union in all decisions affecting
the working conditions of its members.
The public sector labour organisations are no different
from their private sector counterparts. Botswana
Primary School Teachers Association (BOPRITA) has as
its objective to afford fair representation wherever
and whenever matters pertaining to teachers are being
discussed,; to advocate for professional training of
teachers, and secure humane conditions of its members
such as decent accommodation and subsidized rent.
Botswana Secondary School Teachers Federation's
objectives are to promote and enhance the status of
teachers in society, and promote and elevate the status
of teachers, and preserve the integrity of the teaching
profession.
6.5 CONCLUSION.
The foregoing discussion has e examined the various
forms of state of control of the trade union movement
in post-colonial Botswana. After independence, the post
Independence state embarked on a systematic programme
of restructuring and remodelling the trade union
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movement to maximise state control of the trade unions
and make the workers acquiescent and supportive of the
state defined economic policies. To this end the post-
colonial petty bourgeois state elite created a
corporate nationalist model the labour movement in
which wage restraint for national development became
the rallying cry. Lack of infrastructural development
in the colonial era served as a powerful reminder to
the workers that wage restraint is in the "national
interest", and that workers have to accept sacrifice.
As pointed out, habituation is also a process that
involves interior determination, that is, a process of
transmitting the elements of culture that are even
generated by the institutions of the proletarian
culture itself. Trade unions in Botswana seem to have
accepted to work within the system of exploitative
relations of production, and their constitutions
emphasise welfarism and protection of the rights of
their members within that system.
However, this acceptance to work within the existing
exploitative relations of production does not
necessarily invalidate the argument that trade unions
have a potential to transform society. The acceptance
points at the limits of trade unionism at this present
conjuncture. The extent to which the efforts to
restructure and remodel the trade unions, that is, to
habituate the working class to make it acquiescent or
supportive of the capitalist relations of production
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will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. Suffice it to
point out here that the ready acceptance and
willingness of trade unions to work within the existing
relations of production is also due to the fact that
the working class is itself a product of such as
system.
These limits of trade unionism in Botswana are not
unique to the Botswana conditions. They are the limits
of trade unionism in general. As Perry Anderson (1978)
pointed out, trade unions are an essential part of the
capitalist society because they incarnate the
differences between capital and labour. They are
dialectically both an opposit-Lot. to ct&*
component of it. They both resist the given unequal
distribution of income and at the same time ratify the
principle of an unequal distribution by their
existence, which presuppose the existence of
management. It is the capitalist system that has
produced the working class, and it is the capitalist
system that is defining the parameters of working class
action by all manner of control and concessions. In a
word by continually "habituating" the working class to
support or at least acquiesce to the capitalist system.
Habituation as a form of ideological control
presuppose consent. The critical aim of class analysis
is to reveal relations of domination and subordination
often concealed false explanations and justifications
191
perpetuated by the state elite to sustain the process
of accumulation (Zeitlin 1980) . To the extent that
these false explanations and justifications are
accepted by the working class, the petty bourgeois
state elite would have achieved class hegemony by
consent. But consent of the dominated can sometimes be
eroded or subverted by the counter ideologies of the
working class. As Zeitlin points out, class hegemony
can not rest on consent of the exploited alone, but
also on coercion. This is ultimately the indispensable
means of class domination because without it consent
can be withdrawn, with it, consent can be enforced and
imposed. In the field of industrial relations this
coercion appears in the form of labour law. It is to
the analysis of this particular social relation of
domination and subordination that I now turn.
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CHAPTER 7
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN BOTSWANA (1966-1990).
INTRODUCTION.
In his path breaking analysis of the industrial
relations system Dunlop (1958) argued that every
industrialising community, regardless of its political
form, creates an industrial relations system. He
described an industrial relations system as a network
of rules which govern the work place and the work
community. This network of rules consists of
procedures for establishing rules, substantive rules,
and the procedures for deciding their application to
particular situations. These rules appear In different
guises such as legislation and statutory orders; in
trade union regulation, in collective agreements and in
arbitration awards (Flanders 1965).
According to Dunlop, because of the dynamic nature of
society, the rules and their administration are under
frequent review, and in the course of time may be
altered as a consequence of changes in the contexts and
in the relative statuses of the actors. But, Dunlop
points out, the form of the rule does not alter its
essential character: to define the status of the actors
and their interrelations. Dunlop identifies three
principal "actors" at the centre of any industrial
relations system. These actors are (a) the workers and
their organisation,	 (b) the managers and their
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organisation and (c) government agencies concerned with
the work place and work community.
I am particularly interested in Dunlop's argument that
the industrial relations system is bound together by an
ideology or understanding shared by all actors. That is
to say all the three actors share a common belief,
values, and objectives which reinforce social
stability. My position is that an industrial relations
system is another form of state control of the trade
union movement. It is a form of habituation which seeks
to inculcate a "habit" of the rule of law and order in
the worker. In this regard Potter and Wetherell (1987)
point out that the language of law as a social text
tends to overtly or covertly order people's perceptions
of the social structure, construct specific forms of
social relationships, and simultaneously construct and
create social interaction, and therefore has political
implications
This chapter analyses the development of Botswana's
industrial relations from the time of Independence in
1966 until 1990, when the state abandoned two decades
of direct intervention in the economy and in the
industrial relations scene. It is argued that the
industrial relations system that emerged after
independence was characterised by the state's
domination and subordination of labour through various
labour control strategies. This was due to the
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pressures of capitalist economy and private capital.
All these factors gave rise to a system of labour
repression that has often been concealed by Botswana's
liberal democratic constitution and commitment to
individual rights and freedoms.
There are four pieces of legislation that will be
considered here. These are (a) the Employment Act, (b)
the Trades Unions and Employers Organisations Act, (c)
the Trades Disputes Act, and (d) some sections of the
National Security Act. Botswana's industrial relations
system must be viewed within the context of the
country's post-colonial policies of economic growth and
development through the private capital accumulation
and the need the attract foreign capital to one of the
most underdeveloped countries in Africa. But first an
introductory historical background.
6.1 An Historical Background.
At the time of independence in 1966, Botswana was a
predominantly agrarian society, with very little in the
form of industrial or commercial activity. The working
class was very and small and scattered. The majority of
Batswana "workers" were working in the South African
mines and other industries as migrant labourers.
Although trade unions in Botswana were legalised in
1942 by the Trade Unions and Trades Disputes
Proclamation, the country had no established
industrial relations system at independence [1].
197
The legalisation of trade unions in Botswana followed
the 1930 memorandum from Lord Passfield, then
Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies in which
instructed the colonial administrators to take
necessary steps to allow Africans to form trade unions.
Lord Passifield pointed out that unless this is done,
the workers might fall into the hands of what he
described as "disaffected persons who may use workers
to achieve political objectives" [2]
According to Kirby (1990), as a result of the gradual
expansion in formal sector employment, it was felt
that there was a need to bring together some aspects of
common law affecting the employment relationship up to
date, and a new law, the Employment ct NO 15 of
was enacted to replace the old Master and Servants Act.
The Trade Union and Trades Dispute Proclamation (1942)
and the Employment Act of 1963 remained the main labour
laws until 1969. Kirby (1990:2-3) points out that at
the time of independence there was still no machinery
for the settlement of trade disputes, and the 1942
trade union legislation was woefully inadequate. As a
result in 1969 the Trade Unions Act No 24/69 and the
Trades Disputes Act No 28/69 were enacted to replace
the outdated legislation of 1942. These were Botswana's
introduction to modern labour legislation. But with the
rapid development of new industries in the various
sectors of the economy, these laws were perceived to be
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inadequate. In June 1983 a comprehensive and updated
Trades Disputes Act was enacted, and was followed in
1984 by the revamped Employment Act and the Trade
Unions and Employers' Organisation Act. In 1992, these
laws were again amended and an Industrial Court was
created, and some of the provisions of these laws were
given to the Court.
Since Botswana is a formally liberal democratic
country, and it is on the country's constitution that
its statute law is based, any analysis of Botswana's
labour laws must begin with an examination of the
country's constitutional provisions on labour issues.
It is argued here that Botswana's labour laws, which
constitute a system of labour repression are predicated
on the constitution of the country which guarantees
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, but
restricts these rights and freedoms in the case of
labour organisat ions.
7.2 Botswana's Constitution and Labour Legislation.
The Independence constitution that paved the way for
Independence in September, 1966, guarantied and
protected the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual. These rights and freedoms include the right
to personal liberty, protection from deprivation of
property, freedom of conscience and expression and
freedom of assembly and association. In particular
Section 13(1) of the constitution states that:
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Except with his own consent, no person shall be
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of
assembly and association, that is to say, his
right to assemble freely and associate with
other persons and in particular to form or
belong to trade unions or other associations
for the protection of his interests.
However, these rights and freedoms only apply to
individuals, and have been restricted in the case of
labour organisations. That is to say, though Botswana's
constitution guarantees the individual's right to form
and belong to a trade union, the rights and freedoms of
the trade unions have been restricted whilst the
rights of the individual who may belong to such trade
unions are left untrammelled. This was made possible by
the 1969 constitutional amendment which followed a wave
of illegal and wild cat strike actions across the
country.
The original independence constitution, which was
drafted with the help of British constitutional
experts, had not sought to restrict trade union rights
and freedoms to the extent that post-independence
government now felt was necessary. The 1966
Independence Order Section 13(2) stated that:
nothing in or done under the authority of any
law shall be held to be inconsistent with
section 13(1) to the extent that the law in
question makes provision
(a) that is reasonably required in the
interests of defence, public safety, public
order, public morality or public health, or
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose
of protecting the rights and freedoms of
persons, or
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Cc) that imposes restrictions upon public
officers and except so far as that provision
or, as the case may be, the thing done under
the authority thereof is shown not to be
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
[3].
In April 1969, Parliament amended the original 1966
independence Constitution to include a sub-section
restricting the rights and freedoms of trade unions.
According to the 1969 amendment, Section 13(2) (a) of
the 1966 Independence Order was reformulated to read
that "no law that imposes restrictions upon public
officers, employees of local government bodies or
teachers shall be held to be inconsistent with the
provisions of section 13(1)", and another new sub-
section, 13(2) (d) was addes5. The	 to&
stipulates that "a law can be formulated that makes
provision for the registration of trade unions and
imposes	 reasonable condi!ions relating to the
requirements for registration" [4] . The effect of this
is that Eotswana's constitution guarantees individual
rights and freedoms, but restricts collective rights
and freedoms, especially as they apply to the labour
movement [5].
These restrictions on the constitutional rights of
trade unions were political and intended to control the
trade unions, make them tow the line and create
propitious conditions for capital accumulation in line
with the post-independence government stated objectives
of rapid economic growth based capitalist strategy.
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Gladstone (1980:55) argues that many governments in
newly independent African countries sooner or later
came to the conclusion that measures to deal with trade
unions and reform the industrial relations system had
to be taken. He argues that the call for change in the
trade union movement was motivated by the desire by the
ruling elite to protect itself from organised labour as
a source of opposition, as well as the need to
neutralise the labour movement as a centre of
opposition to new economic and social policies that
were envisaged by the new rulers.
Botswana's experience has to a very large extent
vindicated Gladstone's argument. In 1969, just three
years after independence, the new government decided to
revise the pre-independence labour laws. Leading the
debate on the proposed amendments, the then Minister of
Health, Labour and Social Services, Mr BC Thema, argued
that the government should have the powers to restrict
the activities of workers, especially those in the
public sector because they are paid by the state. But
it is interesting to note that although the amendment
was ostensibly for public sector employees, it carried
a provision that laws can be formulated that "impose
reasonable conditions relating to the registration of
trade unions." In fact it was at the same sitting of
Parliament in the aftermath of the 1968	 waves of
strikes, that the process to overhaul	 Botswana's
labour laws started [6].
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The amendment was opposed by the only two opposition
party members in Parliament, Mr PG Matante and Mr TW
Motihagodi, but even then on the grounds that it
discriminated against the trade union specifically, and
not other voluntary organisation like political parties
and women and youth organisations. In his reply, the
Minister argued that:
[Whilst] other voluntary organisation
contributed to the social progress of the
country, they did not have the same potential
for building up or breaking down the economy
of the country such as trade unions had, and
that is why the world over, governments
controlled the formation and running of the
trade unions while they took no such interest
in	 the	 political,	 women's	 and	 youth
organisations. [7].
In that month alone, in addition to passing this
constitutional amendment, Parliament also enacted three
amendments to the labour laws: the Trade Unions Act of
1969; the Trades Dispute Act of 1969, and the
Regulation of Wages and Conditions of employment Act of
1969. Parliament also passed the Public Service Act
which govern the conditions of service of the public
sector employees. Reacting to criticism from trade
union leaders that they have not been consulted, Mr
Thema was very blunt and forthright in his reply:
Representative democracy, 	 as against the
popular type, provided for delegating
legislative responsibility to few people who
may consult the electorate, follow some or none
of its views as they find fit, which we have
done in this particular case and that generally
as elected leaders of people, we are not going
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to follow people all the time, but must lead
them [81
The restrictions on the trade union rights and freedoms
in Botswana provide a typical example of the
shortcomings that are characteristic of bourgeoisie
democracy. As Marx (1968a:107-l08) has argued, these
freedoms are only dressed in "a constitutional
uniform". Each of these freedoms is proclaimed as the
absolute right of a citizen, but always with the
"marginal" note that it is unlimited so far as it is
not limited by other laws. As Marx points out:
[Each] paragraph of the constitution contains
its own antithesis, its own Upper House and
Lower House, namely, freedom in the general
phrase, abrogation of freedom in the marginal
note. Thus so long as the name of freedom was
respected and only its actual realisation
prevented, of course in a legal way, the
constitutional existence of freedom remained
intact, inviolate, however mortal the blows
dealt to its existence in actual life.
In effect, these laws replaced the Trades Unions and
Trades Disputes Proclamation(1942) and the Employment
Law No.15 of 1963 and marked the beginning of
Botswana's own industrial relations system. The labour
laws were again amended in the early l980s to reflect
the changing nature of the political economy of
Botswana. In June 1983 Parliament amended the Trades
Disputes Act of 1969, and in 1984 a revamped Employment
Act and a Trades Unions and Employers Organisation Act
came into force. Though these are the major labour
laws that are germane to my thesis, I would also
discuss the National Security Act f in so far as some
parts of it relate to the trade union movement.
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7.3 The Employment Act (1984).
The Employment Act of 1982 is the basic labour law of
Botswana, and provides the so-called floor of rights,
that is, the statutory employment rights for
individuals at work. The Act replaced the Regulation of
Wages and Conditions of Employment Act (1969). The Act
defines, guarantees and protects conditions of
employment. These include contracts of employment, rest
periods, hours of work, overtime, public holidays,
annual leave, employment of females, children and young
persons, the infirm and handicapped, establisbment of
labour health areas, sick leave, determination of
minimum wages, redundancy procedures and specifies
remedies, jurisdiction, procedures and penalties in
respect of matters pertaining to the infringement of
the Act. It covers all employees in the country except
the public sector employees and domestic and
agricultural workers, who are not defined as employees
for the purpose of the Act [9].
The Act defines an employee as any individual who has
entered into a contract of employment for hire of his
labour, provided that the expression does not include a
public officer or a person employed by a local
authority unless he belongs to the industrial class.
According to the Act the term "employer" applies to
government only in respect of any of its officers or
servants who belong to a category of such or servants
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the members of which are declared by the regulations to
be employees for the purposes of the Act.
In accordance with Section 13(1) of the Constitution,
the Act restricts employers from terminating employees'
job contracts as a result of their participation in a
registered trade union and or for any reason which
could be interpreted as discriminatory on the basis of
colour, creed or ethnic origin. Before the 1992
amendments, there were sections that had caused
disagreements amongst the employers, the employees and
the workers. These were Sections 26 and 27. Section 26
of the Act gave the employer the right to terminate a
contract of employment without notice, where the
employee was guilty of "serious misconduct". The trade
unions felt that the employers have abused the clause
to get rid of "trouble makers" in the work force. The
1992 amendments defined "serious misconduct" more
precisely. Section 27 of the Act gave both the employer
and the employee the right to protest against
termination of employment by either party to the
contract of employment. Under this section, the labour
officer had the powers to investigate cases involving
termination of contract of employment by either party
to the contract, and to order reinstatement in cases of
unfair dismissals. The employers argued that they were
being forced to retain workers who were a unproductive.
This section was repealed by the 1992 amendment.
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According to the revised law, allegations of unfair
dismissals will be decided by the Industrial Court.
7.3 Trade Unions and Employers Organisations	 Act
(1984)
This Act replaced the Trades Union Act of 1969. Through
this	 Act,	 the	 state provided procedures	 for
registration, recognition and ultimately, control and
supervision of trade unions by the state. It is only
when trade unions have been duly registered and issued
with a certificate of registration that they become
lawful and legal organisations. Once a trade union is
registered, the trade union and its officers and
members enjoy trade union rights, immunities and
privileges conferred by section 17 of the Act. The
section	 stipulates that no suit or other legal
proceedings shall be maintainable in any civil court
against the registered trade union or any of its
officers or members in respect of any act done in
furtherance of a trade dispute. According to Section
17 of the Act:
no suit against the registered trade union or
any officer or member thereof on behalf of
himself and all other members of the trade
union in respect of any delictual act alleged
to have been committed by or on behalf of the
trade union shall be entertained by any court;
and
the objects of the registered
	 trade union
shall not, by reason only that they are in
restraint of trade, be unlawful so as to
render-
(i) any member of the trade union liable to
criminal prosecution, or
(ii) void or voidable any agreement or trust.
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Once a trade union has been registered by the state and
issued with a Certificate of Registration it becomes
the recognized trade union for that particular
industry, and it does not have to negotiate for
recognition with the employer. Section 50 of the Act
compels the employer to deal with that trade union as a
negotiating body, and any employer who fails to
negotiate with a registered trade union or its branch
is guilty of an offence.
On the face of it, this is a very generous allowance to
trade unionism, especially by Third World standards.
But a closer reading of the Act reveals that in
practice trade union rights and freedoms in Botswana
are severely restricted. The Act actually contains a
variety of labour control measures and restrictions on
the rights and freedoms of trade unions.
For example, Section 10 of the Act gives the Registrar
of Trade Unions the power to refuse to register a trade
union, and! or to cancel the registration of a
registered trade union for a number of reasons. For
instance registration of a trade union can be refused
if one of its principal officers has been convicted of
an offence under the TUEO Act or under the Trades
Disputes Act, or if the Registrar is satisfied that any
of its principal officers is not a citizen of Botswana.
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Another mechanism of trade union control which
interferes with the freedom of a registered trade union
organisation, concerns the rights, immunities, and
privileges conferred by section 17 of the Act. Although
once registered, a trade union enjoys certain rights,
immunities, and privileges, these extend to trade union
officers and members only, but not to the people in
full time employment of the trade unions, that is,
full-time administrators or employees of the trade
unions.
Another control mechanism is contained in Sections 21
and 22 of the Act. These restricts membership of the
trade union. According to Section 21, no person shall
be admitted to membership of a trade union unless he is
an employee in an industry with which the trade union
is directly concerned and that no employee of a trade
union can be a member of that trade union and that a
member of a trade union who becomes an employee of the
trade union shall cease to be a member of the trade
union. Before the 1992 amendment, the Act stipulated
that a member of a trade union who has ceased to be an
employee, shall also cease to be a member of that trade
union. This section was amended to allow a worker to
remain a member of a trade union whilst his or her case
is still on appeal. The worker will still cease to be a
member if he loses the appeal. Section 22 of the Act
stipulates who qualifies to become an officer of a
trade union. According to the Act, no person can become
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an officer of a trade union or a federation of trade
unions unless that person is a member of the trade
union or of a trade union belonging to the federation
of trade unions. The Act also prevents full-time union
employees becoming officers of a trade union.
These two sections are of particular importance in the
state control of the unions in Botswana. In the first
place, these sections of the Act effectively prevent
the trade unions, and the trade union federation, the
B.F.T.U., from having full-time officials. The B.F.T.U.
and the national unions, can only have as full time
staff, employees who are not entitled to the enjoyment
of the rights, immunities and privileges conferred by
section 17 of Act. What this means i.s that in Botswana,
trade unions, from a branch to a national union and up
to B.F.T.U, can not have full-time officials. They can
only have employees, who do not enjoy rights,
immunities and privileges accorded to trade unionists
under section 17 of the Act. These people are regarded
as employees, and not officials or even members of the
trade unions they are working for, and as employees, as
opposed to officials or members, they do not enjoy the
immunities, rights and privileges granted by Section
17.
The current Secretary-General of the BFTU, Ronald
Baipidi, is a member of Botswana Diamond Sorters and
Valuators Union (BDSVU). He is married and has a
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family. He has been the EFTU secretary-general for
several years and knows the difficulties and
frustration caused by the state's interference in trade
union matters only too well. He articulated the
problems of his organisation in this words:
EFTU and the national unions are run on a part-
time basis because that is what the law says.
They (the government) know that it is
logistically impossible for us to meet every
time we want to meet, because members of the
executive committees are spread all over the
country. We are expected to conduct our affairs
by telephones, and even then after hours. The
BFTU's full time staff have no political
mandate. It is the part-time officials who
have the mandate. But we are expected to be at
our places of employment during normal working
hours. Unlike the employers organisation, union
employees can not make decisions on behalf of
the BFTU. They can not vote for or against a
proposal because they have no political
mandate. Those with the mandate like the
secretary general are full time employees
elsewhere and are not often available to decide
on important matters at the right time. We
attend executive committee meetings after
hours, when we leave our place of employment.
This part-time work for the union does not give
the officials the time they require to attend
to union or BFTU business. You must also
understand that these people have family
commitments after work. It is either the unions
suffer or it is the family that suffers [10]
The state's restrictions on the rights and freedoms of
the trade unions stands in sharp contrast to the
absence of such interference in the employers
organisation. There are no restrictions on membership
of the employers organisation nor does the state
prescribe to them the type of office bearers they can,
or can not have. To begin with most employers in
Botswana are expatriates, and secondly, though the
employers' organisation, Botswana Chamber of Commerce,
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Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), has a local Director
and Deputy Director, it is largely run by expatriate
staff or "technical advisers" from the abroad.
According to sources inside BFTU and Labour Department,
BOCCIM is really run by the expatriates who do the
technical or specialist jobs, with the local Director
and or his deputy just used to rubber stamp and execute
the decisions [11]. As Ronald Baipidi again put it:
Our labour laws are repressive, and pro-
employers. We are not allowed to request money
from outside the country, yet employers are not
likewise restricted. That organisation is run
by employers who are not citizens of the
country. We are not allowed to have the
assistance of non-citizen, but BOCCIM is
staffed by expatriates. Its local director is a
figurehead. All technical experts are American
or British [12]
These are of course subjective views which can not be
easily verified. But when one looks at the size of
BOCCIM's highly qualified expatriate staff and
financial resources, one can see the extent of the
involvement of foreign capital in the affairs of
BOCCIM. The fact that the Act covers both the trade
unions and employers, should not be interpreted
literally to mean the state puts similar restrictions
on the organisation of capital.But this is to be
expected, because after all, the state is committed to
attracting foreign capital to Botswana, and it is quite
possible that such foreign capital will come only on
certain terms, including the right to run their affairs
in their own way. That capital should be allowed the
rights and freedoms that are not available to labour
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indicates that the state is never neutral in a class
divided society. As I have pointed out already, under
conditions of private capital accumulation, the state,
although appearing to be standing above the fray of
class antagonisms, in reality serves the long term
interests of capital.
The provisions of the TUED Act that have been examined
here show how that the Botswana state has been able to
control labour and keep the trade unions
organisationally weak, but allow the employers
organisation a relatively free hand. However, according
to one former government minister, there is nothing
wrong with the Act. Addressing the 1984 BFTU Delegates'
Conference, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)
Secretary General, Mr Kwelagobe said that he saw no way
in which the Act infringes on what he called the
"legitimate concerns and interests" of the trade union
movement, and that the legislation is there to ensure
the "orderly development" and administration of trade
unions. He further stated that:
We in the Party have always felt strongly that
economic development in Eotswana is a
partnership between government, employers and
workers. We see the role of government as
providing a suitable environment to promote
development and the necessary ventures to
attract investment [13]
The implication in the minister's remarks is that
the need to provide incentives for investment is by
far more important than the trade union rights to
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organise in full freedom. Although trade unions are
supposed to be partners in development, the terms of
the partnership are defined for them by the state.
Needless to say, the meaning of such concepts as
"legitimate" and orderly, as used by the minister are
not always self-explanatory. Rather the meaning of
these concepts are subject to various interpretation,
depending on the ideological orientation of the user.
Pay demands are not legitimate in the eyes of the
employer, nor are strike actions an "orderly" process
in the eyes of the government.
Addressing himself to the organisational problems posed
by these legal restrictions, Minister Kwelagobe
defended the government position by arguing that there
is a general principle of separating policy issues from
implementation issues. He argued:
The	 same	 principle	 of	 divorcing	 the
implementation of decisions applies in
Government. Members of Parliament and Ministers
are charged with the responsibility of
establishing policy and the civil service has
the responsibility of implementing such policy.
A permanent secretary doesn't have to be a
minister in order to implement government
policy. He still remains a permanent secretary
and his job is to implement policy which has
been formulated or fashioned by Parliament and
Ministers [14]
Peter Olsen, the Gaborone based consultant labour
economist, and a former Industrial Relations Officer,
was sympathetic to the government view. He said in our
discussion that he thought that the trade unionists are
using Section 17 as a "red herring" and argued that
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BFTU is not the only organisation with a split between
policy and administration. He argued that the
difference between officials and employees of BFTU is
that officials can vote whereas employees can not, but
that they are all free to participate in BFTU
activities. Olsen argued thus:
To say Section 17 of the Act is discriminating
and weakens the labour movement is not true. I
know that they (trade unionists) always say
that. This is just a red herring. Most
organisation in Botswana, including the ruling
party, clearly differentiate between
administration and policy making. The BDP
policy makers are employed elsewhere as
ministers, and they only run the party on part
time basis. I think the problem with BFTU is
the calibre of their manpower. Contrast it with
Botswana Mining Workers Union. It is really
strong because of the calibre of people like
Saleshando and Setihare. But the union is run
on part time basis. The chairman and secretary
general are both full time employees of BCL
[15]
There is some truth in the argument of both Kwelagobe
and Olsen that there is a difference between policy and
implementation. But whether the BFTU should be able to
function efficiently without full time officials is
debatable. In the first instance, the issue is about
the fact that the state has created structures for the
labour movement and the labour movement is not happy
with those structures. In the view of the trade unions,
these structures prevent the trade unions from
organising in the way that they as the labour movement
feel is most effective. It is the state, and not trade
unions themselves, which has prescribed ways on how the
labour movement should organise. This is the central
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issue raised by the BFTU's Secretary General in his
remarks above. To argue, as Kwelagobe and Olsen do,
that policy must be separated from implementation and
administration, does not in any way invalidate the
arguments raised by the EFTU through its Secretary
General, let alone lessen the repressive nature of the
TUEO Act. The bottom line is that the trade unions in
Eotswana do not organise in the manner and methods
chosen by themselves, but in the manner and method
prescribed for them by the state. This is a system of
labour repression, notwithstanding the fact that BFTU
may have incompetent full time administrators.
In the second instance, there is very little basis to
compare BFTU officials to government ministers. It is
not true that ministers are responsible for policy
formulation. The policies are the responsibility of the
party and of Parliament. Ministers are appointed o qo
and implement these policies, and to do this they rely
on the state civil bureaucracy. At the same time
Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are paid from the
national coffers, and not by the party. The state and
the employers command resources that the EFTU does not
have.
Another mechanism of control that was repealed by the
1992 amendments was in Section 30 of the Act. This
section	 empowered the Minister to send a
representative to the meetings of BFTtJ's executive
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committee meetings. According to the Act, the Minister
could send a representative to attend every meeting of
the body in which the ultimate authority of BFTU is
vested, that is, the National Council of the BFTU,
which meets biennially. The Minister could also send
his representative to the federation's executive
committee meeting. Though the minister's representative
could take part in the deliberations of the meetings,
he could not vote. In addition to this, the
constitution of BFTU carried a clause that recognizes
the attendance of the government representative. Issac
Mabiletsa, the former executive committee member of the
BFTU, and now an Accountant with Barclays Bank in
Gaborone informed me:
The BFTU constitution has to carry a clause
that recognizes the government representative
at their conferences. You have to write to the
Registrar of Trade Unions informing him of the
time and date of the meeting, so that he could
arrange to send a representative. Any attempts
to exclude the minister's representative will
render those deliberations null and void [16].
In addition, trade unions and the BFTU are required to
furnish the Registrar of Trade Unions with the names of
their office bearers, and as Mabiletsa pointed out, "if
the registrar can detect that one of the office bearers
is not a citizen or a full time employee, he may
dissolve the executive committee". To crown all these
mechanisms of control of trade union movement, Section
32 of the Act stipulated that the books containing the
minutes of the proceedings of the executive committees
of registered trade union or meetings of the body in
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which the ultimate authority of a registered trade
unions is vested or of the executive committee of the
trade union federation, shall be open for inspection
by any member of the trade union or by any person
authorised on that behalf by the Registrar. This
section was repealed by the 1992 amendments.
7.5 The Trades Disputes Act (1983).
Before the 1992 amendments, this Act covered areas such
as procedures for settlement of disputes, arbitration
by the Permanent Arbitrator, settlement of claims and
collective labour agreement, unlawful industrial
action, enforcements of collective labour agreements
and awards of the permanent arbitrator, and the
protection of essential services. There were two major
characteristics of this Act in the period up to 1992.
The first was to give the state the powers to intervene
at any time in any trade dispute, and the second
characteristic was to create a mediation-conciliation
compulsory arbitration procedures to deal with
bargaining deadlocks.
Sections 4 to 11 of the Trade Disputes Act, spelt out
the procedures for the settlement of disputes,
prescribed steps to be followed in any labour dispute,
and also gave the Commissioner of Labour the power to
intervene in any trade dispute, even if that dispute
had not been formally reported to him. For example,
section 4.1 of the Act stipulated that:
218
Where the Commissioner of Labour is satisfied
that a trade dispute exists or is apprehended,
he may, whether the dispute has or has not been
reported to him under section 5, mediate
between the parties to the dispute or
authorize some other person so to mediate.
The Act provided the procedures and administrative
framework through which disputes between employees and
employers could be settled and handled. The Act made
provisions for a legal strike, but excluded workers in
essential services, (that is, electricity supply, water
supply, health). Certain procedures, however had to be
followed for strikes to legally occur. The Act
specified that strikes (or threats of strike) could be
declared illegal by the Minister of Labour and Home
Affairs if in his/her judgement the procedures for
settling a dispute had not been exhausted; or when
workers wanted to strike in sympathy or in support of
others; or when the strike was intended to force
employers to employ only union members (i.e closed
shop), or when the issue at hand is in the hands of the
Permanent Arbitrator.
The other important feature of the Act was the creation
of the mediation-conciliation-compulsory arbitration
procedures, to deal with deadlocks. These procedures
made strikes effectively illegal. The Act provided
stages for conciliation and mediation by Commissioner
of Labour. As I have indicated above, the Commissioner
of Labour could intervene at any appoint in the
dispute, regardless of whether he had been invited or
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not. If the efforts of the Commissioner failed or ended
in a deadlock, the matter would be referred for
voluntary arbitration if both parties agreed. But where
one party to the dispute did not accept voluntary
arbitration, the Commissioner of Labour was then
statutorily bound under section 7 of the Act to report
the dispute to the Minister. This section has been
amended and the Commissioner will now take the matter
to the Industrial Court. Section 9 of the Act empowered
the Minister to declare an industrial action unlawful
has been retained. The Minister can still refer a trade
dispute to the Industrial Court without the consent of
the parties to the dispute. Once the dispute has been
referred to the Industrial Court, it is unlawful for
workers to continue with the dispute or the industrial
action. Before the amendment, Section 20(1) of the Act
empowered the Permanent Arbitrator, who has now been
replaced by the Industrial Court, to make an award to
settle a dispute and stipulate that such an award would
be binding. The relevant part read:
Every award of the Permanent Arbitrator shall
be binding upon every party to the dispute in
question, whether that party did or did not
appear or was or was not represented at the
hearing and determination of the dispute
Section 20 (2b) of the Act stipulated that every award
by the Permanent Arbitrator should not be inconsistent
with any written law or fail to take into account the
social and economic policies of government. In a
Situation where a capitalist strategy has been adopted
220
as the state's policy of development, the implication
is that the state's social and economic policies will
have to ensure that the award of the Permanent
Arbitrator should be such that capital will feel
protected against any tendencies that might disrupt its
accumulation and or valorisation. Whilst section 20(2b)
did not instruct the Permanent Arbitrator on what to
do, it remained an important political terms of
reference [17]
Another major area of contention with regard to the
Trades Disputes Act is the length it takes to exhaust
procedures in order to have a legal strike. Workers
have always found themselves in a situation whereby it
was impossible to follow all rules and regulations to
be able to go on a legal strike. As a result of these
cumbersome procedures, Eotswana has never had a legal
strike since its Independence in 1966, and all strikes
have been declared illegal in terms of this Act. In a
recent survey on trade unions that was conducted for
BFTU most trade unionists expressed skepticism about
the Trade Disputes Act. They pointed out that although
the Act was formulated to facilitate settlement of
disputes, it deliberately makes it impossible to effect
legal strikes in Botswana [18]
In the survey, in which some 151 trade officials were
interviewed, 87 percent of the respondents felt that in
practice, it is impossible to have a legal strike in
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Botswana and identified the Trade Disputes Act as the
source of constraint. Asked which of the labour laws
they are most unhappy with, the Trade Disputes Act was
the first, followed by TUEO Act, with the Employment
Act coming last. In the same survey, 72 percent of the
respondents felt that it was not fair for the
Commissioner of Labour to intervene in a dispute not
reported to him, whilst 65 percent felt it was not
necessary to report a dispute to Commissioner of Labour
unless there is a deadlock. The trade unionists also
pointed that the powers of the Commissioner of Labour
to intervene in a dispute at any time seriously
impeded collective bargaining, or made it virtually
irrelevant. Section 4 of the Act, which allows the
Commissioner of Labour to intervene in disputes not
reported to him has been retained.
7.6 National Security Act (1986).
This Act was passed in May, 1986, following military
incursions by South African army commandos into
Botswana. The Act was enacted to make provision for
national security and other activities prejudicial to
the interests of the nation such communication of
information relating to the country's security and or
the deployment of military or security agents or
installations.
However the Act extends to trade unions as well and
brings the definition of necessary services under its
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arnbit. According to the Act, "necessary service"
include any service to provide electricity supply or
distribution; fire service; rubbish disposal and
sanitation services; health or ambulance service;
service relating to the production, supply or
distribution of water, food or fuel, and any other
service or facility declared by the President to be a
necessary service. The Act supplements the Trade
Disputes Act, which also lists essential services and
empower the Minister of Labour and Home Affairs to
declare any service an essential service. In 1990 the
Minister declared a strike by Barclays Bank workers
illegal in terms of the Trades Dispute Act, and went on
to declare banking an essential service. This was the
first time that a banking service was declared an
essential service. Although the National Security Act
had up to 1992, been invoked only once in connection
with a strike action, the fact remains that a Minister
or the President can still declare any service an
"essential service" for the purpose of outlawing a
strike action.
7.7 Labour Organisation in the Public Service.
The public sector includes central government, local
government authorities (District Councils), and
education. That is, teachers in primary and secondary
schools and teacher training colleges. The army, police
force and the prison services are also regarded as
public officers although in addition to the Public
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Service Act, as members of disciplined forces, they
have their own laws and regulations 1:19].
As I have I pointed out above, the Employment Act,
though the basic law of the country, does not cover
all categories of workers. For instance the Act does
not cover domestic workers. Public sector workers also
do not fall under the provisions of the Employment Act
or any of the countries labour laws that I have
discussed thus far. This section of the working class,
numbering about 80,300 workers, or about one third of
formal sector employment, is governed by the Public
Service Act, and their conditions of service are spelt
out in the General Orders.
The most important thing to note in this discussion on
public sector workers is that the term "public officer"
as it is applied in the context of Eotswana is too wide
and all-embracing, and includes everyone from the most
junior clerical assistant through to a Permanent
Secretary and the Secretary to the Cabinet. The
definition of a "public officer" is to be inferred from
the Constitution of Botswana. According to Section 127
of the Constitution, a public office means "an office
of emoluments in the public service" and the public
service means "the civil service of the Government",
and a "public officer" means "a person holding or
acting in any public office". According to Botswana
labour laws, a public officer is excluded from the
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definition of "employee" as defined in the Employment
Act (see Chapter 7.3 above).
The effect of this exclusion is all workers in. the
public sector do not have the right to form and belong
to trade unions for the purpose of free collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining is defined as a
method of negotiations between an employer, a group of
employers or one or more employers' organisation on the
one hand and one or more representatives of workers
organisation on the other, with a view to reaching an
agreement (Farnham and Pimlott 1992:140).
At same time, the state, which is the single largest
employer, does not, in terms of the law, regard its
relationship with its employees as an employer-employee
relationship. The law also has the effect of preventing
all public officers, regardless of rank, or occupation
from forming or belonging to a trade union, which is
defined by Section 2 of the TUEO Act as:
an organisabion consisting, wholly or in part,
of more than 30 employees the principal objects
of which include the regulation of relations
between employee and employers or employers
organisation or between employees and employees
(emphasis added)
Neither the Public Service Act nor the Constitution of
Eotswana provides a machinery for the regulation of
relations between public sector employees and their
employer, the state. The Act empowers the President of
Eotswana to make regulations for the setting up of a
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body for the purpose of consullalions between
government and public sector workers.
The body that has been created to cater for the
interests of public sector workers is the Botswana
Civil Servants Association (BCSA), which can only
consult, but not enter into collective bargaining.
BCSA's method of consultation is as follows: at the
grass root level there is a Ministerial Consultative
Committee (MCC) for each of the twelve or so
ministries. An MCC is chaired by the Permanent
Secretary of that ministry. It is made up of the "staff
side", that is the representatives of workers chosen at
the annual BCSA conference, and the "management side",
that is senior members of the ministry chosen by the
Permanent Secretary.
A regular MCC meeting is devoted to considering
submissions from various public officers scattered
through out Botswana, and the issues discussed are on
how to make the public service more effective in
administering government policy, and not about the
welfare of the public officers themselves. Matters of
welfare of an employee in the public sector are between
the public officer, his supervisor and the Permanent
Secretary. The Permanent Secretary may make
recommendation to the Director of Public Service
Management, or resolve the matter "internally". Some
of the issues discussed by the MCC may be resolved by
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the Permanent Secretary on the spot, by issuing a
directive pronouncing on the matter. Some issues may
be taken to the Central Joint Staff Consultative
Committee (CJCC), which is a committee made up of
Permanent Secretaries and some members of BCSA
executive committee. The CJCC is chaired by the
Director of Public Service Management, and the
committee may resolve certain issues, or make
recommendation to the Permanent Secretary to the
President, who is also Secretary to the Cabinet, for
him to act on the recommendation or forward them to
cabinet [20]
There are other labour organisation in the public
sector, but none of them can negotiate or enter into
collective bargaining with government, and all of them
have to channel their views through BCSA which acts as
a de facto national centre for public sector labour
organisations. These organisations are:
(a) Botswana Unified Local Government Staff Association
(BULGASA)
(b) Botswana Teachers Union (ETU)
(c) Botswana	 Federation	 of	 Secondary	 School
Teachers, (BOFESETE)
(d) Botswana Nurses Association (BSA)
(e) Botswana Primary School Teachers (BOPRITA).
The essential feature of public sector employment in
Botswana, that emerges form the foregoing account is
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the complete absence of collective bargaining at all
levels of the public sector. The public sector
employees do not fall under the category of employees
in terms of the Employment Act, and therefore are not
entitled to bargain collectively with their employer.
BOFESETE and BOPRITA actually broke away from the BTU
after dissatisfaction with BTTJ's strong ties with the
Ministry of Education, and the way that the old guard
in BTU had become too bureaucratic and acquiescent to
the government [211.
Whilst in developed capitalist countries such as
Britain for instance, it has been possible for
governments to legislate for the right to belong to
trade unions, and to restrict or ban strike actions by
workers certain services such as those that affect
national security, law and order and health services, a
complete ban on all public sector employees to form and
belong to a trade union is unusual.
7.8 Botswana and ILO Conventions.
The discussion of Botswana's labour laws and industrial
relations system will not be complete without reference
to Botswana position regarding the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Conventions. Botswana joined the ILO
in 1978, immediately after the formation of the
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions, (BFTU). Though
Botswana has been a member since then, the government
has not ratified the ILO Conventions essential to the
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development of free and independent trade unionism.
Botswana government has refused to ratify Conventions
NO 87 of 1950, on Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise; Convention NO. 98, concerning
the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organise and Bargain Collectively, and Convention NO
151 on the Protection of the Right to Organise and
Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in
the Public Service, commonly known as the Labour
Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 [22]
Convention No. 87 states inter alia, that "workers and
employers, shall have the right to draw up their
constitution and rules, to elect their representatives
in full freedom, to organise their administration and
activities and to formulate their programmes" and that
"public authorities shall refrain from any interference
which would restrict this right or impede the lawful
exercise thereof". Part II Article 5 of Convention 151
on the protection of the right to organise in the
public sector states that public employees'
organisations shall enjoy complete independence from
public authorities; that public employees' organisation
shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of
interference buy a public authority in their
establisbment, functioning or administration and that
in particular:
acts which are designed to promote the
establisbment of public employees' organisation
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under the domination of a public authority, or
to support public employees' organisations by
financial or other means, with the object of
placing such organisations under the control of
a public authority, shall be deemed to
constitute acts of in interference within the
meaning of this Article.
However as of January, 1994, Botswana had ratified only
two ILO conventions, all dating back to the 1920's.
These are Convention 14 of 1921, on Weekly Rest,
(Industry) and Convention 19, of 1925 on Equality of
Treatment (Accident Compensation) [23].
A question may be posed as to what the relevance of the
ILO conventions is to the analysis of labour law in
Botswana, especially because where international
conventions are at variance with laws of a sovereign
country, laws of sovereignty prevail. This question is
important for two reasons: first, as a member of the
ILO, Botswana is expected, though by no means required,
to abide by these conventions, otherwise there is very
little sense in belonging to such an organisation.
Secondly, ratification of these laws will mean Botswana
has to put them into effect, and this would mean
removing section 13(2) of the constitution, which, as I
have pointed out, was enacted specifically to control
the labour movement in both the private sector and in
the public sector.
7.9	 CONCLUSION.
This chapter has	 charted out the structure of the
Botswana industrial relations system, and revealed
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various forms of labour control embodied in these
structures. These forms of control involve a variety of
strategies such as the state's creation of minimum
conditions of service and protection of basic rights,
as provided for in the Employment Act, the intervention
of the state, through the Labour Office, in industrial
disputes, to mediate, conciliate and if necessary to
order compulsory arbitration to break any bargaining
deadlock, the denial of the state employees the right
to form and belong to trade unions, but the creation of
an alternate and less demanding form of representation
in the public sector. This had the effect of limiting
the strength of organised labour in the public service
by emasculating its capacity to bargain collectively
with the employer.
The state, however, has not sought to impose a
constitution on either the BFTU or the national unions,
or to impose a secretary general as it happened in
Kenya or Ghana. Nonetheless, the Botswana state still
defines the parameters of organisation of the trade
union movement both internally and externally. The
legal environment within which the trade union movement
in Eotswana has been operating in the last two decades
has seriously constrained its development and limited
its autonomy. This constitutes a system of labour
repression.
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Contrary to what Dunlop (1985) argues, an industrial
relations system is not bound together by an ideology
shared by all actors. The foregoing account of labour
law in Botswana show that an industrial relation system
is not stable and integrated but is bound together more
by coercion than by consensus. As Hyman (1975:11)
points out, to define industrial relations system
solely in terms of rules and regulations presuppose
that industrial relations is about the maintenance of
stability and regularity, with the focus put on how
conflict is contained and controlled, and the question
of whether the existing structure of ownership and
control in industry is a source of conflict is
dismissed as external to the study of industrial
relations.
As Hyman argues, an industrial relation system is just
an element in the totality of capitalist relations of
production: it does not presuppose consensus, but it is
a relation of domination and subordination. An.
industrial relations system viewed from the vantage
point, is therefore, a process of control over work
relations in which job regulation, is merely one of the
many forms of such control.
But having said all this, it must be pointed out that
there have been changes in the political economy of
Botswana. These changes have been accompanied by
quantitative and qualitative changes in the composition
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and the awakening of working class consciousness on the
part of the workers. Whilst the state's industrial
relations practices such as the wages policy and labour
laws, such as I have analysed, provided objective
structural limitations within which the working class
could perceive their options, the working class has
gradually developed their own counter-ideologies and
counter-discourses and learnt, in the course of the on-
going confrontation with the state and capital, that it
can challenge the system. Neither the state nor the
capital have a monopoly of political or ideological
dominance.
As Marx and Engels (1968a:37-38) argued, one of the
progressive roles played by capitalism is that wherever
it has got the upper hand, it has put to an end all
social relations that bound man to his "natural
superiors", and has left remaining "no other nexus
between man and man than naked self interest". It is
this self interest that propels workers forward. As
Hyman (1975:6) argues, the social contradiction which
offers the greatest potential for structural change is
that between the independent collective character of
productive activity, and the concentration of ownership
and control of economic resources in a small number of
hands. According to Hyman, the spontaneous
collaboration which modern production requires offers a
basis for collective intervention of workers to
transform society,	 and	 the	 crucial	 additional
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ingredient for such a transformation is a conscious
organisation in pursuit of this objective.
Botswana workers have at times displayed a capacity to
resist their domination by the state and capital. These
acts seek to exert the autonomy of labour and challenge
the hegemony of capital albeit within the limits of the
structures of state control, domination and
subordination. This is the point to which I turn to.
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CHAPTER EIGHT.
Trade Union Growth and Development. The Post-Colonial Era.
INTRODUCTION.
One of the key features of the development of capitalism and
capitalist relations of production is the growth of formal
sector employment, whereby the labour force is freed from the
traditional non-waged economic activities, such as subsistence
agricultural production, into waged labour. The economic
growth and the consequent structural transformation of the
various sectors of Botswana's economy in the post-independence
period have provided a dynamic new basis for an increase in
the number of wage earners, led to class formation, engendered
class contradictions and created a potential for unionisation.
The purpose of this chapter is to give an historical overview
of the growth and development of the trade union movement in
Botswana. Trade unions, and the movement of class of which
they are a part, are dynamic social organisations that develop
both quantitatively and qualitatively over time, with regard
to both size and density. That is, the proportion of trade
union membership as a percentage of the working class as a
whole or in particular industries. Working class consciousness
is also a dynamic phenomenon. With time, trade unions gain
experience, confidence and foresight in their dealings with
the management.
I start this chapter with a brief historical overview of the
trade unions in colonial Botswana and show that trade unions
in Botswana have always been viewed with suspicion by the
238
colonial state. I then move on to the examine the state of the
trade union movement in the post-colonial period and show how
the working class have growing numerically due to the changes
in Botswana political economy. I then examine the limitations
of collective bargaining and the settlement of disputes
procedures. I conclude by arguing that notwithstanding its
obvious limitations, the trade union movement in Botswana has
proved to be an important organisation of workers, and one
that they cannot do without.
8.1 Trade Unions in Colonial Botswana.
In Botswana, as in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, the
development of trade unionism, to a large extent parallels the
late arrival of capitalism in this part of the world. Until
the 1940s there were no trade unions in the country. The
persistent underdevelopment of the economy and the absence of
wage labour on any significant scale ensured that there was
virtually no working class in the country to support a trade
union movement. The opportunities for formal employment were
in South Africa, where most of Botswana's workers went as
migrant workers. The limited extent of industrialisation
during the colonial period, the first trade unions in
Botswana, as in many other parts of Africa, were concentrated
in the lower and middle ranks of the civil service and public
enterprises such as the Public Works Department (Gladstone
1980)
The first trade union in Botswana was the whites only European
Civil Service Association formed in 1948. It was followed by
the formation of the African Civil Service Association in
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1949. These two existed as parallel organisations, speaking on
behalf of white and black employees respectively. After
Independence, the two merged to form the Eotswana Civil
Servants Association (BCSA) [1]. In the very small private
sector side, the first trade union to appear was the
Francistown African Employees Union (FAEU), which was formed
in 1949. The FAEU was a local union based in Francistown, in
the northeast of Botswana. The FAEU was open to all workers
in all manner of employment, except public officers. Most of
its membership were unskilled and semi-skilled labourers with
very little formal education (Simkin, 1975) . According to
Simkin, the FAEU collapsed after about six years after its
formation due to such problems as poor quality leadership,
lack of resources and financial mismanagement.
The efforts to form a country-wide trade union were only
realised in 1959 with the formation of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate Workers Union (BPWU). The BPWtJ, had its
headquarters in Serowe, and branches in Mahalapye, in central
Botswana, Lobatse in the south and Maun, in the north. In
1963, the Bechuanaland Trade Union Congress (BTUC), was
established, and was later instrumental in the formation of
the Bechuanaland General Workers Organisation (BGWO) in 1964
t2]
Is in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa at this period, the
trade union movement in Botswana, small as it was, was also
involved in nationalist politics of the time, and the trade
unions were divided along ideological lines. For instance, two
of the four trade unions mentioned above were aligned to the
240
two rival nationalist political movements. The FAEU and BPW(J
being the more conservative, and inclined to the so-called
'bread and butter" trade unionism, were aligned with the
Bat swana Democratic Party, (BDP), which was viewed as more
reactionary and pro-imperialist, whilst the BTtJC and BGWO
supported the radical nationalist Botswana Peoples Party,
(BPP) [3]
As noted in Chapter 4, the BPP had very strong links with the
African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, and the
Convention People's Party of Kwame Nkuruniah in Ghana. The BPP
was therefore viewed as a pro-communist and subversive
organisation by the out-going colonial administration. It
appears that the administration had become increasingly
worried by the political direction of the infant trade union
movement, and was taking more than a passing interest in the
emerging trade union movement [4]. Though police surveillance
reports show that all the parties had established relations
with various trade unions, the colonial administration seemed
to have been more worried by the radical nationalist BPP. In
one report on the BGWtJ, the Special Branch noted that unlike
the other trade unions, this trade union was politically
inspired, and was following the Ghanaian pattern. According to
the report:
[Its] formation is an attempt to prevent any
opposition to the BPP, on the part of the workers...
[The] decision to form a country wide Trade Union
movement affiliated to and part of the BPP was
definitely inspired by Ghanaian contacts [5].
The report concluded by noting that there was an increasing
awareness of the trade union movement in the urban areas, and
that it would be essential to encourage, if possible, the
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development of "healthy" trade unions guided along independent
and non-political lines.
The greatest threat to this growth would be the
formation of a strong BGWtJ organised by the BPP and
influenced and guided and possibly financed by the
Ghana TtJC. Pressure would no doubt be brought to bear
on this union, to undermine any ICFTU influence and
affiliate with AATUF [6].
Another confidential report on trade union activity in the
country advised that:
Although it is inevitable that trade unions will be
subjected to political influences, it is essential to
establish them on sound foundations, and to develop
constructive attitude which will enable them to resist
the effects of subversive movements to turn them into
their instruments for achieving their own ends.. .The
basic need appears to be that of ensuring that the
embryonic movements in the Protectorate are put in
official contact with western international movements,
visited, entertained and trained by their officials,
and assisted financially to enable this to be done
before the eastern international movement takes them
under its wing [7].
To understand a little about the colonial state worries about
the emergent trade union movement in Botswana one needs to
look at the international and regional situation prevailing at
this time. This was during the height of the cold war between
the capitalist West and the Eastern Bloc of countries. This
cold war rivalry had permeated and caused a split in the
international labour movement (Thompson and Larson 1978).
There were now two international trade union movements, the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) based
in Brussels and supporting the free enterprise system, and the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) based in Prague, and
supporting socialism.
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This cold war rivalry percolated down to the colonial
countries and pervaded local trade union movements. With
regard to trade unions in the colonies, Gladstone (1980:53)
points out that in the pre-independence period, political
factionalism was an important factor responsible for trade
union multiplicity. He argues:
Political orientations of different parts of the
trade union movement were ideological, spanning the
entire political spectrum. In part this situation was
influenced by the pressures of the ideologically
divided international and metropolitan trade union
movement and mirrored these divisions.
Even in Botswana, this cold war rivalry was felt. According to
Motshidisi (1975), the FAEU and BPWU, had now merged to form
the Bechuanaland Federation of Labour (BFL) and had
established links with and received assistance from the ICFTU
in Brussels, while the ETUC had established links and received
assistance from WFTtJ based in Prague. It is within this
context that in 1962, one J.S. Longrigg, wrote a confidential
memo to the Government Secretary in Mafikeng warning the
government about trade union developments in Botswana.
Longrigg said that in the course of gathering material for a
despatch on trade unionism in South Africa, he met Leon
Levy, President of the South African Congress of Trade Unions
(SACTtJ) and that during their discussion, Levy told him that
SACTU was negotiating with the Ilinfantuu trade unions in the
High Commission Territories for their affiliation to SACTU.
Longrigg cautioned:
This [SACTU] is the left-wing trade union organisation
affiliated to the Congress Alliance, to which the
majority of the African trade unions belong. On the
international plane, it is affiliated to the All
African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) whose
headquarters is in Accra. Levy himself is reputed to
be a Communist, although I am bound to say that he did
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not talk like one when I saw him. . . It will be
unfortunate if the Territories trade union movement
joined SACTU. In the first place, it would line them
with the South African Congress Alliance and thus
directly involve them in political activities against
the South African Government. In the second place it
would link them firmly with Accra; and thus reduce the
chance of healthy influence being brought to bear on
them from ICFTtJ or the British TtJC [8].
Thompson and Larson (1978) point out that the ICFTtJ and the
WFTtJ were bitter ideological enemies who were striving for
spheres of influence in the trade unions around the world.
Motshidisi (1975) argues that:
Following the break between the WFTU and the ICFTIJ in
1949, the ICFTU wasted no time in spreading its
influence into Africa. It sent missions to make
contacts with trade unions and their leaders. To this
end, it had the support and cooperation of the
colonial authorities- for at least, they had one thing
in common, they were anti-communist, and they both did
not want the WFTTJ to entrench itself in Africa.
The 1960's were also a turbulent era in the history of the
Southern African sub-continent. This was the period when the
Nationalist Party in South Africa had just banned the leading
black political organisations, namely the African National
Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the multi-racial
South African Communist Party. Through trade, labour
migration, and contiguity, some Batswana were enmeshed in
South African politics, and the nationalist demands for
independence in Botswana was regarded as very much a part of
the whole liberation movement in Southern Africa. According to
Parsons (1984) the Bpp had about 20 branches in South Africa,
five of them in the Johanesburg area alone. These links
between the BPP and the black nationalist politics in South
1frica caused the colonial government in Botswana to throw
their weight behind the BIJP.
244
There are two closely related points that arise from this
brief historical overview, and against which we should locate
state control of the trade union in post-colonial Botswana. In
the first instance, in the on-going anti-colonial struggles of
that era, trade unions had thrown their lot with the
nationalist forces. Even in Botswana, with its limited
industrialisation during the colonial era, even the small
trade unions that were there were also involved in the anti-
colonial struggles, as we can see from the concerns expressed
by the colonial administration about the alliance of the BPP
and the BTTJC and BGWO.
This alliance, which seemed to have taken its organisational
inspiration from Nkruinah's Convention Peoples Party and the
ANC, had made some political impact through rallies, marches
and boycotts of businesses allegedly discriminating against
black people (Gossett,1986) . Boycotts of business were
particularly strong in urban areas such as Lobatse, Gaborone,
and Francistown. In one such boycott, the police surveillance
report stated:
This is a political boycott which is fashioned on
recognisable Congress lines to test the influence of
local political leaders and at the same time launch a
demonstration against local Europeans. [9].
The report went on to say that it appears that the boycott was
intended to give a boost to a local activist or "budding
politician" as he was labelled, and that there was a
pronounced "anti-BOER" flavour which was based on "minor"
grievances such as allegations of contemptuous attitude on the
part of some European staff towards African customers and on a
case of unfair dismissal of some African workers. The
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boycotts, however, had their opponents, beside the colonial
administration. Gossett (1986) points out that 	 some of the
prominent violators of the boycotts were none other than
Seretse Kharna and his BIJP supporters, who had made a habit of
crossing BPP picket lines, presumably in an effort to win the
support of the business community.
The second point to note is that the development of the trade
union movement in Botswana can not be seen in isolation from
the international and regional situation. Botswana is part of
a region dominated by South Africa, in the international
capitalist system. As I pointed out in Chapter Four, the
unease of the colonial administration with the BPP and the
emergence of the BDP under the tutelage of the colonial state,
persuade us to view the decolonisation process in Botswana in
the context of attempts by the imperialist countries to
contain or roll back socialism aad t
	 tt' t
capitalist camp.
Capitalism is indeed a world system which reaches out to every
corner of the globe. That is why the control of trade unions
around the world is an important foreign policy item of
imperialist countries. This was particularly important during
the cold war, and the developments in the trade union movement
in Botswana were taking place at the height of the rivalry
between the ICFTU and WFT'J (Thompson and Larson 1978). There
is therefore a running thread of suspicion and hostility in
the attitude of both the colonial the post-colonial state
towards "politicised° trade union movement. This hostility and
suspicion were underlined by the measure that the post-
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colonial state took to restructure the trade unions to make
state control more effective.
8.2 Organized Labour in the Poøt-Co].onial Period.
By and large trade unions in Botswana do not have a long
experience or even seasoned leaders. That notwithstanding, it
can be argued that the attempts that have been made since
independence to habituate the trade union movement along the
lines that I have described in Chapter 6 were really a
reaction by the petty bourgeois state elite to the stirrings
of working class consciousness and restiveness and class
contradictions engendered by Botswana's rapidly changing post-
independence political economy.
As I have demonstrated in Chapter 4, the rapid economic growth
policies of the post-independence era have led to a
significant structural transformation in various sectors of
the economy. These have led to growth in formal sector
employment and rapidly expanded the social base of the working
class on an ever increasing scale. The process of
industrialisation, the separation of direct producers from
their means of production, and their re-constitution as a
"proletariat", increases the potential for workers to
constitute themselves in a new class organisation, the trade
union. It is the advent of trade unionism that accentuates the
class struggle against capitalism.
The trade union movement in Botswana really took off only in
the 1970s, when a number of collective labour agreements were
concluded with various employers. The first collective labour
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agreement in Botswana was signed in March, 1972 between the
Botswana Commercial and General Workers Union and the Botswana
Breweries Limited. The Mine Workers Union also entered its
first collective labour agreement with the mining house,
Bamangwato Concessions Limited in 1972, and with the De Beers
Mining in 1973. The Botswana Bank Employees Union concluded
its first collective labour agreement in 1974, with Barclays
and Standard banks, the only two commercial banks in Botswana
at that time [10]
The increase in formal employment has meant that, at least
theoretically, that more workers have come into the labour
market to support trade unions. These collective labour
agreements were not just symbolic or just formal, but were
indicative of the growing awareness on the part of trade
unions in Botswana. They have also opened the way for more
collective agreements by other unions and strengthened
unionism in Botswana. Table 8.1 shows the various sectors of
the economy and the corresponding levels of employment in
these sectors.
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TABLE 8.1
ESTIMATE NUMBER OF PAID EMPLOYEES BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (SELECTED YEARS)
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	 AUGUST 1981	 SEPTEMBER 1985	 AUGUST 1991
Agriculture	 4,800	 4,000	 6,700
Mining & Quarrying	 7,300	 7,300	 7,800
Manufacturing	 6,400	 9,900	 26,000
Electricity & Water	 1,600	 1,900	 2,500
Construction	 15,200	 11,500	 33,800
Commerce	 15,300	 18,300	 41,000
Transport &	 3,900	 5,700	 9,100
Communication
Finance & Business	 4,900	 6,800	 16,100
Services
Community & Personal	 3,800	 3,900	 8,600
Serivces
Education	 1,600	 1,900	 2,500
TOTALS:
Private	 142,500
Parastatals	 64,800	 71,200*	 11,800
Governrnent**	 32,600	 45,600	 68,500
TOTAL:
All Sectors	 97,400	 116,800	 222,800
SOURCE: STATISTICAL BULLETIN, SEPTEMBER, 1988; LABOUR STATISTICS, 1991.
* INCLUDES PRIVATE SECTOR
** INCLUDES LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TABLE 8.2
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
SEX AND CITIZENSHIP (MARCH, 1991)
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 	 MALE	 FEMALE	 CITIZENS	 NON-CITIZEN
TOTAL
Agriculture	 4,717	 782	 5,499	 177
Mining &
	
6,977	 470	 7,447	 359
Quarrying
Manufacturing	 15,301	 9,502	 24,803	 1,220
Electricity &	 2,173	 224	 2,397	 115
Water
Construction	 27,688	 3,584	 31,272	 2,558
Commerce	 19,336	 20,421	 39,757	 1,288
Transport &
	
6,921	 1,777	 8,698	 392
Communication
Finance & Business	 9,584	 4,768	 14,352	 1,792
Services
Community &
Personal Services	 5,047	 2,884	 7,931	 615
Education	 835	 1,090	 1,925	 615
Sub-Totals:
Private	 89,722	 44,106	 133,826	 6,€T3
Parastatal	 8,857	 2,396	 11,253	 521
TOTALS:
Private &	 98,579	 46,502	 144,081	 9,194
Parastatal
Central Government	 39,361	 23,105	 62,466	 2,079
Local Government	 8,708	 4,158	 12,866	 108
TOTAL ALL SECTORS	 137,648	 73,765	 210,413	 11,381
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, LABOUR STATISTICS, 1991
Th
TABLE 8.3
REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS AND ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP, OCTOBER, 1991
NAME OF UNION	 HEADQUARTERS	 ESTIMATED
MEMBERSHI P
40000
8890
8234
3401
1665
1125
700
450
400
230
212
196
174
152
150
104
50
46
30
30
1. Manual workers Union
2. Commercial and General Workers Union
3. Construction Workers Union
4. Mining Workers Union
5. Meat Workers Union
6. Railways Workers Union
7. Telecommunication Workers Union
8. Postal Services Workers Union
9. Bank Employees Union
10. Railways Senior Union
11. Diamond Sorters and Valuators Union
12. Development Bank Staff Union
13. Railways Staff and Artisan Employers Union
14. Housing Co-operation Workers Union
15. Bank Union
16. Air Botswana Employees Union
17. Non-academic Staff Union (UB)
18. BAMB Workers Union
19. BPC Workers Union
20 BVI Workers Union
Gaborone
Gaborone
Gaborone
Selibe-Phikwe
Lobatse
Gaborone
Gaborone
Ga bo rune
Gaborone
Mahalapye
Gaborone
Caborone
Gabo rune
Gaborone
Gaborone
Gaborone
Gaborone
Gaborone
Palapye
Gaborone
TOTAL=
	 66239
Source: Register of Trade Unions and Employers Organisations, Botswana
Federation of Trade Unions, National Unions
Table 8.1 shows the keys sectors in terms of employment, and
also the trend in employment patterns. By August 1991, formal
sector employment in Botswana stood at 222,800. Of these
citizen employment stood at 211,413 (see Table 8.2) . According
to Table 8.1, the private sector has emerged as the largest
employer. In August 1991, the private sector employment stood
at 142,500 or 64 percent of total employment, followed by
central government with employment level of 68,500 and
parastatals with some 11,800 workers. The five dominant
sectors in terms of employment are: Commerce 41,000;
Construction 33,800; Manufacturing 26,000; Finance and
Business 16,100. But with a total 36 percent of total
employment, the state remains the largest single employer.
Table 8.2 gives a breakdown of formal sector employment by
economic activities, sex and citizenship. The table shows
that employment opportunities in Botswana are skewed in favour
of males. Out of total formal sector employment, some 137,648
or 65.1 per cent of formal sector employees were males, and
only 73,765 were females. There seem to be only one sector
where females predominate at work, that is in the teaching
profession. Non-citizen employment in Botswana is also quite
high, accounting for about 11,381 or 5 percent of total
employment. The most noticeable feature of non-citizen
employment in Botswana is that most non-citizens are mostly
employed in managerial, professional and technical jobs or
Supervisory positions (Lebang and Olsen, 1990), and as such, a
large share of Botswana'S income accrues to non-citizen
employees.
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In March, 1991, average non-citizen earnings were five times
higher than that of citizen employees (Table 5.1) . This
disparity has always been justified on the grounds that
government needed to attract skilled manpower from abroad, and
to do this the wages policy allowed employers, including
government, a leeway to pay expatriate workers "contract
addition" which gave the expatriate workers more in terms of
remuneration than a local employee with similar
qualifications and experience.
The predominance of non-citizen employees in management
positions have a historical explanation, and stems largely
from the fact that at the time of independence, in 1966,
Botswana's manpower resource base was virtually non-existent.
As I have discussed this at length in the Introduction, I
shall not repeat it here, suffice to point out that this wage
disparity was deeply resented by the citizen employees and had
been one of the factors that led to illegal strike actions by
public officers, in an unprecedented violation of the
country's laws banning strike by public officers (see Chapter
9)
Table 8.3 shows trade union membership in Botswana. By October
1991, total trade union membership stood at 66,239. Based on
March, 1991, formal sector employment (see Table 8.2) this
makes trade union density of 31 per cent. Its is possible that
trade union membership and trade union density in Botswana
could be higher if the public sector workers were not denied
the right to form and belong to trade unions. Compared with
some developed capitalist countries where there has been a
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decline in trade union membership, this is not a bad
performance. In 1988 trade union density was highest in Sweden
at 85.3 percent, and lowest in France at 12 percent. In
Britain trade union density stood at 41.5 percent in the same
year. (World Labour Report 1992:156).
By far the largest union in Botswana is the manual workers
union In October, 1991, the estimated membership of this union
stood at 40,000, or about two thirds of the total trade union
membership in Botswana. The manual workers union, is an
organisation of the so-called industrial class employees in
the state sector, that is in central government, local
authorities and parastatals. The manual workers union
therefore represents the "blue collar" section of the state
workers. The "white collar" public sector employees belong to
Botswana Civil Servants Association (BCSA), an "association"
registered in terms of the Societies Act, rather than the
Trade Unions and Employers Organisation's Act.
Next in line in terms of membership strength is the Botswana
General and Commercial Workers Union (BCGU), with a membership
of 8,890. The BCGU, it will be recalled from Chapter 6, is the
only general union in Botswana. It was exempted from the
restructuring process of the late l960s. The next in line is
the Botswana Construction Workers Union with a membership of
8,234, followed by the Mine Workers Union, with an estimated
membership of 3,401, followed by the Meat Workers Union with a
membership of 1,665, and the Railway Workers Union with
1,125. The rest of the unions are very small, with a
membership of less than a thousand. However, these small trade
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unions include the Bank Employees Union, which, despite its
size is one of Botswana's best organised, well resourced and
militant unions (See Chapter 9).
8.3 Collective Bargaining in Botswana.
One of the most striking features of the industrial relations
system in Botswana concerns the weakness of organised labour
vis a vis capital in the process of collective bargaining and
or in negotiations on various labour issues, including the
settlement of labour disputes. This fact was acknowledged by
the former Commissioner of Labour. In the 1989 Annual Report,
the commissioner pointed out that:
While the Labour Movement and Labour Department
constitute a weaker and a weak partner respectively in
the tripartite structure of our national labour
relations machinery, the employer constitutes a strong
partner. His representation is often by a mature and
experienced personnel officer. In urban areas of
Gaborone, Francistown, Selibe Phikwe, Lobatse, Orapa
and Jwaneng, the employer's representative is often a
retired top public officer, i.e. ex-Permanent
Secretary, a lawyer or a representative of a
consultancy company. [11].
But while it is true that BFTtJ is cash strapped and can not
employ people of the calibre of a retired top civil servant or
a top lawyer or labour economist, or a host of other experts
that are found at BOCCIM, there are several other important
reasons for its weakness. Certainly BFTU has a serious
manpower problem but this is not the only problem that BFTtJ is
faced with. There are two other problems, namely (a) lack of
disclosure of information for collective bargaining, and (b)
the absence of formal structures of collective bargaining. I
will deal with the last problems first, and then return to the
problem of manpower raised by the Commissioner of Labour.
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It is doubtful, even in the event the EFTU can raise enough
cash to hire experts to assist them in any collective
bargaining, especially in wage and salary determination, that
these people can do their work effectively. The TUEO Act
stipulates that once a trade union has been registered, the
employer is expected in terms of section 50(1) to deal with
the trade union as the negotiating body in respect of all
matters of employment. However, neither the TTJEO Act nor Trade
Disputes Act, (as amended), make any provisions for the
disclosure of information for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
In other words, although legally an employer is compelled to
recognize a registered trade union, and deal with it in
collective bargaining negotiations, the employer is not under
any legal obligation to disc1os to t	 oII	 tc'i
financial and other information concerning the company's
performance. This is yet another strategy of labour control
because it impedes the ability of trade unions to bargain
effectively. Salamon (1987:245) defines disclosure of
information for collective bargaining as:
[The] transfer to employee representative of
information generated as an integral part of the
managerial function of planning, controlling and
decision making and traditionally retained within the
exclusive possession of management.
In Botswana, the employer has no legal duty to keep his
employees informed about the state of the enterprise. Most
trade unionists have argued that they usually go to the
negotiating table with no factual information or knowledge
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that they can use to conduct a meaningful collective
bargaining [13].
The question that arises is, what really is the significance
of automatic recognition of trade unions, and the legal
requirement that employers should negotiate with registered
trade unions in their industries, whilst the management is
under no obligation to give out information for that purpose?
We are once again faced with a situation where the state gives
with one hand and takes with the other.
Admittedly, the disclosure of information for the purpose of
collective bargaining is a controversial and sensitive issue.
Salamon (1987:247-248) argues that managers have always
resisted the disclosure of information for various reasons.
One reason that has been put forward by the managers is that
in a competitive and conflictual environment of collective
bargaining, the possession of knowledge by one party to the
exclusion of the other is an important determinant of relative
power relationship, and that any disclosure of such exclusive
knowledge may affect the balance of power to the detriment of
the management. Another reason given is that the disclosure of
managerial information on a formal and regular basis may lead
to pressure for the expansion of joint regulation into much
wider areas of decision making, because the assumptions,
logic and implications of such information may be questioned
or debated by the recipients. The other reason that Salamon
cites is that managers are reluctant to disclose information
because it may be imprecise, and thus reflect adversely on
their capability and credibility to manage.
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In the developed capitalist countries like Britain, there
exist a legal requirement for the disclosure of information
for the purpose of collective bargaining. The question that
remains is, what type of information to disclose. Accordin g to
Salamon in Britain there exists a requirement to release to
the workers side information without which the trade union
negotiators will be to a material extent, impeded in carrying
on such collective bargaining. For instance, Advisory,
Conciliation, Arbitration Services (ACAS) Code of Practice
provides guidance as to the range of information which
management may be expected to disclose for purpose of
collective bargaining. Such information will include
information concerning the performance of the company, that
is, data on productivity and efficiency; savings from
increased productivity and output; return on capital invested;
sales and the state of the order book. Companies may also be
required to disclose financial information, that is, cost
structures; gross and net profits, allocation of profits;
sources of earnings; assets and liabilities; details of
government financial assistance; transfer prices; loans to
parent or subsidiary companies and interest charged (Salamon
1987:249-250)
As Salamon points out, however, this development must be seen
in the right context, which is that, in a developed country
such as Britain, there has been a general pressure within the
society for more openness in political and governmental
systems at all levels. The pressure on commerce and industry
is therefore directly linked to these societal pressures.
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However in small peripheral countries like Botswana, with
their industrialization dependent on foreign investment, it is
not easy to make such demands on foreign investors. As I have
pointed out in Chapter 3, the international political economy
of capitalism exerts pressures on the developing countries,
and the peripheral state, in its quest for foreign investment.
in turn exerts pressure and incapacitates the labour movement
in various ways. Lack of disclosure of information is
therefore one of the several mechanisms used to paralyse the
trade union movement. This is the first handicap for union
negotiators.
The second handicap concerns the absence of proper structures
for collective bargaining. Although trade unions were
compelled by law to organise along industrial lines, capital
was allowed to remain amorphous, with no corresponding
employer organisation. Martin Setihare, former executive
committee member of BFTU I and Deputy Administrative Secretary
for Botswana Mine Workers Union in Selibe Phikwe, has argued
that trade unions are made deliberately weak by being forced
to negotiate at plant or enterprise level. He argued that the
present employer's organisation, BOCCIM, is just a
heterogeneous organisation of various employers. He argued:
BOCCIM can not address regulation of relationship
between employers and employees. They are more
concerned about profit. BOCCIM can not have a role in
industrial relations because it is not an industrial
organisation. Trade Unions in Botswana have been
formed along industrial lines, but they have no
counter-part employer organisation to negotiate with.
What workers want is employer organisation to
negotiate with, not to negotiate with the management
of a particular plant or enterprise [14].
259
These views were also echoed by Johnson Motswarakgole, the
National Organising Secretary of the largest union, the
manual workers union, which represents the 40,000 industrial
workers in central government, local authorities, and public
corporations. He pointed out that the only collective
agreement that exists is between the government and the union,
and only affects workers in central government. There is no
collective agreement with either local authorities or public
corporations. He pointed out in our discussion:
The biggest problem facing our union is that although
the union has been registered as one union in
accordance with the Trades Union and Employers
Organisation Act, we have three different employers.
These employers have different powers and resources.
We therefore have to negotiate separate agreements for
members of one union. This presents obvious
difficulties. Some rnenibers may feel that they are not
adequately represented when their colleagues in other
sectors gain better conditions or wages, and they are
left behind. They do not understand that these
employers have different resources. It is even
difficult for industrial workers in local authorities
to understand how they can not have the same
conditions of service with their counterparts in
central government. But we are negotiating with our
three employers so that we can have common industrial
class regulations to cover all manual workers
throughout the country. We want one consultative
machinery in which employers representative will face
employer representative. At the moment industrial
workers in local authorities are not covered by the
Unified Local Government regulations. Each local
authority controls its employees in its own ways. We
are proposing a joint consultative machinery that will
be comprised of council secretaries, and town clerks
on the one hand, and ourselves on the other [15].
Iow to return to the question of manpower. The Commissioner of
Labour alluded to the fact that some of the weakness of the
labour movement is that it does not have the calibre of
manpower that the employers have. A similar criticism has
already been voiced by Peter Olsen [161. To the extent that
this is true, it is related to the fact the TUEO Act plays a
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part in weakening the strength of the unions, and thus
strengthening the hand of capital.
As the EFTU Secretary General pointed out, the managers of
capital have a habit of depriving the trade unions of their
most educated and experienced leaders who had no sooner been
elected into trade union office than the employer "kicks them
upstairs" into "pseudo managerial" positions [17]. Once a
worker has been promoted into a managerial position, they lose
their trade union membership rights, because they are now
members of the management. Section 61 (12) Cc) of the TUEO Act
defines a member of the management as:
an employee who is employed in a capacity that
requires him to have full knowledge of the financial
position of the undertaking or enterprise in which he
is employed or gives him personal access to other
confidential information relating to the conduct of
his employers business".
The tactics of the managers of capital to "promote" educated
and experienced trade unionists in order to silence them and
at the same time weaken the trade union has become a very
popular management weapon against trade unions in Botswana.
Employees who have thus been promoted are not expected to have
anything to do with a trade union, but may join a "staff"
union. At the centre of the "bogus promotion" is whether an
employee has the right not to accept promotion, especially if
that promotion is viewed with suspicion by the employee or the
union.
Although this tactic is alleged to have been used over the
years, the first test case was only brought to court in 1990
in the case of Tamasiga V National Development Bank (NDB)
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[18]. The applicant lost the case. The details of the case are
that the applicant, who was a Senior Projects Officer at the
NDB head office and the chairman of the staff union, was
transferred to another post in Serowe, some 300 km north west
of Gaborone.
Tamasiga refused the transfer and after some time his contract
with the bank was terminated by the bank. The applicant
appealed to the Labour Office, citing Section 27 of the
Employment Act, which gives the employee the right to protest
against termination of contract of employment. The Labour
Officer confirmed the transfer and subsequent termination, but
ordered that Tamasiga be awarded compensation equal to two
months basic salary. Tamasiga then applied to the righ Court.
for reinstatement. In his submission Tamasiga based his
application for reinstatement, first, on the law of contract.
He asked the court to rule in his favour on the grounds that
the transfer was an unreasonable instruction as the position
of Assistant Regional Manager did not exist and that this puts
him at risk. He further argued that the transfer amounts to a
demotion because whereas his present position entitled him to
approve projects of up to P20,000, the position of Assistant
Regional Manager limited him to projects of up to P10,000. He
further argued that his academic qualifications, a BA degree
in Economics and Statistics and an MBA, were those of Project
Officers and not of a Regional Manager, and that the position
of a Projects Officer is different in content, rank and status
from that of Assistant Regional Manager.
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Secondly, the applicant sought reinstatement because he
believed that the transfer was a victimisation for his trade
union activities, that is to say, the management wished to
curtail or hamper his trade union activity by sending him to
an isolated place and promoting him to the post of Assistant
Regional Manager. The applicant invoked section 23 of
Employment Act, which prohibits employers to terminate
employment on the grounds of trade union membership. Tamasiga
also told the Court that he has told his employer that he did
not want to become a Assistant regional Manager and that he
had decided to not to accept the offer.
In his ruling the judge said that there was no way that a
letter of transfer could be construed as an offer that the
applicant was entitled to accept or refuse. The judge referred
to one of the bank's condition of service which said that "an
employee shall be liable to serve in any branch of the bank
within Botswana and to perform the bank's business anywhere
outside Botswana". In his concluding remarks, the judge
pointed out:
I have therefore come to the conclusion that there was
an order of transfer and that order was lawful and not
made with an ulterior motive of preventing the
applicant rendering service to the Union. In any
event, I pause here to point out that his salary was
paid by the Bank. His first duty in terms of his
employment was to the Bank and if he felt that he
could not render service to both the Bank and the
union then in my view he had to make a choice [19].
This on the surface seems a straight forward judicial
pronouncement based on a sound and diligent interpretation of
a contract of employment, but it is the analysis rather than
surface interpretation, that is of interest to me here. This
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judgement reveals the inequality embodied in the contract of
employment under capitalist relations of production. In this
relationship, the worker does not only surrender his capacity
to work to the employer, but even cedes his right to accept or
refuse redeployment. As Crouch (1977:4-5) points out:
At the core of both class relations and industrial
relations is the economic relationship of domination
and subordination: the labour contract. In exchange
for his wages the worker places his labour at the
disposal of the employer. This relationship is
distinguished from other commercial contracts in that
the worker accepts a role of subordination. . . For a
specific wage payment the employer acquires a
generalised capacity to control the labour... It may
well be the case that within the terms of the
relationship subordinates are occasionally able to
exercise more situational "power"; but this should not
obscure the fact that the employment relationship is
necessarily one in which one party places itself under
the control of the other.
In Chapter 3, I raised the issue of the rule of law and how
this innocuous legal principle may actually conceal relations
of domination and subordination. The judgement in Tamasiga v
NDB is an example of how the principle of the rule of law
conceals the fact that the applicant's interests are
subordinate to that of the employer. This inequality enables
the law to resolve a dispute by virtue of its power rather
than its impartiality.
8.4 Settlement Procedures and Arbitration.
Although the Trade Disputes Act was amended in June 1992, to
pave the way for the establisbment of an Industrial Court, by
March, 1994, the Industrial Court had still not been
constituted. Labour disputes of both individual or collective
nature are on appeal from the Commissioner of Labour or on
instruction from the Minister, referred to the Permanent
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Arbitrator for decision. Although in theory the Permanent
Arbitrator has all the independence, he is a senior civil
servant of the rank of Assistant Attorney-General. Secondly,
section 20(2) (d) of the Trades Disputes Act clearly
circumscribes the judicial independence of the Permanent
Arbitrator by giving him a guide-line that stipulates that his
judgement must take into account the social and economic
policies of government. The Permanent Arbitrator's decisions
must necessarily take on board social and economic policies of
government, such as the wages policy. In both the letter and
the spirit of the above section, the Permanent Arbitrator had
to bear these in mind. It can be argued that the decisions o
the Permanent Arbitrator were therefore judicial as well as
political.
Up to March, 1990, only twelve cases had been referred to the
Permanent Arbitrator for a decision. But most of these labour
disputes were about rights involving the interpretation of
individual labour law, and most of these have been deposed of
at the level of the District Labour Office (Lebang and Olsen,
1990). Most of the grievances were primarily concerned with
the statutory conditions of employment as per the Employment
Act, breaches of contract by the employer in cases of unfair
or unlawful dismissals. If the labour office found against the
employer and the employer did not accept to reinstate the
employee, then the employer would be asked to pay two months
basic salary in lieu of notice.
According to Lebang and Olsen (1990), by 1989, the District
Labour Offices around the country had recorded some 5478
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individual grievances, with 4636 carried over from the
previous years. They point out that although 4244 cases were
settled in 1989 with a total of P274 253 being recovered from
employers on behalf of the employees for breaches of
statutory provisions of the Employment Act, some 5803 cases
remained unsettled and were carried over into 1990. This is
more than 10% of the 1989 private sector employment figures.
But this is more than mere statistics. This points to the
fact that in Botswana there is no security of employment. As
most trade unionists argued, if all that the employer is
required to do if he does not like an employee's face is to
fire him and pay a compensation of only two months then it
becomes nonsensical to talk about security of employment [201.
There are no known cases of individual disputes that have
reached the Permanent Arbitrator. But the interesting feature
is that like the individual disputes at the level of the
labour officer, even collective disputes have mostly been over
rights, as opposed to disputes over economic or political
interests of the trade unions. For instance in 1989 the Bank
Employees Union went on a strike for one week following a
breakdown in negotiations.
The facts of the case are that following a dispute involving
the interpretation of the collective agreement in which the
Commissioner of Labour failed to bring the two parties
together, the workers refused to return to work. Thereupon the
Commissioner of Labour referred the matter to the Minister.
The Minister declared the strike illegal in terms of the
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Trades Dispute Act, and referred the matter to the Permanent
Arbitrator for compulsory arbitration.
As I have pointed out already, when the matter is before the
Permanent Arbitrator, any industrial action in pursuance of
the dispute is illegal. However, the workers defied the law
and stayed away for two more days after their strike was
declared illegal, before their lawyers could persuade them to
return to work. Meanwhile the management decided to deduct
wages for those two days. This resulted in another dispute
that was taken to the Permanent Arbitrator for voluntary
arbitration. When the matter reached him, he found against the
union because the workers had been on an illegal strike. The
original grievance was dealt with a separate matter [21]
Another case of dispute over rights involved a non-unionised
group of Batswana artisans who complained to the Commissioner
of Labour because of pay discrimination. The matter was
referred to voluntary arbitration. The local artisans had
complained that their salaries were 40 percent lower than
those of expatriate artisans from South Africa, who happened
to have the same qualifications and experience as atswana
artisans, and that these pay differentials were discriminatory
and contravened the Employment Act. The management defended
themselves by arguing that the 40 percent differential was
made up of allowances that government accepts as inducement
for expatriates. However, because the basic salaries and the
"allowances" were in a package, the arbitrator refused to
accept the management argument and ordered that local artisans
must be paid the same amount as
	 their expatriate
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counterparts. The ruling increased the local artisans salary
by 40%. But because this was a voluntary arbitration, the
management appealed to the High Court. The Court found that
the Minister was wrong in ordering arbitration, and the
decision was declared null and void [22].
The only case of a collective dispute that involved a dispute
of economic interests of the workers was that of Botswana Mine
Workers Union V BCL Botswana Mining Co [23]. The facts of the
case are that the union proposed to management a 40 percent
wage and salary increase across the board for certain grades.
The management countered by saying that they wanted to
negotiate the introduction of economic rents and the phasing
out of subsidies to the workers. The union wanted the two
issues to be discussed separately. This resulted in a
deadlock, and the matter was referred to voluntary
arbitration. The arbitrator agreed with the union that the two
issues should be negotiated separately, and awarded the union
a 30 percent wage increase as against their proposed 40
percent, but nevertheless substantially higher than the 10
percent suggested by the management.
what is of interest are the reasons for this award. The
Arbitrator pointed out in his judgement that the union has a
good case because in the first place, workers work a longer
week than workers in the public sector whose wages and
salaries have been raised by 10 percent recently. The
arbitrator rejected the management's argument that the
company will not be able to sustain the pay increase because
the prices of metals are volatile. He said that the 10 percent
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salary increase in the public sector was a cost of living
award and not a wage and salary increase. He said that BCL has
for a number of years not been profitable and was unable to
meet its liabilities. However, there were now indications that
the situation as has changed as the company has started paying
its creditors and that the award "takes into account the
sacrifices made by the employees of BCL during the lean years
that the BCL went through". The Permanent Arbitrator observed:
The history of the union in this dispute of wage
increase has shown remarkable appreciation of the
circumstances under which BCL has been operating its
mine. It has shown restraint in not asking for wage
increases during the difficult periods during which
the mine operated. It is only proper that when the
company is making an operating profit that recognition
be given to the fact that inflation has eroded
whatever purchasing power the employees had, more so
given their forbearance in making up for that loss of
purchasing power. It is therefore unreasonable on the
part of management to keep on insisting that the bad
times are not over when the current two years in the
history of the mine profits were made and legal
liabilities were being met to ask the union to forego
a modest increase [24.
The management were however told that the award does not pre-
empt them from negotiating the ±ntroductjon of economic rents
or subsidies.
8.5 Sectionalism and Class Consciousness.
As I pointed out above, it was capitalism that brought about
the working class in the first instance. As result trade
unions have emerged not only as part of the capitalist
economy, but they have also organised according to the
capitalist division of labour. The sectional character of
trade unions therefore derives from the sectional character of
capitalism. Because trade unions are organised along sectional
lines rather than class lines, there is a tendency for some
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sections of the trade union movement to focus on the short
term interests of particular groups of workers rather than the
long term class interests (Kelly 1987:54-7) . This has led to a
problem of sectionalism in the working class movement.
Sectionalism can be defined as a working class consciousness
in which one's own group interests are placed above those of
the other groups either within a trade union or between trade
unions (Kelly 1987:131)
According to some trade union theorists , one important litmus
test for the growth of class consciousness is whether trade
unions are able to transcend the problem of sectionalism and
develop a corporate consciousness, that is, identify their
sectional interests with those of a large corporate body, such
as national federation, and thus with the working class as a
whole. Working class consciousness cam also by judged by the
transition from corporate consciousness to a more hegemonic
interests, that is, when the working class as a whole
identifies their interests with those of the society as a
whole (Kelly 1987:88).
There are a few problems of sectionalism that are present in
the trade union movement in Botswana. One of these problems
concerns membership. Although trade union density at 30 per
cent may be considered to be relatively high, trade union
membership in Botswana seems not as • high as it should be,
considering that at least formally trade unions have the right
to exist, and, as I point out in Chapter 6, trade unions do
not have to negotiate for recognition. Ronald Baipidi, the
BFTU secretary general pointed out in the interview that some
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BFTU affiliates have not been giving the BFTU secretariat
correct information on their membership because they want to
avoid paying increased subscription to the BFTU. Subscription
to the BFTU is based on the level of membership. According to
Baipidi, some national unions have developed a tendency of
giving the lowest figure in order to pay the lowest
subscription. In fact when I was going through the files on
trade unions annual returns at the office of the Registrar of
Trade unions and Employers Organisations, I have also been
surprised to find that trade unions had not had any increase
in their membership for several years. This was surprising
considering the fact that employment in Botswana has been on
the increase for several years. According to Baipidi:
Workers have not yet been conscientized. They do see
the value of belonging to trade unions. At the same
time some workers have been threatened by employers
that they would be sacked if they beiong to trade
unions. This is against the law. But when we try to
investigate, workers do not come out because they fear
victimisation. There Is very little that we can do as
EFTU to fight this anti-trade 'rniori act tr
Other problems pointed out by Baipidi include poor
communication with affiliates. The country is too big and we
do have the resources to send out trade union organisers on
education tours and recruitment drives. We prefer to use the
available resources on seminars for those who have already
joined, he argued. Other problems enumerated by Baipidi are
(a) generation problem, (b) gender problem, (c) and
commitment and support for ones trade unions. I shall discuss
this briefly in turn.
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On the problem of generation gap, Baipidi pointed out that
this has manifested itself when it comes to adopting
resolution for industrial actions, He said that older members
are very conservative and have been a constraining factor on
the younger ones who are more militant because they are aware
that they are still marketable, and can go and look for
another job. According to Baipidi when the union wants to call
for a strike actions, the older members are reluctant. They
say that they have to think about their families first.
On the problem of gender, Baipidi pointed out that some male
members in some unions are opposed to paid maternity leave,
saying that they are being overworked. "They say that it is
unfair for women to go on maternity leave on full pay, when
they [male workers] are the ones who are being overworked as a
result of the women employees' absence". Baipidi pointed out
that male workers are just jealous of the advantages that
females get over them.
On the problem of commitment to trade unionism, Baipidi
singled out the white collar workers as the least dedicated.
He pointed out that when BFTU proposed that subscription to
the national unions should be a check-off system, based on a
percentage of ones 's salary it was the white collar workers
who resisted, arguing that they will be paying more for
identical services. At the same time, Baipidi argued, the
white collar workers think they have everything, and only
think about the union when they are fired. "The lower income
group are the keen unionists" he pointed out. He continued:
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The white collar workers are the least dedicated, if
their attendance of our meetings is anything to go by.
But look at the manual workers. They are the most
militant and disciplined, and they support their union
all the way. These are the most exploited workers. If
the leadership calls for a strike action, they never
hesitate. They have nothing to loose. They do not
start thinking about housing and car loans when they
have to take industrial action. They do not start
worrying about where they will get the money to pay
their instalments if they are fired. They have no
loans with the company or the banks [261.
The problems of the labour movement in Botswana, some of which
have been described by the secretary general can be better
characterised by the concept of "interior determination",
which as involves the transmission of elements of bourgeois
culture which become accepted and transmitted or even
generated by the institutions of proletarian culture itself
(Cohen and Henderson 1991).
For example the negative attitude or lack enthusiasm displaced
by the white collar workers towards the trade union movement
reveals how much they have internalised white collar
mentality. They believe that because they are white collar
workers, and have relatively good salaries and mortgages and
car loans, they have everything they want. They are inclined
to support the status quo, or at the very least, do no want to
rock the boat. Thus tO the list of strategies of control such
as bonus schemes, pensions, gratuities, and promotions can be
added benefits such as company or bank loans. It would seem
that in Botswana, these strategies have met with some measure
of success, in so far as they have separated "white collar"
workers from their "blue collar" colleagues. As we can see in
the remarks made by the secretary general, solidarity between
the white collar workers and blue collar workers is very low.
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The point to bear in mind about this particular problem
sectionalism of the white collar workers is a result of the
capitalist division of labour process into "white collar" and
"blue collar". This is also a consequence of the degradation
and fragmentation of the labour process under capitalism, into
the such categories as "unskilled", "semi-skilled", "skilled"
and "expert" workers. This degradation and fragmentation of
the labour process created a privileged stratum or a "labour
aristocracy" which has developed a work orientation that
subjectively puts it on the side of capital, although
objectively it remains part of the working class. Which
explains why white collar workers do remember their trade
unions, but only when they are in trouble.
In Eotswana, this mentality has also been reinforced by
another strategy of labour control, the creation of the so-
called "staff unions" as a separate entity from the "regular"
trade union of the "rank and file" workers. This sectionalism
has actually been buttressed by law. The pity of it all, as
Cohen and Henderson (1991) point out, is that this form of
habituation is accepted and transmitted through proletarian
culture and institutions.
8.6 CONCLUSION
The economic structure of pre-independence Botswana was in the
main characterised by both undeveloped capitalist productive
forces and uneven development of capitalist relations of
production within the country itself. The working class was
just too small and organisationally weak to conduct any
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significant class struggle in a social formation whose
relations of production were predominantly non-capitalist.
This kind of economic structure placed limitations on the
development of the working class and class struggle in the
country. The strength of trade unions derive from the extent
of the spread of capitalist relations on the ground, that is,
in tandem with the development of capitalism.
As Marx (1968b) pointed out, capitalism has created for the
mass of the people who have been transformed by the economic
conditions into workers, a common situation and conimon
interests. This mass is thus constituted as a class in itself,
in relation to capital. This is indeed a very powerful insight
and a recognition of the dialectical relationship between
material conditions and the political and ideoloqical t
The development of trade unions in Botswana
intricately bound with the development of capitalism in this
country.
Although trade unions in Botswana are committed to working
within the capitalist system, as I have shown in chapter 6 and
earlier on in my discussion of collective bargaining in this
chapter, they have nevertheless strived to fight for the
interests of the workers even within the limits of that
system. This is much demonstrated in several legal actions
that trade unions have taken against various employers. It
can be argued that the trade union movement in Botswana have
at least fulfilled two important functions of the trade union
movement, namely providing elementary resistance and defending
the immediate economic interests of its members. Trade Unions
275
work well as far as they counteract, even if temporarily, the
tendency of to a fall in the general rate of wages. Their
great merit in their struggle to keep up wages is that they
tend to keep up and to raise the standard of living of its
members (Draper 1987:94-5)
Insofar as the trade unions can use their organisations in
defence of their immediate legal, social, and economic
interests of fighting the effects of exploitation, of
retarding the downward movement in their standard of living
and the miseries that capitalism imposes on them, then they
are at least fulfilling the minimum expectations of the role
of trade union. As Marx pointed out, trade union struggles are
an indispensable means of holding up the spirit of the
labouring masses, to prevent them from becoming apathetic,
thoughtless, and more or less well fed instruments of
production. Trade unions still remain the real organisation of
the workers in which they carry out their daily struggles with
capital (Draper 1978) . At the very least, the workers are
organised in organisations, they carry out their demands as an
organisation, and not as individuals. This is by no means a
sufficient condition for class struggle, but it is a necessary
one.
According to Marx trade union struggles are class struggle,
because in the course of its confrontation with capital, the
workers become united in their trade unions, and the interests
they defend become class interests, and the struggle of class
against class is a political struggle. The extent to which
trade union struggles in Botswana have become class struggles
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or even political struggles is the subject of the chapter that
I now turn to.
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CHAPTER 9.
CLASS ORGANIZATION AND CLASS STRUGGLES IN BOTSWANA.
INTRODUCTION.
The previous chapter has examined the development of trade
union in Botswana in terms of their qualitative and
quantitative aspects. I have argued, following Marx, that the
trade unions are the real organisation of the working people,
in which the workers carry on their daily struggles with
capital. By organising in the course of the struggle, the
working class becomes a self conscious class, that is, a class
for itself, and the interests it defends become class
interests.
The object of this Chapter is to show ho orki
have striven, within the limits imposed on them by the
capitalist state, to assert their autonomy, and to challenge
the capitalist system. But. as I have indicated in chapter 8,
the trade union movement in Botswana accepts the reality of
the capitalist system. The challenges that the trade unions
pose to the capitalist system are not to eliminate the system,
but to defend the immediate social and economic interests of
the workers. That is to counteract the tendency of the
capitalist production to push the value of labour to its bare
minimum. To this end workers have resorted to illegal strike
actions in a deliberate defiance of the law. It is argued that
these challenges by the workers, although expressed in purely
economistic terms, do constitute low intensity class struggles
that are going on in this country.
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The major causative factor of strikes in Botswana has been the
post-colonial wages policy that had been in place for almost
two decades. Coupled with this has been the insistence by the
government that any increases in wages and salaries all
sectors of the economy must be kept in line with increases in
wages in the public sector, and not so much with the rise in
productivity. In a situation where the state, as theguarantor
of private capital accumulation, intervenes in industrial
relations and interferes with free collective bargaining, it
transforms the trade union question into class question, and
class question into a political question. The trade union
struggles are longer "pure and simple", but political
struggles against capital and the state.
I start by giving an overview of the trade unions and class
struggle, and then examine strike actions in the private
sector, looking at the strikes by Bank workers and the miners.
I then turn to the examination of industrial conflict in the
public sector, which has been spearheaded by the blue collar
manual workers union and the white collar teachers
organisations. To appreciate the value of these strikes, focus
must not be on the immediate consequences, or even on the
number of workers involved or on the duration of the strike
actions, but on the fact that all these strikes were all
illegal, and deliberately so [1]
9.1 Trade Unions and the Class Struggle.
While there is no consensus as to what constitutes a class
struggle, it is generally accepted that these struggles relate
to the distribution of the social wealth. Sandbrook and Cohen
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(1975:199) argue that contemporary working class action in the
African context, with its militant economism, should be
understood in the context of the inequitable distribution of
rewards in these countries. They argue:
Consumptionism on the part of the workers is
undoubtedly stimulated by the contradiction between
the political class's command that unions restrain
wage and related demands in the public interest and
its practice of self-enrichment and conspicuous
consumption... [G]overnment, backed by a growing
bureaucratic and commercial class, will deny increases
in wages and services while at the same time swelling
the power, privileges and earnings of the dominant
economic groups.
Hyman (1975) argues that conflict in industry conventionally
centres around the distribution of its products, the level of
wages and salaries. He argues that it is the social pressures
that encourage workers to express their grievances and
aspirations in economic terms rather than as denants for
control and creativity in work. He argues:
The pressures are reinforced by the institutional
procedures of industrial relations: pay claims are
readily negotiable, since they provide ample scope for
bargaining and compromise; whereas non-wage demands
often involve questions of principle on which
compromise is far more difficult. Trade union
officials, face with the power of capital, are
normally far happier pursuing demands which offer
reasonable prospects of peaceful settlement; hence
workers' organisation reinforce the bias towards wage
consciousness.
Class conflict can take various forms, ranging from disputes
over such issues as the supervisor's attitude to the work
force, to disputes over pay determination. They involve such
actions as late coming, boycotts, sabotage of equipment,
absenteeism, go-slow, overtime ban and work to rule, etc.
Labour disputes can lead to strike actions of one type or
another and can culminate with different consequences for both
the employer and the employee.
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But what makes a strike a class conflict or even a 0low
intensity class struggle"? Again there is no consensus. But I
have been influenced by Marx's argument that economic
conditions first transform the mass of the people into
workers, and that their common situation and common interests
then constitutes them as a class in itself, against capital,
and in the ensuing struggles, this class becomes united as the
interests of individual proletarians are generalised into
class interests, and the interests it defends becomes class
interests, and their struggle becomes struggle of class
against class. Trade unions are therefore the real
organisation of workers in which the they carry out their
daily struggles with capitalism, and it is the organisation of
workers on a classwide scale, that is in trade unions, that
tends to politicise the struggle (Draper, 1978:87-88)
Strike action is only one form, albeit the rizos vsib)e fz
of the class struggle. The merican economist, Griffin (cited
in Hyman 1989:17) defines a strike as a "temporary stoppage
of work by a group of employees in order to express a
grievance or enforce a demand". Expanding on this definition,
Hyman points out three elements in a strike action: (a) that a
strike is a temporary stoppage and that the workers intend to
return to the same jobs with the same employer, who also
normally views the stoppage in the same terms; (b) the action
is a stoppage of work, and thus in principle at least distinct
from an overtime ban or go-slow, and that (c) it is a
collective action undertaken by a group of employees, and
differs from refusal by tenants to pay rent or students to
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attend lectures, acts which are called strikes only by
analogy.
Hyman (1975:19-25) argues that an important characteristic
which may distinguish different types of strikes is their
duration. Hyman makes a distinction between a "demonstration
strike" and a "trial of strength" strike. According to Hyman,
a demonstration strike is an industrial action which is short
lived and lasts only a few hours or a few days. This type of
action involves what he calls "perishable disputes". The
primary purpose of a demonstration strike is to call attention
to a grievance, and strikers are usually willing to return to
work to permit negotiations to take place even before
concessions have been offered. Hyrnan argues that it is these
types of strikes vñ-xich are prevalent Ti itri,
proven highly effective in speeding negotiations towards an
acceptable outcome. On the other hand there is a strike action
which function as a "trial of strength" between employers and
the workers, and lasts several days or even several months.
This type of strike action is rare.
Strikes can be official and legal, that is, when established
procedures have been followed, and the strike action is not
declared illegal by the state. Strikes can also be official
but illegal, that is when the proper procedures for a strike
action such as balloting members have been followed, but the
strike is declared illegal by the state. In Botswana there
have been many short lived "demonstration strikes", sometime
either official or unofficial (labelled "wild cat" by the
state), but all invariably illegal. Most strikes have been
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quickly resolved on the intervention of the Labour Department.
[2]
The important thing to note about the strike actions in
Botswana is that like strike actions I have examined in Ghana,
Kenya, and Zambia, they are more about wages, conditions of
service, unfair labour practices, and bad industrial relations
at the work place. These are the usual concerns of trade
unionism and they reinforce the arguments I have made that
strikes are more of defensive actions to protect the interests
of the workers. They are a challenge to, rather than a overt
attempt to overthrow, the capitalist system.
Botswana has also had its share of strikes of "trial of
strength" type which have shaken the system. These are the
strikes that I will concentrate on. At the end of this
analysis, I will attempt a broader definition of a strike
action that will reflect the situation as it exists on the
ground.
9.2 Class Conflict in the Private Sector.
(a) The Bank Workers Strikes.
The first major industrial action by the private sector
workers after the enactment of the Trade Unions Act and the
Trades Dispute Act of 1969 came on the 25th, November, 1974,
when about 700 members of the Botswana Bank Employees' Union
went on an illegal strike for about a week as a result of a
deadlock in negotiations over wages and other conditions of
service (Cobbe, 1977; Moyo, 1981)
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The dispute was about the pay differentials between local and
expatriate staff salaries and the management's failure to
implement the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry on
differentials between South African and Botswana rates that
the trade union had argued were discriminatory. The banks,
though British owned, were effectively managed from South
Africa by largely white male South African managers. In 1970,
the banks decided to increase only the salaries of the
expatriates in the form of "special allowances". This was
resented by the union, and the matter was taken up with the
management in 1971, but it was not until July, 1973, that a
one-man commission was asked to look into the dispute (Moyo
1981)
According to Moyo, the commission recommended that any
differentials between the local staff and expatriates should
be removed and that there should be one basic salary structure
for all the employees, and that any allowance paid the
expatriates must not be part of the basic salary. The
commission also recommended that the local staff must be given
back pays covering the period of the dispute.
By 1974, the banks had not fully implemented the
recommendations. The union added more grievances to their
original list, and accused the bank's management of retarding
the pace of localisation. Another complaint was that banks'
wages and salary structures, which were pegged to those of
governnient by the Wages Policy Committee (WPC), failed to take
into consideration longer working hours worked by bank
employees. The union argued its members could not be compared
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to state sector workers who work regular hours and argued that
the comparison did not take into consideration fringe
allowances paid to state sector workers. There was a deadlock
and the union served the Commissioner of Labour with a strike
notice.
On the 22, November, 1974, two days before the strike, the
Minister banned the impending strike in an announcement in
Government Gazette Extraordinary. The strike was declared
illegal in terms of the Trade Disputes Act, on the grounds
that the union had not exhausted the requirements of the Act.
The workers resolved to go ahead with the strike anyway, and
the strike commenced as planned on the 25th, November, 1975
and went on until 2nd, December, 1974.
After a week, the management warned workers to return to work
or face dismissals. Cobbe points out that in spite of the
return to work by the strikers, the banks awarded increases in
wages and salaries shortly thereafter. Cobbe (1977) speculates
that the intransigence of the management could also have been
influenced by the government's attitude that Bank workers were
already well paid in the relation to the majority of private
sector workers and have no moral right to be asking for more
pay.
The next major bank strike was in 1989, when some 592 workers
belonging to Barclays Bank of Botswana went on a one week
strike. The strike, which was described as the country's most
devastating financial sector strike, was prompted by the bank
management's decision to review the salaries and make a 10
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percent wage offer to managerial staff without following the
procedures of the collective labour agreement [3]
According to the union, such review and increments were in
violation of the collective labour agreement entered into by
the commercial banks and the Botswana Bank Employees Union
[4]. The Department of Labour failed to persuade the workers
to go back to work, and the Minister declared the strike
illegal in terms of the Trade Disputes Act, and the matter was
sent for compulsory arbitration.
The Permanent Arbitrator found that indeed the bank's decision
to make salary increment without consulting the union was
ultra vires the interests of the union. The arbitrator
however, upheld the management's decision to deduct two days
wages from the strikers pay packet on the grounds that workers
had continued with the strike after it was declared illegal
[5]
It is not possible to estimate the financial cost of the
strike to Barclays Bank, but it must have been substantial
because thereafter the Minister took the unprecedented action
of declaring banking an essential service, effectively
outlawing strikes in the financial sector. Since then there
has been no other strike in this sector, and only time will
tell what the future course of action will be.
(b) Mine Workers Serikes.
The first strike in the mining sector was at Orapa in 1974,
when a group of machine operators and other workers went on a
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three day "wild-cat" strike after a dispute over minimum
wages. Orapa is a small remote but very modern town and hosts
one of Botswaria's major diamond mining operations: a high
yield, capital intensive extractive mining operations and
highly profitable to the De Beers group. According to Cobbe
(1977) the workers had asked for wage increase and the company
was ready to accede to the request. However, the government
intervened and said that the workers were already being well
paid in the terms of the wages policy. When the miners
threatened to strike, the government backed down, and allowed
the management to increase wages.
The defining moment for Botswana 's labour relations came in
July, 1975, at Selibe Phikwe. Selibe Phikwe is a large copper
nickel mine involving huge financial resources from American
Metal Climax (AMAX) from USA and Anglo American Corporation of
South Africa. Since coming on stream in 1970, the mine had
been plagued by a series of technical problems that greatly
delayed production and thus affected government revenue
(Cooper,l978:244-277). The union had put forward a wage
demand for a monthly minimum of R56.00 in their negotiations
with the management. But the state, through the Wages Policy
Committee (WPC) intervened and instructed that the appropriate
minimum wage for Selibe Phikwe mine workers should be R40.O0 a
month (Ngidi, 1985). The management and the union could not
come to any agreement concerning wage increase demands, and
there was deadlock that was followed by a strike action. The
strike was declared illegal in terms of the Trade Disputes
Act.
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The striking miners locked the main gate to the main smelter
plant and some sections of the miners attacked expatriates
workers who were coming to work in company cars. Units of the
paramilitary force were sent in to disperse the strikers and
restore law and order in the mine. During the ensuing fracas,
more than 600 people were arrested. After the strike
government authorised the management to fire all workers and
re-employ them through a sifting process in which alleged ring
leaders and "communists" were not re-employed (Cooper, 1977).
It was Seretse Khama, the President of Botswana who seemed to
give succour to the management to do whatever they wanted with
the striking workers. The President claimed that he had
knowledge that the majority of the workers did not wish to
participate in the strikes but were intimidated by a "hard
core of politically motivated individuals who hope to reap
political rewards from the chaos which could result" [6].
President Seretse Khama expressed concern about workers who,
he argued, though comprising only a minority of Batswana, are
trying to hold the nation "to ransom" through wage demands. He
said that such demands were not in the interest of the nation,
because these demands could scare away foreign investors.
The President also said that it is essential for Botswana's
development that the country should continue to retain foreign
investment and that this could only be done if the companies
which invest in the country were allowed to obtain "a
reasonable return on their investment". The President pointed
out that illegal and unnecessary strikes have continued to
such an extent that Botswana would loose its reputation as a
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"stable and safe country to invest in" [7]. Thirty four trade
union activists were later tried and sentenced to terms of
imprisonment raging from three to twelve months for charges
including intimidation, riotous assembly and wanton
destruction to property.
9.3 Class Conflict in the Public Sector.
(a) Manual Workers Strikes, 1968/69.
Workers' struggles in the public sector in Botswana have been
spearheaded by the by the so-called "industrial class
employees", who are organized in the Manual Workers Union,
otswana biggest trade union (see Chapter 8 above). This union
is comprises the so-called "unskilled" workers like drivers,
cleaners, garbage collectors, grave diggers, cooks, security
guards, messengers etc, employed in central government, local
authorities or parastatal organisations. Manual workers have a
long history of militancy, and sov people	 pct tt .t wa
the manual workers militancy which prompted government to
amend the Constitution in 1969, and introduce tighter controls
on organised labour (Motshidisi, 1975).
It was on the 15th February, 1968, just a year after
Botswana's gained independence, that the manual workers union,
then called National Union of Government Manual Workers
(NUGMW), voted for a strike action which was to last for ten
days. The government departments involved were the Public
Works Department(PWD) workshop in Gaborone, Government
Printer, Central Stores, Botswana Agricultural College and
Content Farm in Sebele in the outskirts of Gaborone.
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The trade union cited the source of their grievances as low
wages, unfair dismissals, lack of proper protective clothing
and alleged that the clocking device has been tampered with to
prolong the working day [8]. After the commencement of the
strike, government issued a statement urging workers to go
back to work as some of their demands have been met, and that
a commission of inquiry would be appointed to look into their
other grievances like hours of work and protective clothing
[9]. The workers ignored the appeal from the government and
stayed away from work. Thereafter, the government issued an
ultimatum that workers should return to work before the end
of the following day, or face dismissal. Only ten workers
were reported to have returned to work before the deadline
expired 1101.
The following day a government spokesman announced that all
workers who had not returned to ork oLd tL
contracts terminated and would lose their gratuity rights. The
government also announced that those who wished to re-apply
for reinstatement could do so. Thereafter it was reported that
all the strikers who had defied the government's ultimatum had
"gone back to their respective departments to seek
employment". The PWD was reported to have re-employed all
workers whilst the Government Printer refused re-employ seven
of the twenty eight strikers [11]
In the meantime negotiations between the union leaders and
government continued behind the scenes with union leaders
insisting that all workers must be employed without pre-
conditions and that workers should not loose their gratuity
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rights. But government negotiators were adamant and insisted
that workers who wanted re-employment must first re-apply. The
government also refused to back down on its position that all
workers who went on strikes and had refused to heed government
ultimatum had lost their gratuity rights [12). However,
negotiation continued behind the scenes and on the 27th
September, the government backed down. The Minister of State,
Mr MPK Ngwako, told about 300 workers in Gaborone that
government had decided that the workers who had been on strike
would not lose their gratuity rights after all, although the
days on strike would count against their leave [13].
Later it emerged that during the negotiations, workers had
threatened to call a national wide general strike. But it is
not clear whether this threat had carried any weight or what
sort of compromise was reached behind the scenes. However, a
few months after this strike, the Secretary General of the
same trade union was reported as warning trade union activists
about the danger of indulging in politics, and that the union
had now decided in principle to persuade workers to cooperate
with the government in the development of the country. The
Secretary-General also warned the workers of the danger of
ignoring their trade union [14].
(b) The Teachers's Strikes.
The position of white collar public sector workers is a vexed
question. At the centre of the matter, as Fairbrother (1989)
argues, is that employment in the public sector, especially in
the welfare areas like education, health and administration,
is not directly or exclusively defined by capital-labour
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relation because these workers are more involved in the
production of use-values, rather than surplus-value.
Fairbrother (1989:192) argues in the context of teachers
struggles in Britain that:
To appreciate the class position of the workers, it is
necessary to consider the structural contradictions of
their place in a capitalist society... On the one
hand, workers in the welfare areas sell their labour
power for wages as teachers, nurses, administrators,
or clerical workers- on the other, these workers are
employed in contexts where the "iediate purpose" of
their labour is to produce use values, knowledge,
health, shelter or to provide the means of
participating in exchange relationships through income
maintenance.
Fairbrother argues that state employment is a distinctive form
of capitalist employment and that workers have increasingly
displayed a capacity to organise and act in ways that indicate
a recognition of their subordination as waged workers.
Thus in 1986, the Botswana's Teachers Union (BTU), the oldest
workers organisation, started to crunible as a result of
internal disputes when its ability to represent and articulate
the aspirations of its members was questioned by the more
youthful and militant members [151.
For more than 50 years of its existence, the BTtJ had
represented all members of the teaching profession in the
country. However, in 1986 the secondary school teachers broke
away to form their own teachers organisation, called Botswana
Federation of Secondary School Teachers (BOFESETE).
At its founding congress, held under the banner of "Mobilise
for a democratic teacher's federation", the secondary school
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teachers argued that the BTtJ was dominated by well paid
headmasters of an older generation who were reluctant to
challenge the state on any issue including conditions of
service and pay. The teachers also argued that the
organisation's leadership has abdicated its responsibilities
to its membership because of its failure to challenge the
government [16].
The secondary school teachers, who represent the young
generation of Batswana teachers have come to resent the old
guard in the leadership. They argued that the entire executive
committee of the BTU consisted of Principals and Head Teachers
who had benefited from the job evaluation exercise, and were
the happiest beneficiaries of the exercise [17]. The teachers
also accused the BTtJ leadership of being too complacent,
timid, docile and acquiescent in its dealings with government;
and that the BTU had been overtaken by events and had become
irrelevant and could not adequately address issues that face
teachers in contemporary Botswana [18].
BOFESTE's major grievance was low salaries. BOFESETE argued
that the teachers were not being paid well and that they want
to negotiate with government about their pay and other
conditions of service. As I pointed out in Chapter 7 above,
for public sector workers, except the industrial class
employees, negotiation and collective bargaining are an
anathema to the state, the employer.
Thus when BOFESETE first presented their application for
registration,	 the Registrar refused to register the
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organisation on the grounds that its constitution carried a
clause which said that one of the objectives of BOFESETE was
to negotiate with the government. After the offending cause
was removed and other amendments made, BOFESETE was duly
registered on 10th February, 1987 as an association, in
accordance with the Societies Act, and not as trade union, as
it would be the case under the Trade Unions Act.
After registration, BOFESETE faced another challenge to its
existence. It now had to battle for recognition by the
Ministry of Education. Apparently, the old guard in the
Ministry of Education, some of whom had been promoted to their
jobs after long teaching experience, were not favourably
disposed to the "rebellious and confrontatonal"	 to
[191
The Chairperson informed the delegates that they had pleaded
with the ministry officials and pointed out to them that by
not recognizing BOFESETE they were acting contrary to the
spirit of section 13(1) of the constitution, but that their
plea had fallen on deaf ears. The refusal to recognize
BOFESETE seemed to have been spearheaded by the Permanent
Secretary of Education, who is reported to have labelled
BOFESETE as a "divisive and sectarian organisation". The
Permanent Secretary is said to have instructed all head
teachers throughout Botswana not to help BOFESETE with any
facilities [201
BOFESETE carried on, and toward the end of 1987, about 500
teachers, all claiming to be members of BOFESETE, refused to
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mark junior certificate examinations papers, in protest
against conditions of service. They argued that accommodation
was poor, that the food was bad and served under unhygienic
conditions, and that the pay for marking examination papers
was too low [21].
As the boycott continued, the ministry sent out letters to
individual teachers threatening to charge them with
insubordination and misconduct. The teachers, who are mostly
university graduates, and therefore some of the most educated
workers in Botswana, also saw an opening and tried to force a
de facto recognition by the ministry. The strikers refused to
have any dealing with the ministry officials except through
BOFESETE. Its secretary-general, Serake Mfolwe, pointed out
that the dispute could only be resolved by negotiations with
BOFESETE. He argued that the striking markers were BOFESETE
members, that the organisation is a legal organisation, whose
constitution clearly states that it was the sole
representative of the secondary school teachers [22]. BOFESETE
was finally recognized by the new Minister of Education, Ray
Molomo and his new Permanent Secretary, PD Molosi, following a
cabinet reshuffle after the 1989 general elections [23]
Despite this long journey to recognition, the formation of
BOFESETE seemed to have opened the floodgates of
rebelliousness on the part of the teachers. On the 24th,
November, 1987, eighteen Batswana lecturers at Molepolole
College of Education and at Gaborone Polytechnic went on a two
week strike and refused to mark examination scripts. Their
grievances concerned salaries, housing, and the slow rate of
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localisation. The strike was declared illegal in terms of the
Public Service Act and the lecturers were ordered to go back
to work. Later disciplinary action was taken against the
teachers involved, and their salaries were reduced [24).
The biggest strike by white collar workers came in September,
1989, when more than 10,000 primary school teachers went on a
four week strike in order to press their demands for higher
salaries. Unlike BOFESETE, which boycotted examination
markings, the action by the primary school amounted to a
strike action in the classic sense.
Like all other strike actions in the country, the strike was
declared illegal by the Minister of Education [25].
This is the background to the strike. Earlier that year, the
mostly young primary school teachers followed in the footsteps
of BOFESETE, and broke away from ETtI to form a primary school
teachers organisation called Botswana Primary School Teachers
Association (BOPRITA).
BOPRITA had emerged spontaneously early in the year in protest
against the recently completed job evaluation exercise. The
teachers said that they were dissatisfied with the methods of
the job evaluation which awarded more money to administrators
like Headmasters and Principals, and less to teachers [26].
During the debate on the job evaluation a majority of
teachers, again mostly young teachers, became increasingly
disillusioned with the leadership of the BTU for its failure
to defend the interests of the teaching profession, and
resolved to go on strike [27].
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Amidst threats of dismissal by the Permanent Secretary for
Education, BOPRITA instructed a firm of lawyers to proceed
against the Minister of Education and the Director of Unified
Teaching Service and to ask the High Court to set aside as
null and void the Job Evaluation recommendations as it applied
to primary school teachers. The grounds cited by the teachers
were that the job evaluation exercise was ultra vires the laws
under which they had been employed and in breach of their
contract of employment with their employer the state [28].
The case did not reach the court. Instead the ministry
appointed a "Special Task Force" to deal with the grievances.
The main objective was to examine the grading of all members
of the teaching service, with particular reference to primary
school teachers and to submit its report to the Ministry of
Education for onward transmission to Cabinet [29]. The
teachers were invited to send representatives. The matter did
not reach the High Court, and a compromise was reached [301.
(C) The Manual Workers Strike of 1991.
The most recent and biggest strike yet in Botswana's labour
history was launched by this section of Botswana's working
class in November, 1991 when about 40,000 workers went on a
one week strike following a breakdown in negotiations between
the union and the state. This followed a dispute over wage
claims and the interpretation of a collective agreement.
Workers felt the government had reneged on an agreement
reached to raise their wages from P237 to P600 per month, an
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increase of 154 percent. The wage negotiations had been going
on for almost a year following the adoption of a new wages
policy regrading of the public sector salary structure. As is
the case in public sector employment in Botswana, these
changes were not done through negotiations with the employee
organisations [31].
According to Johnson Motshwarakgole, one of the union
negotiators, when the government introduced a new wages
policy, the union assumed that deregulation meant that wages
will be determined through collective bargaining. On the basis
of this assumption, the union appointed a sub-committee to
devise a formula which the union could
	
use in its
negotiations with the government. According to Motshwarakgole:
The sub-committee resolved that the best way was to
negotiate for a living wage and decided to calculate
the living wage based official statistics on the cost
of living. The committee relied on what the Central
Statistics Office said was the basket of goods
required to maintain an average family. To arrive at
this the committee went to the shops and costed the
items in the CSO basket and arrived at a figure of
P600. The union went to the negotiating table with
this information, and demanded a living wage of P600 a
month, or an increase of 154 percent [32].
After protracted negotiations lasting several months, the
National Joint Industrial Coordinating Council, (NJICC), a
statutory body made up of union leaders and senior government
officials from the Directorate of Public Service Management
(DPSM), agreed that the 154 percent wage increase demanded by
the manual workers was justified and reasonable. The NJICC
then resolved to make recommendations to the re1evant
authorities" for approval [33].
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According to the collective labour agreement between the
manual workers union and the government, the NJICC, which is
chaired by the Deputy Director of DPSM, the second person in
command of public sector employment, is the highest
negotiating body [34]. It was the phrase "relevant
authorities" that seemed to have caused a lot of confusion and
much aggravation. For instance, when I asked Motshwarakgole,
what he understood by the term "relevant authorities", he was
of the view that it meant that the agreement will be taken to
the minister just for a "signature". But what happened
thereafter was a dramatic reversal of the understanding
reached by the two parties [35].
After receiving the NJICC recommendation, the Director of DPSM
asked his colleague at the all powerful Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning (MFDP) to give an opinion. In a
secret memorandum that was later leaked to a weekly newspaper,
the Permanent Secretary of FMDP rejected the wage claim by the
union, arguing amongst other things that the calculation of
the living wage was erroneous, and argued that in fact the
CSO basket shows that Poverty Datum Line is in fact P328. He
argued that the union had used average prices instead of
minimum prices.
The Permanent Secretary argued that the calculations of PDL
assumes that people with lower income purchase goods from the
cheapest possible source, but that the union has aimed at
finding items which when added together would yield the P600
per month, thus justifying the 154 percent wage demand. He
further argued that in any case wage determination can not be
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based on the calculation. of the Poverty Datum Line (PDL)
alone, but has to take into account factors such as labour
productivity and affordability by the employer to pay a
specific wage rate [36]
The Permanent Secretary further argued that there is no basis
to argue that union members' productivity has increased, and
that manual workers are already better off than their
counterparts in the private sector, and that any wage increase
would precipitate wage demands in the private sector, and
would have a rachet effect on the public sector salary
structure [37]
When the workers learnt about this opposition from the MFDP,
they felt that government had reneged on the collective
agreement and voted to go on strike for one week. After two
days, the strike was declared illegal in terms of Trade
Disputes Act, and the workers were warned to return to work or
face summary dismissals. On the second day of the strike, it
was announced that unless all the striking workers went back
to work the following day, disciplinary action will be taken
against them in terms of the Industrial Class Regulations
[38]
The workers ignored the threats of dismissal and went ahead
with the strike action. Four days after the warnings, the
government carried out its threat and sacked its industrial
class employees en masse, and instructed the local authorities
and parastatals to do the same in accordance with the
Industrial Class Regulations. These state that any employee
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who absents himself from duty for two consecutive days without
authorisation is automatically deemed to have terminated his
services [39]
For the whole of that week workers in Gaborone, which had the
largest number of manual workers would gather at the parking
area of the African Mall, a small shopping area mostly for
small businesses. The workers were joined by the University of
Botswana students who came to demonstrate their solidarity
with the university branch of the manual workers union. For
the whole of that week, the whole shopping area was like a
carnival, with workers and students boyi-toying (ANC dancing),
and singing, despite acts of provocation by units of the
paramilitary Special Support Group, which deliberately drove
through the chanting crowd several times [40].
On the fifth and last day of the strike, there was an
emergency cabinet meeting. After the meeting, it was announced
through the radio station that all sacked employees were now
advised to re-apply for their old jobs but were told that they
would loose all their benefits. This was interpreted as a
softening of government previous hard-line attitude, which,
according a source, could have been the attitude of just one
minister [41]
The government's reaction to the strike was given by the
Minister of Public Administration, in a written address to
Parliament. The Minister said that beside the fact that the
strike action was unprocedural in terms of the union's own
constitution and the Memorandum of Agreement entered into
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between the union and government, the strike action was also
illegal in terms of the Trade Dispute Act. The minister also
pointed out that the wage demand was not in the national
interest as it would have serious financial and economic
implications. He said the wage increase would mean diverting
resources that would otherwise have been spent on development
projects such as building more schools, more roads and more
clinics and reduce the general welfare of the nation as a
whole. Some of the reasons that the Minister gave were that
(a) an increase of wages for manual workers would result in
similar demands by similar categories of workers in the
private sector, where the salaries are even lower, (b) that
such demands would result jn marginal firms going out. o
business because of unaf fordable labour costs, (c) that other
firms may resort to automation, and that such transmission of
wage increases into the rest of the economy would result in
Botswana becoming a high wage economy. This, the minister
cautioned, would defeat the government's objective of
attracting foreign investment [42].
The union called off the strike after a week as planned in
order to continue with negotiations. But instead of continuing
with the negotiations, the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning announced that the government was going to appoint a
Salaries Review Commission to look into public sector wages
and salaries, and that the union would be invited to send
representatives [43]
The union for its part decided to take the government to court
and asked the High Court to declare the government in breach
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of the collective agreement; order the government to abide by
the agreement reached at NJICC and declare the government
lockout to be in breach of the collective agreement and to
declare the dismissal of all striking workers null and void,
and unreasonable and unlawful [441.
The judgement was a compromise. The Court held that the matter
was whether the decision of the NJICC had the effect of
constituting a minimum wage of P600 per month or was a
recommendation. The judge said that he was unable to order the
implementation of that decision, and ordered that it must
still be taken to the "relevant authorities" for a final
decision. Significantly, the judge seemed to agree with the
union that NJICC is the highest negotiating body. He even
referred to the speech by both the minister responsible and
the Director of Public Service management's implicit
recognition of the NJICC, but insisted that the earlier
statement by the Deputy Director, together with a letter from
the Director himself to the effect that though the decision
had been reached the matter still has to be taken to the
relevant authorities left reasonable belief that the matter
was not finalised. The judge concurred that the NJICC's
recommendation had aroused legitimate expectations on the part
of the employees, but ruled that the strike was nevertheless
unofficial in terms of the union's constitution, and also
illegal in terms of the law, and that the government's
decision to lockout the workers was therefore not a breach of
agreement. At the time of writing up this study, the manual
workers union had decided to take the matter to the Court of
Appeal [45]
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The most interesting aspect of this strike is that even before
the matter reached the High Court, the government announced
that it has made a policy decision to offer an option of
permanent and pensionable terms of employment to all serving
industrial class workers. The directive further stated that
all new employees will from the date of implementation of the
directive be appointed on permanent and pensionable terms and
conditions of service, and will not have any other option as
this will be their first contract with the employer. In other
words the manual workers are now going be treated as white
collar public officers and be governed by the Public Service
Act, and not TUEO Act.
This move by the state is significant bcaus that 1i 	 it
it is the assumption that by dressing manual workers in "white
collar" terms and conditions of service, the government will
no longer have any trouble from them. The Public Service Act,
as I have noted in Chapter 6, prohibits workers from forming
and belonging to trade unions, or from bargaining collectively
with the employer, the state.
This move by the state seems to be a strategy to demobilise
and incapacitate the manual workers, and remove, once and for
all, the irritation caused by this section of the public
sector workers. The state, which is the single largest
employer, will now become the largest employer as new
industrial workers come under the Directorate of Public
Service Management (DPSM). Central government employment will
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now account for about two thirds of total formal sector
employment.
9.5 CONCLUSION.
A question may be posed as to whether trade union
confrontations with the state or capital really constitute
class struggles or are even adequate indicators of the class
struggles. As I have shown these strikes have taken place
mostly on the economic terrain. This question needs to be
posed and answered because it has important political
consequences which I intend to deal with it in the concluding
chapter. Suffice to point out here that the strikes that I
have described have taken place in circumstances that restrain
free trade union activity and in spite of the legal
restriction imposed by the state on strike activities.
According to Marx and Engels (l968b), the existence of the
organisation of the workers, that is, the trade union
movement, is a sine qua non for political struggle. The fight
for political power emanates from the economic struggles. When
the working class is not yet advanced in its organisation to
undertake decisive campaign against the ruling class, it must
at any rate be trained for this eventuality by continued
agitation against, and hostile attitude towards the policies
of the ruling class. Otherwise, Marx, argued, the working
class would remain heart-broken, weak-minded, worn-out and
unresisting play thing of the bourgeois, whose self-
emancipation may prove impossible.
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The fact that workers start by making the usual working class
demands, for example, higher wages and improved conditions of
service, but choose to go on an "illegal strike" when these
are not met, or when they find the legal procedures too
cumbersome, suggests that the strike is as much against such
laws and procedures, as it is for the original demands. This
action is never really planned with any great meticulousness,
and is certainly not very calculative. The empirical analysis
of the strike actions in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia,
show that strikes are more often spontaneous, and only come
after a breakdown in negotiations.
All the strikes in Botswana have been illegal and unofficial,
and have ended up as rebelliousness against the state, than a
direct result of grievances arising from failure to reach a
settlement in collective bargaining. The strikes have
therefore been directed against both wages policy and or
labour law. This is because it is the legal procedures that
often prevents workers from entering into any meaningful
negotiations with the employer. I therefore disagree with
Anderson (1978) when he argues that trade unions as
institutions merely express class contradictions, but do not
challenge the existence of capitalism. Actually they do. But
this is not to say that they consciously or overtly want to
overthrow the system. To challenge the status quo arid to want
to overthrow it are two different issues.
My own definition of a strike will therefore be that a strike
is a spontaneous stoppage of work as result of accumulated
grievances from the work place, stored in the collective
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consciousness of the workers and aggravated by the negative
response of the state and or capital. As this definition of a
strike suggests, the grievances of the workers have to
accumulate in their collective consciousness and be aggravated
by the intransigence of the state and or capital. When the
workers deliberately break the law of the land, thus
expressing their disrespect for the state which is the
upholder of such laws, the conflict now becomes political as
well.
Waterman (1976:331) points out throughout industrial history,
and across the contemporary world, the strike has been the
most dramatic expression of wage protest, at once the most
typical and the most extreme form in which the workers
questions their socially allotted role. Like volcanic rumbling
and explosions, they provide information about fundamental
social structures and processes that are concealed by the
appearance of every day industrial life. Strikes are the
surface or the most visible manifestation of an ocean of
turbulent cintradictions (Shaheed 1979:182)
It is these "volcanic rumbling and explosions" that have
continually shifted the balance of forces in favour of the
working class, and as a result helped in the building of a
relatively better conditions of service and standard of living
for the working class in some capitalist countries. It was
through the workers own struggles workers standards of living
have significantly improved, not because of the benevolence of
the state.
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The final question that needs to be resolved in the light of
the strike activities that I have described is, who has won in
these confrontation between the state and labour or between
capital and labour? A question posed in this way is false in
the sense that it assumes that in the kind of struggles that I
have analysed, there has to be a total victory for one of the
parties to the conflict. Literature to support that argument
will be difficult to come by. The reality is that both parties
can justly claim victory, as they so often do. The labour
movement can claim to have won the battle whilst the state and
or capital can claim to have won the war.
The reality of the situation is described by Hyrnan (1989:22-
23) when he argues that some strikes may end in capitulation
by one side or the other, but usually a form of compromise is
reached. Having endured the losses which a strike entails,
both sides are normally determined to end with something to
show for their pains even if unable to convincingly claim
victory. This will have an impact on state policy. How the
state policy can actually be affected by working struggles is
the subject of the concluding chapter that I now turn to.
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CHAPTER TEN.
CONCLUSION: ORGANISED LABOUR IN THE THIRD PHASE.
10.1. State-Labour Relation Before the 1990g.
The previous chapters have given an historical overview and
critique of the political economy of Botswana from the time of
independence up to 1990. Through the examination of the
character and the form of the state, I have been able to
demonstrate that the post-colonial Botswana state is a
capitalist state located in an emergent capitalist economy
which it seeks to sustain through the process of private
capital accumulation. To this end, the Botswana state, which
is controlled by a petty bourgeois modernising elite, has
imposed all manner of restriction upon the trade union
movement.
I have argued that, notwithstanding its capitalist character,
the form of the state is aeterminea not 'oy capital alone üut
by a constellation of class and non- class forces in struggle.
The working class is a particularly important aspect of this
constellation for two major reasons: firstly, because of the
strategic place of the working class in the labour process;
secondly, because of the political strength of organised
labour in influencing the form of the state. Capitalism
constitutes the mass of the workers as a class in itself; the
development of trade unions begins to transform this class in
itself into a class for itself.
In a formally liberal democratic capitalist country like
Botswana, with regular elections, trade unions also may have
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electoral significance, if their members are mobilised around
social issues concerning the interests of the working class as
a whole. As I have argued, following Zeitlin (1980), the state
is the product of the historically specific constellation of
class and other social relations, and its policies are a
distorted reflection of the struggles for the realisation of
contradictory interests through the state. This is a political
struggle.
Admittedly, the trade union movement in Botswana is still
small and relatively inexperienced. What is more, the trade
union movement seems quite prepared to fight for its economic
interests within the parameters of the capitalist system of
production. The trade union movement seems to have accepted
the reality of the capitalist system, even as it challenges
elements of it from within. This is mainly because the working
class is a product of the same system that it is challenging;
the trade union struggle is defined by the terrain set by the
capitalist system. The trade union movement in Botswana has
done reasonably well in defending the economic interests of
its members and keeping up pressures on wages, but not in
linking up with any political form of the working class.
It was basically because of the development of capitalism in
Botswana that working class organisation evolved in the form
of trade unions. The economic growth policies of the post-
colonial period and the consequent structural transformation
that took place in the political economy of Botswana
introduced in social terms three related processes:
industrialisation, urbanisation and proletarianisation. All
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these factors combined to give the working class and their
organisation a much needed social weight (Fine 1990)
On the other hand, there was hostility and suspicion towards
the trade union movement from the side of capital and the
state. The post-colonial state reacted by restructuring and
remodelling the trade unions, and at the same time enacted
laws that prevented trade unions from organising in freedom.
One important element in the social weight of the trade union
movement in liberal democratic capitalist countries has been
the electoral power of the workers. Workers are not just
workers, they are also voters. As Kelly (1988) has pointed
out, several governments in Europe have been forced to
accommodate to the demands of the mass of the working class or
face electoral defeat. In Botswana, the opposition vote has
also been growing steadily since independence. In the 1989
election the main opposition party, the Botswana National
Front - a left populist grouping - won 27 percent of the
popular vote, and the combined opposition vote in the urban
areas, where workers are concentrated, was 56 percent. Most
urban councils are controlled by the opposition parties
(Parson 1990)
The social weight that the trade unions possess is
demonstrated eloquently in their confrontations with the state
and capital, given dramatic expression in strikes. Third World
workers, through their trade unions, have shown immense
capacity to act courageously against structures created by the
state, thus proving that the trade unions are still the
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"typical and universal organisation of the workers, the one
that they can not do without, and through which they both
discover and impose themselves on society" (Waterman 1977:58).
According to Draper (1978), the working class is necessarily
drawn into class struggle, insofar as capitalism fails to
satisfy its economic and social aspirations. It is capitalism
that compels and accustoms workers to struggle.
The social weight of Botswana workers, expressed both in
strike actions and electoral defeats of the ruling party, has
pushed the state to make limited reforms in labour legislation
in the early 1990s. Speaking at the official opening of the
seminar on the revision of labour law, the Minister of Labour
stopped short of admitting this reason as a factor behind
labour reforms. He argued that:
Because of government intervention, therefore, there
is a danger of [labour] disputes being politically
exploited and of government being accused of taking
sides... the time has come for ne and indepenc3ent
institutions to be established for the settlement of
disputes... At the political level we must ensure that
a situation does not develop whereby economic
inequalities lead to social and political unrest,
thereby destabilising the country as a whole... This a
matter of balancing forces.. .The time has come to
establish independent institutions, free of
government, to which both employers and employees can
turn if they are unable to settle their differences
internally [1]
The state in Botswana has now began to move away from direct
intervention in the country's industrial relations system. But
this only means that the form of state intervention has
changed, and not the essence of its intervention. For example,
in his address to Parliament in November 1990, President
Masire warned that, although labour laws were going to be
317
reviewed, the government would still have to ensure that
industrial relations do not "degenerate into anarchy". To this
end, he pointed out that the government would retain the right
to intervene in industrial relations where it deemed it
necessary and in the national interest [2]. However, the form
of the state and its intervention in industrial relations, is
important because it creates and defines the space within
which labour can act.
This change has been most visibly marked by reforms of labour
law in Botswana. In the next section I shall briefly sunimarise
them.
10.2. Labour Legislation in the 1990s.
(a) The Employment Act (1992).
The Employment Act still remains the main labour law of the
country and regulates the minimum conditions of service. In
the 1992 amendments, Section 26 of the Act, which gave the
employer the right to terminate contracts of employment where
an employee was guilty of misconduct, has been amended to give
a more precise definition of "serious misconduct". Before this
amendment, the interpretation of 'serious misconduct' was the
employer's prerogative. Section 27 of the Act, which gave the
Commissioner of Labour the power to settle individual
grievances, order reinstatement or compensation of two months
in lieu of reinstatement for unfair dismissals, was repealed
in anticipation of the establishment of an Industrial Court.
But the Commissioner of Labour will continue to exercise
powers of conciliation, although binding decisions can only be
made by the Industrial Court [3].
(b) Trade Unions and Employers Organisation Act 1993.
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This Act has been the most intrusive into trade ufljOflSl rights
and freedoms. Strangely, this Act was left out of the public
debate in the 1990 seminar. But its exclusion was not missed
by the trade union leadership; it expressed disappointed that
the Act had been excluded from the agenda for the debate [4].
Section 21 of the Act, which prevents trade unions from having
full time officials, still remains, with a minor alteration to
allow trade unions to continue to represent a member whose
case is on appeal. Section 22, which restricts the unions from
appointing full-time officials remains essentially the same.
The amendment was for clarification, rather than for
substantive change [5].
Section 30 of the Act, which gave the minister the power to
send his representative to attend the meetings of BFTU's
Executive or National Council meetings, has been repealed.
Section 32 of the Act, which gave the Registrar oi Trade
Unions the power to inspect the books cortairng the mirnites
of the	 meetings of the executive committees of national
unions or of the BFTU, has been repealed. Section 64 has been
amended to allow trade unions to accept scholarships, or
travel assistance, without the consent of the Minister. But
trade unions still cannot accept financial assistance from
outside Botswana without the consent of the Minister.
(c) Trades Disputes Act (1992).
The most important of the amendments to Botswana labour
legislation were in the Trades Disputes Act. The Permanent
Arbitrator has now been replaced by an Industrial Court, and
the role of the Commissioner of Labour and the Minister in the
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settlement of disputes has been greatly reduced. The
Commissioner will still have a role to play in mediation and
conciliation before a dispute can be referred to the
Industrial Court. Similarly, the Minister still has a role
where the dispute concerns an essential service. However, the
final settlement of the dispute will be a matter for the
Industrial Court. One important amendment to the Act is that
it has consolidated individual and collective disputes. Whilst
in the past, a dispute concerning an individual employee was
regarded as an "individual grievance", the amendment has
broadened the meaning of trade dispute to include individual
grievances [6]
The Act also makes provisions for ttie staisment ot ont
Industrial Councils (JICs). The absence of proper collective
bargaining structures, especially on the employers' side, has
long been an area of concern to trade unionists, but the
establishment of the JICs has a sting in the tail for trade
unions. A JIC can only be established by a joint application
from a trade union and an employer's organisation which
consider themselves to be sufficiently representative of
employees and employers in that industiy.
The application for the setting up of such a council will be
made to the Commissioner of Labour, who will have to consult
any other interested party to satisfy himself that the
formation of such a council is desirable and practicable. The
Act gives the Commissioner of Labour the power to refuse or
cancel the registration of a JIC. Interestingly, an appeal can
be made, but to the Minister, and not to the Industrial Court.
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This means that it will be relatively easy for the employers
to bring pressure to bear on the Minister not to establish
JICs. After all, it has been the trade unionists who have been
pressing for the establishment of JICs. The employers seem
quite happy with the amorphous BOCCIM (the Botswana Chamber of
Commerce, Industry and Manpower).
The question remains: are the employers ready to organise
themselves along industrial lines and to form joint industrial
councils? Only time can tell. Suffice to note that the
establishment of JICs depends on the voluntary agreement of
the two parties and is not a requirement. This gives the other
party, especially the employers, a leeway. Flowing from my
argument that it was the trade unions who called for the
establishment of JICs and not the employers, it stands to
reason that their formation in any sector of the economy will
be a very contentious issue. This will be especially so
because there are various employers of varying sizes and
financial viability. The fact that any disagreement on the JIC
will finally be resolved by a politician and not by the
Industrial Court, re-politicises industrial relations and is
likely to favour the employers.
From this summary of the amendments to labour laws, it can be
seen that many restrictions that I have pointed out in the
preceding chapters are still in place. The deregulation of the
labour market should, therefore, be viewed as a change in the
modality of state intervention in industrial relations rather
than in its content: it does not give substantially more
freedom to the unions.
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The state is mainly seeking to impose new forms of
subordination of labour to capital, as the old strategies
became more unstable. The increasing number of illegal strikes
of the last several years, some of which involved public
officers, certainly points in that direction. Removing any
threat to the political stability of the country is therefore
an immediate task for the state elite as Botswana enters its
third phase of capitalist development. With the establishment
of an Industrial Court, they hope that they can in future
beguile the workers by avowing "It is not the government. It
is the Industrial Court", and in the same breath warn the
workers to respect the rule of law. In order to support
Botswana's capitalist development, the government thereby
plans to avoid social upheaval.
The Botswana experience shows that though law can be used to
ensure class domination, it has at the same time to be seen to
be legitimate and acceptable by the dominated class. It is a
good illustration, as Pritt (1972:6) argues, 'of the Marxist
assertion that the law is one of the weapons of the ruling
class in the class struggle' . At the same time it illustrates
Pritt's claim that
the law is determined not just by the ruling class,
but rather by the results, varying from time to time
as the struggle sways to and fro, of the conflict
between the ruling class and the forces - especially
the working class forces - opposed to it; that
conflict may be as acute as ever, but is no longer as
unequal as it was.
The ruling class is forced to make concession to the working
class demands or risk disruption of both law and order and the
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economy. Law is only useful only in so far as it can succeed
in channelling discontent into safe areas and regulating human
conduct by making it predictable. If it can not achieve this,
then law becomes ineffective. Whether a strike ends in defeat,
compromise or victory for workers adds a new dialectic to the
state-labour relationship. This point is important to note
because it is central to the notion of class struggle. Though
labour law is, like other laws, made by lawyers and
politicians as a form of social control, it is mainly about
the activities, aspirations and hopes of ordinary workers and
in the final analysis, it rests on the consent of the governed
and can be made unenforceable if large numbers of people elect
to break it.
10.3 The Future of Collective Bargaining.
It is still too early to say what the future of collective
bargaining in Botswana is going to be. However, the partial
withdrawal of the state from two decades of direct
intervention in the economy and industrial relations and the
introduction of the Industrial Councils and the Industrial
Court increases the space for the working class in collective
bargaining.
The biggest formal obstacle to collective bargaining remains
lack of disclosure of information for that purpose.
Recognition of trade unions by the employers in Botswana is
not accompanied by an obligation on the part of the employer
to disclose information. The question that remains is, can
employers be regarded as negotiating in good faith when they
continue to have a monopoly of information on company
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financial records and future plans? Freeland and Davies
(1983:107) point out that the disclosure of information for
the purpose of facilitating collective bargaining is a crucial
aspect of recognition. Disclosure of information does not only
strengthen collective bargaining, but it also , strengthens the
hand of individual workers seeking to gauge their own
prospects and job security within the enterprise.
The disclosure of information is at the heart of effective
collective bargaining, particularly in cases like Eotswana
where relatively weak unions are denied all access to company
information. Under these circumstances, 'collective
bargaining' is neither collective nor bargaining, because one
of the partners is kept in the dark about matters within the
exclusive knowledge of the other but which are relevant to an
agreement. The financial records and the prospects of the
enterprise are relevant to wage negotiations; intended changes
in production methods are equally significant for bargaining
about possible redundancies and their consequences (Freeland
and Davies 1983:10)
This summary of the labour reforms of the l990s exposes the
limitations of capitalist democracy in the field of industrial
relations in Botswana. These limitations serve to underline
the argument I put in Chapter 2: that though the state is
forced by the struggles of the working class to accommodate
some of their demands and interests, this can only be done
within the framework of ensuring sustained capital
accumulation. In other words, the interests of the working
class are accommodated by making compromises only on secondary
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issues, without sacrificing the essential interests of
capital.
The labour movement cannot escape subordination to the
interests of capital even within liberal democratic regimes.
Limited as they are, however, the labour reforms won from such
regimes open important spaces that the labour movement can
take advantage of. This is the point to which I now turn.
10.4 CONCLUSION: Social Movement Unionism.
Though the labour movements of emergent capitalist countries
in the 'West' were the object of detailed analysis by Marx and
Engels and were the subject around which they constructed
their theory of social revolution, they never developed a
systematic theory of trade unionism. Instead, the subject was
touched upon at various stages ovex a ptio o
	 t'j
with the result that any Marxist theory of trade unionism has
to be culled out and collated from those many writings
(Moses,1990) . However, Marx's article on the role of trade
unionism, Trade Unions: Their Past. Present and Future (Draper
1978:99-103), contains vital clues of his thinking, and in my
judgment points in the direction of what has now become known
as 'social movement unionism' [7]
Marx argued that trade union struggles are a basic form of
working class struggle against capital; as such, trade union
struggles are also political struggles. This view, however,
does not represent the totality of Marx's perspective on trade
unionism. Marx also cautioned trade unions against relying too
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much on economic struggles. He cautioned that economic
struggles are only short-lived. Trade unions, if confined to
the economic terrain, will only be addressing the effects and
not causes of their economic problems. He pointed out that
trade unions have kept too aloof from wider social and
polilical movements. Marx injected a normative element in his
analysis of trade unionism and argued that trade unions should
not be confined to local and immediate struggles with capital,
but should 'awake to their historical mission': instead of
fighting for a fair day's wage, to act against the system of
wage slavery itself.
Marx argued that apart from their original purpose, trade
unions should learn to act as organizing centres of the
working class in the broad interests of its complete
emancipation; to this end they should aid every social and
political movement tending in that direction and consider
themselves champions and representatives of the whole working
class.
This was Marx's position and it is one which I am endorsing in
this thesis. The question, however, for the present is this:
How is this task - the linking of the economic struggles of
trade unions and wider social and political struggles - to be
accomplished?
According to Munck (1988:117-8), in countries such as Brazil,
India and South Africa, trade unions have been increasingly
reaching out to those sectors of the population which lie
outside formal sector employment, such as rank-and-file church
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workers, women's movements, community movements and other
organisations traditionally seen as outside the labour
movement. He argues that there is a growing confluence of
interests and a gradual overcoming of previous social and
political barriers, as some of these movements turn towards
labour and in other cases labour turns towards them.
According to Munck (1988:119-21), in Brazil since the mid-
1970s, neighbourhood movements have sprung up in big cities
like Sao Paulo, and provided workers with a social base for
support in their struggles. The struggles centred around
issues such as housing, health care, running water and
transport. He argues that the city was turned into a broad
supportive network in which were constructed multiple and
varied social spaces of solidarity. In India permanent
workers' unions have taken up the cause of temporary or
contract workers and there have been cases of industrial and
even white collar unions extending their organisations to
include rural labourers. There have also been acts of
solidarity of unregistered casual workers with the registered
work force.
In the case of South Africa, Lambert (1988:32-35; see also
Friedman 1987:1-9) argues that [before the advent of
democracy] a brand of trade unionism evolved in South Africa
that entailed a redefinition of the traditional role of trade
unions to include not only factory issues, but also township
living conditions. This necessitated alliances at both local
and national levels, and linkages of campaigns on the
shopfloor to local and national campaigns to deracialise and
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democratise the South African state. According to Larnbert, the
main content of this brand of unionism was the conscious
establishment of "structured" alliances with urban social
movements at the local level, and political movements at the
national level to challenge the existing structure of
capitalist dominance in the spheres of the economy, civil
society and the state.
The important thing to note about this brand of trade unionism
in the case of Brazil and South Africa, is that it emerged
under conditions of political repression and state
surveillance. It is only in India that this brand of trade
unionism has emerged under conditions of formally liberal
capitalist democracy. What are the prospects for social
movement trade unionism in Botswana?
The applicability of this brand of unionism to a liberal
capitalist democracy may differ from that of an overtly
repressive state. This is mainly due to the existence of other
forms of political expressions in a formally liberal
democratic regime. The shortcoming of Munck's account of the
Indian situation is that it does not shed any light on how
this brand of trade unionism articulated or related to
political organisations, such as the Communist or Social
Democratic parties, which are present in the Indian political
landscape. The difficulty of this brand of trade unionism in
conditions such as those of India and Botswana is that the
state has supported in a variety of ways - politically,
legally and ideologically - the separation of politics from
economic struggles. Trade unions are expected to confine
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themselves to economistic issues and the welfare of their
members only; any political issues are supposed to be the
responsibility of political parties.
There are two points to note here. First, the social and
community problems encountered in repressive political
conditions are similar to those encountered in a liberal
capitalist democracy. Second, even in a liberal capitalist
democracy the state still defines the parameters of trade
union activities. The difference is therefore one of form
rather than essence. In this context, how can trade unions in
a country such as Botswana adopt some form of social movement
unionism?
Part of the answer is provided by Waterman (1993:266-7), when
he gives ten suggestions (or propositions) for the creation of
social movement trade unionism. These suggestions are intended
to show how the traditional concerns of trade unions can be
linked with broader struggles in contemporary capitalism. I
shall not restate Waterman's suggestions but will attempt to
condense them in the following way.
Waterman's argument is that social movement trade unionism is
a brand of trade unionism which is struggling within and
around waged work for better wages and conditions and for
union control over the labour process as a whole, including
the struggle for socially useful production. Such unionism
should articulate with the movements of non-unionised or non-
unionisable workers, take up social issues within the society
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at large, and work for the continuing transformation of all
social relationships and structures.
The prerequisite for such linkages is recognition that
workers' struggles are not the only struggles in society, and
that these struggles are bound to founder unless they are
linked to 'non-class' struggles. The exact mix of Waterman's
suggestions, that is whether links must be structured as in
the South African case or left "loose", should, however, be
left to those on the ground. Suffice to point out that
Botswana is in need of urgent social reforms in many areas.
The first area is its industrial relations system.
I have shown how a large number of workers have been denied
the right of forming and belonging to trade unions. These are
the public sector orker, 1ct\	 t-3
teachers, nurses and other health workers, and local
government workers, and many other workers who are presently
denied trade union rights, such as agricultural and domestic
workers. The registered trade unions must realise that the
exclusion of these workers from the ranks of the trade union
movement is designed to cripple the registered trade unions
themselves.
It would, therefore, be a crucial strategic move if the
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) demanded the right
of these workers to form and belong to trade unions
(Waterman's propositions 3 and 7). Already teachers have taken
the unprecedented step of engaging in strike action in the
public sector, though the only support which they got from the
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3FTU was a message of solidarity. In future it would be
helpful if such actions were backed by more concrete forms of
support from the registered trade Unions: including regular
consultations, solidarity meetings, and financial and
logistical backing. All these can be done within the existing
legal framework. In addition the possibility of illegal
sympathy strikes should also be considered.
The second line of manoeuvre should be to link trade unions
struggles with community struggles, but in a way that will not
split the ranks of the labour movement (Waterman's
propositions 4 and 8). It is a fact of life that some workers,
for whatever reasons, are supporters of the ruling party. On
the basis of this, an overtly political union may not succeed
in Botswana. The question is, how do you link trade union
struggles with community struggles without being political?
As I have already indicated, Botswana is a developing
capitalist society. Its rapid economic growth policies and
structural transformation have created many social imbalances
that go beyond the immediate concerns of the labour movement.
For example, infrastructural development is biased towards
capitalist urban enclaves; in the rural areas where about
seventy five percent of the people live it does not exist.
People still travel long distances to get to the nearest
clinics, schools and other social services centres.
Agricultural subsidies still favour those with large cattle
herds. In the urban areas there is an acute housing crisis
which has resulted in exorbitant rentals. In Gaborone alone
some 50,734 people are on the waiting list for houses [8].
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There is no proper public transport and workers have to part
with their meagre wages to get to work on expensive and badly
run private taxis and mini-buses.
Though Botswana has a high GDP and per capita income, the
distribution of both wealth and income is highly skewed, and
there is a problem of child poverty and hornelessness. The
government is gradually introducing school fees; health care
is no longer free; at the same time the government has
increased military expenditure. The media, though formally
free, is dominated by the ruling party.
These problems, such as cuts in public spending in social
services, face the majority of the people in and outside
formal sector employment; they provide a common ground on
which the trade unions could take the initiative and reach out
to the people at large. The most important factor is that, of
all the organisations of civil society, trade unions possess
an organisational and administrative infrastructure,
collective identity, capacity to mobilise, and bargaining
power through their potential to disrupt the economy. Trade
unions, therefore, need to forge strategic alliances with at
present weaker organisations of civil society to increase
their social weight. These strategic alliances will be the
most effective demonstrations by which the labour movement can
convince the world that far from being narrow and selfish, it
aims at the emancipation of society as a whole, while at the
same time accelerating its forward march.
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The labour movement in Botswana should wake up to the fact
that a liberal democratic capitalist society such as Botswana,
with a competitive system of elections, offers prospects of a
more favourable terrain of struggle than fascism, dictatorship
or one-party state systems. Fortunately, it appears that some
trade unionists are already aware of the potential that
Botswana's liberal democracy offers. For example, Ronald
Baipidi, the Secretary General of BFTTJ, argues in connection
with the recent amendments to labour law that the ruling party
was panicking because it realised that it was losing seats,
especially in the urban areas: "They acquired a political
expert who advised them to bring the workers nearer, and to
bring the workers nearer is to satisfy their needs" [9].
Johnson Motshwarakgole, the National Organising Secretary of
the manual workers union, had this to say:
I think workers must participate in politics. We must
listen to all parliamentary debates, and identify who
says what, so that we can know who articulates our
demands. By listening to parliamentary debates we will
know who has our interests at heart. We will then
inform our members in every constituency which MPs are
for us and who are against us, and we will deal with
them at the next election [101
Though workers may suffer defeats they still have the
political space to push their demands and thereby shift the
balance of forces in their favour. Trade union struggles can,
therefore, be economistic as well as political. This is so
regardless of the fact that their demands may not be
explicitly posed in terms of the "class struggle".
As Marx (1953:93-94) said in his letter to Friedrick Bolte,
the political movement of the working class has as its
ultimate object the conquest of political power, but that this
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requires a previous organisation of the working class which
arises from economic struggles and then develops into the
political arena. According to Marx, every movement in which
the working class comes out as a class against the ruling
class and tries to coerce them by pressure from without is a
political movement. Here Marx used the example of the law of
the eight-hour day: if the economistic demands of the working
class can succeed into being put into labour legislation, they
are political because the class would have succeeded in
enforcing its interests in a form possessing socially coercive
force, namely law. In Marx's view, economistic strikes and
political struggles are on a continuum, rather than being two
sides of a coin.
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APPENDIX A.
The following ten propositions are posited by Waterman
(1993:266-7) as constituting preliminary definition of social
movement unionism. This means a unionism which is
1. struggling within and around waged work, not simply for
better wages and conditions but for increased worker and union
control over the labour process, investments, new technology,
relocation, subcontracting, training, and education policies;
such strategies and struggles should be carried out in
dialogue and common action with affected communities and
interests so as to avoid conflicts (e.g., with
environmentalists, with women) and positively increase the
appeal of the demands;
2. Struggling against hierarchical, authoritarian and
technocratic working methods and relations, for socially
useful products, for a reduction in the hours of work, for the
distribution of that which is available and necessary, for the
sharing of domestic work, and for an increase in time for non-
economic activity for cultural self-development and self
realization.
3.Intimately articulated with the movement of other non-
unionized or non unionizable working classes or categories
(petty-commodity sector, homeworkers, peasants, housewifes,
technicians, and professionals);
4. Intimately articulated with other non or multi-class
democratic movements (base movements of churches, women's,
residents', ecological, human rights and peace movements,
etc.);
5. Working for the continuing transformation of all social
relationships and structures (economic, political, social,
residential,domestic sexual) in a democratic and cooperative
direction;
6 Intimately articulated with political forces (parties,
fronts, and states) with similar orientations (ie, which
recognize the value of a plurality of autonomous social forces
in a transformatory project);
7. Intimately articulated with other potential allies as an
autonomous , equal, and democratic partner, neither claiming
to be, nor subordinating itself to, a vanguard or sovereign
organisation of power;
8. Taking up the new social issues within society at large, as
they arise for workers specifically and as they express
themselves within the union itself (struggle against
authoritarianism, bureaucracy, sexism racism etc.);
9. Favouring shop-floor democracy and encouraging direct
horizontal relations both between workers and between the
workers and other popular democratic social forces;
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10. Favouring direct shop-floor, grassroots, and community
contacts and solidarity internationally, both with workers and
other popular or democratic forces, regardless of social
system, ideology, or political identity.
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APPENDIX B.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.
Research methodology is an interface between methodic
practice, substantive theory, and epistemological underpinings
(Harvey 1990:1) . Methodic practice refers to the way empirical
data are collected, and ranges from observation through
interviews to reading documents. Theory is a set of
propositions that make a claim about the nature of the social
world, and epistemology refers to the presuppositions about
the nature of knowledge. Research methodology is therefore not
just about data collection methods in themselves, but about
the whole process of enquiry, which embraces conceptualisation
of the problem, as well as the theoretical debates that
surround it. According to Harvey, methodology is the point at
which method, theory, and epistemology coalesce in an overt
way in the process of directly investigating specific
instances within the social world.
Admittedly, mainstream sociological research is dominated by
the use of questionnaires, interviews, and participant
observation. This study, however, falls within the tradition
of historical sociology. Accordingly I have chosen the
historical method. This method is the most appropriate for the
chosen research topic. Typically, historical method relies on
documentary and archival sources. The obvious advantage of
this method is that it enables the researcher to take a longer
term historical perspective. Thus I have been able to look at
the political economy of Botswana, that is, the interaction of
state policies, the structural changes in the economy and
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class formation as a social process that has been unfolding
overtime.
Whilst I accept that the use of questionnaires, depth
interviewing and participant observation are respected
sociological methods, they would not be particularly useful
for this type of enquiry. To look for respondents whose
recollection and interpretations of the historical development
of Botswana goes back twenty five years is a task that would
have been both difficult and time consuming. I have, however,
carried out limited interviews with a few key informants and I
have used the information they gave me wherever I thought
there was a need to supplement my documents or archival
materials.
Whilst the use of documentary sources may not be very popular
in mainstream sociological research, document research is not
anything new, having been extensively used by such classical
sociologists as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Marx made extensive
use of sources such as official statistics, Her Majesty
Inspectors of Factories reports, reports by the Medical
Officer of the Privy Council, Royal Commission and Inland
Revenue Reports, and newspapers and periodicals. Weber made
extensive use of religious tracts and pamphlets, whilst
Durkheim relied on official statistics in his study of suicide
(Harvey 1990; Scott 1990).
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1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN.
Data was collected from the Botswana Federation of Trade
Unions headquarters; Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs;
Employment Policy Unit, the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning; Botswana National Archives; Botswana
National Library and the British Newspaper Library, London.
For data on economic growth, structural transformation and
class formation, I have relied on official publications such
as the National Development Plans, Labour Statistical
Bulletins, Employment Surveys, and Labour Department's Annual
Reports, and government papers. For data on income
distribution I have relied on Household Income and Expenditure
Survey and National Accounts reports and government
commissioned consultancy reports. I have supplemented these
with unpublished consultancy reports on wages policy and
government ministers' speeches on the wages policy and trade
unions. For state control of labour I have used statute laws
on labour legislation. To this I added a comprehensive review
of secondary material in the politics, sociology and economics
of post-independence Botswana. I have also used trade union's
commentaries on the wages policy and labour legislation and
searched for relevant newspaper coverage of strikes
activities, including government public reactions to strike
actions.
Most of the documents I have used were of two types: state
documents with archival access, and private documents, mainly
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), with archival
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access. Only on rare. occasions have I used government
documents of restricted access [1]
The general principles of handling documentary sources are no
different from those applied to other areas of social
research. In all cases data must be handled scientifically.
although each source requires slightly different handling
(Scott 1990:1-2) . To this end I have applied Scott's criteria
of quality control in handling documentary sources, namely
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.
Authenticity refers to whether the evidence is genuine and of
unquestionable source; credibility refers to whether the
evidence is free from distortion; representativeness refers to
whether the evidence is typical of its kind, and meaning
refers to whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible.
Authenticity of the evidence for analysis is the fundamental
criterion in research. Thus I had to satisfy myself that all
the documents were not forgeries and were indeed what they
purported to be. Establishing the authenticity of government
documents was not much of a problem. I got most of these
documents either from the Government Printer or from various
government offices. Although a possibility exists that an
incorrect entry could have been made in the documents, for
instance, some figures in the Labour Statistics do no always
add up, I have regarded this as a genuine error and not a
fraudulent activity. I have no reason to believe civil
servants can deliberately "doctor" documents in order to
mislead the public.
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With regard to consultancy papers, it was also relatively
easy to establish their authenticity because these were not
picked from the streets or from unreliable sources, but were
collected from the consumers themselves, that is, government
or trade union officials. I had no reason to believe that I
could be receiving false documents. For example, a consultancy
report by Coiclough and Olsen (1985) or the BFTEJ's Policy
Prptosal on the RecTulation of Wanes and Sal pries. Prices,
Profits, and Rents are examples of such documents which have
been produced for consumers, the government and the trade
unions respectively. On the question of authorship, I have
taken for granted the names of the authors inscribed on the
documents. For example, the first wages policy paper was
produced by Professor Ghai, a consultant. But I regard such a
document as an official Botswana government document because
it has been endorsed and accepted by the government as its
policy document on wages. I also suspect that several
documents I have used were produced by experts, for example,
the Household Income and Expenditure Survey report was
probably produced by civil servants at the Central Statistics
Office, and the EFTU policy proposals were probably written
with the help of a consultant labour economist. The President
and the minister's speeches on trade unions could have been
written either by civil servants or with their help. But I
have taken for granted that the speech is the work of the
minister who delivered it.
On the question of credibility, that is, whether the documents
consulted were free from distortion, I can only say that all
the documents I have used were prepared independently and
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beforehand. None of the documents were produced for my
benef it. I therefore believe that they are sincere and could
not have been altered for my benefit or to mislead me. The
question of credibility also applies to my respondents. I
believe that the views that these people expressed were made
honestly regardless of the fact that they could have erred in
fact or in judgment of the situation. As Scott (1990:22)
points out, the question of credibility should concern the
extent to which an observer is sincere in the choice of a
point of view and in the attempt to record an accurate account
from that chosen stand-point.
This point also applies to views expressed in the consultancy
reports. I have no grounds to believe that the consultants
have deliberately misled the consumers of the reports.
Similarly, the views expressed by the trade unionists were
made in their representative capacity. The extent to which
their views reflect those of the rank and file is a matter
that continues to bedevil representative democracy: the views
of the representatives are not necessarily those of the people
they represent. With regard to newspapers, I have ignored the
reporters' comments on strike actions, and concentrated only
on factual press statements or interviews of trade union
leaders or government spokesmen. Any newspaper commentary used
is acknowledged but not passed as fact.
The question of representativeness applies more to some
documents than others. Documents such as Household Income and
Expenditure Survey and Rural Income Distribution Survey were
prepared by professional statisticians using generally
343
accepted sampling frames and random selection procedures. This
is clear from the methodology section of these reports. The
fact that some of the findings are actually embarrassing to
the government testify to their representativeness and
authenticity. But as to whether the documents I consulted were
representative of the totality of all the relevant documents
pertaining to a specific issue under investigation is
difficult to say. I was dealing with bureaucracies of both the
state and trade unions. Bureaucrats are notorious for secrecy,
and as I point out below (see Section 1.5), I have been denied
access to some files. However, I believe that speeches by the
President and his cabinet colleagues accurately reflect the
position of the Botswana government. There is no known case of
a cabinet minister who has made a pro-trade union speech which
could be atypical of the government stand. I can safely say
that a speech by one minister, notwithstanding its particular
nuances or personal idiosyncrasies, to a large extent
represents or reflects state policy.
Finally, on the question of meaning, it is important to
realise that the ultimate purpose of examining documents is to
arrive at an understanding of the meaning and significance of
what the document contains (Scott 1990:28) Another important
point to be considered in the use of documentary sources is
how to decide which inference to make from a document about
matters other than the truth of its factual assertions (Platt
1980). For example, information on the growth of both Gross
Domestic Product and per capita income is given in factual
quantitative terms. On its own, this type of information may
lead people to expect a more equitable distribution of income
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and a higher standard of living. But when this information is
read together with information on sectoral and structural
changes in the economy, ownership and control of the means of
production, employment patterns and income distribution, the
picture gets more complicated. This is because statistics only
give what can be called face value meaning. Statistics are
only "raw materials" which must be interrogated and their real
meaning reconstructed. One can only make sense of this welter
of apparently disparate bits and pieces of information, by
situating it within a theoretical context. It is the theory
that re-orders these, and inferences come as a matter of
interpretation of the raw material informed by theory. It is
in this sense that Harvey talks of the methodology as a point
where method, theory and epistemology coalesce to make sense
make sense of the specific instances of the social world.
This study has looked at the issues that some of the
economists and political scientists alluded to have raised.
They have been discussed critically without negating the
valuable contributions these economists and political
scientists have made. The distinguishing characteristic of my
study is its class analysis approach, in which critique is at
the centre of the analysis. For instance, even though I have
sometimes drawn from the same sources as some of the
commentators on the political economy of Botswana, for
example, Harvey and Lewis (1990), I come to a different
conclusion on such issues as wages policy. Unlike these
authors, I look at structural changes and formal sector
employment as a process of proletarian class formation. While
some of the documents I have used have also been used by the
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very people who have often painted a rosy picture about
Botswana, I have focused on the issue that they have left out,
namely, state-labour relation. No social and economic
development can take place without the involvement of its
working people. The mode of production of the society
determines the degree to which various classes benefit from
such social and economic process.
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1.3 RESEARCH TECHNIQUES.
The main technique I used here was document or text analysis,
but in a very critical way. I call this critical analysis
which is underpined by a critical-dialectical perspective
which attempts to dig beneath the surface of social structures
in order to bring out the amazing complexity of what lies in,
behind and beyond those structures (Strauss 1987; Harvey
1990). Critical social research involves the process of
deconstruction. That is, rather than take a phenomenon such as
wages policy at face value, I examine very closely to reveal
its inner meaning and its consequences, and show how it
relates to some other social phenomenon, namely private
capital accumulation.
Both the wages policy and labour legislation are critically
analysed to reveal how their wording, that is their language,
is a form of discourse that subtly orders people's perceptions
of the social structure and could be used to construct
specific forms of social relationships and maintain the status
quo. Language, whether written or spoken, subtly orders our
perceptions of situations, and thus also constructs and
creates social interaction. As Potter and Wetherell (1987:6)
argue, social texts do not merely reflect or mirror objects,
events and categories existing in the social world, but also
actively construct a version of those objects, events, and
categories. Language therefore has social and political
implications.
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No amount of rigourous interrogation of documents is
sufficient to remove all doubts from a researcher's mind,
especially when it comes to making inferences and drawing
conclusions. This was an obvious pitfall that I had to avoid.
To this end I have augmented my documentary and archival data
by a few interviews with selected key informants. These key
informants are people who have been active in Botswana's
industrial relations field, and it was important to capture
their perceptions, attitudes, views and feelings, and the
meanings, and the interpretations they have given to certain
events and situations, and to detect any conflicting attitudes
and interpretations of the same events and situations (Hakim
1987:26-27)
My discussions with these key informants enabled me to gauge
the perceptions and interpretations of these structures by the
trade union movement. Most of the discussions helped me get
the feel of what is happening in the industrial relations
field in Botswana, and not necessarily for use in the
analysis. However, where I have felt that I need to
incorporate their views in the analysis, I have done so.
Since my interest was to analyse structure and action, rather
than the subjective views of the actors involved, I have
concentrated may analysis on state policy and how the workers
have sought to oppose it. These represents what I call
counter-discourses and counter-ideology generated by the
labour movement as it gained more knowledge and experience, Of
course action does not take place in silence, and the fact
that there have been strikes at all in Botswana, shows the
348
development of working class consciousness and their readiness
to act within the limits of these structures. But it is the
strikes which are a practical manifestation of working class
actions and consciousness. That is really what is central to
my thesis, rather than subjective views of individual leaders
and/or the rank and file.
1.4 Research Process.
Data collection was carried out in two successive stages. The
first stage was the exploratory stage from mid-July to mid-
September, 1990. It was during this exploration that a
significant development took place and had a far reaching
impact on my subsequent research activities, and actually
influenced the whole research effort. This was the government
publication and subsequent adoption of the Presidential
Commission Report of 1990.
The publication of this report was followed by a three day
seminar on the Revision of the Employment Act and the Trades
Dispute Act. I attended the seminar as a non-participant
observer. The seminar was convened by the Commissioner of
Labour and brought together the main actors on Botswana
industrial relations scene. The seminar was convened to
discuss some of the recommendations of the Presidential
Commission and their implications for future industrial
relations in Botswana. It was during the debates that took
place at the seminar that I realised that my initial
assumptions were wrong. Botswana state intervention in the
economy and industrial relations was not a permanent character
of the post-Independence Botswana state. As I went through the
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Presidential Commission Report, I realised that the new wages
policy will have a significant implications for the labour
movement. I had to recast some of my assumptions in order to
capture this new reality.
This was one of the most exciting things about this research.
Instead of designing a study and then collecting the necessary
data, one would first obtain details of the contents of
records and other documents as they became available, and then
examine these against their theoretical starting point. For me
this was exciting because I was able to reevaluate some of my
theoretical assumptions, and thus gain a better understanding
of the debates on state-labour relation.
For instance, I was view the government's reaction to workers'
restiveness and the reforms (compromises) the state was trying
to make, against the backgroud some of received state
theories. I could see how the state tries to distance itself
from the class conflict by pretending to be neutral. This came
out very clearly in the opening speech by the Minister of
Labour and Home Affairs. Part of the speech is quoted in
Chapter Ten above. Although it can still be argued that the
state is an instrument of the ruling class, how this
instrument is actually used cannot be taken for granted,
because the determining factors are the political and class
relations and the balance of forces that emerge from such
relations.
I realised	 then that Botswana's economic development was
entering a new phase, or rather, that Botswana is leaving one
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phase of development and entering another. It became clear to
me that Botswana's first wages policy, which had been in place
for 18 years, was just a phase in Botswana's development, and
that the advent of the new wages policy marked the beginning
of another phase. However, there is a common thread in both
the old and wages policies: wage restraint. The new wages
policy, however, now intends to deregulate the labour market,
and for the purpose of this research, this was a very
important turning point that I could not possibly ignore.
The second stage of my research was carried out on a part-time
basis from September 1991 to June 1992. I had by now
reformulated my approach and recast most of my questions. This
was the time that I started collecting my data. I was lucky in
that in January-March, 1992 I participated in a collaborative
effort with colleagues from the Sociology Department of the
University of Eotswana on The Study of the Trade Unions and
the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTtJ). The study
mainly focused on organisational, management, financial and
training needs of the trade unions. However, I was able to
learn more, especially the impact of labour law on the
organisation of the trade union movement as a whole.
1.5 Problems Encountered.
One major problem I encountered during the field work was
limited information on industrial actions or strikes in the
early period. The EFTU or its affiliates, even to day do not
have proper offices or documentalists. Important strikes and
other forms of industrial actions have not been properly
documented. Even the Department of Labour Annual Reports are
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a very recent development, the first such Annual report having
been issued as recently as 1986, following the enactment of
the Employment Act of 1982. But the Act only came into force
on the 14th December, 1984. The Act requires the Minister to
lay before Parliament the work of the Department each year.
The reports have not been published on time, and at the time
of writing up this thesis, the latest report in my possession
was for the year 1990.
As if this was not bad enough, Botswana did not have an
independent press until the 1980s. As a result, I had to rely
on a government newspaper whose coverage of events was very
much muted for obvious reasons; governments are not in the
habit of giving the workers struggles publicity. However I
have benefited tremendously from newspaper coverage of the
strikes from the 1980's up to the present. That this is so is
due to the existence of an independent press which only came
into being in the mid-1980's.
The other problem is that I did not receive a lot of
assistance from the Botswana Civil Servants Association
officials. In fairness to them, they never said they do not
want to talk to me, but the chief spokesman was always "busy",
and could not find files on their submissions to Salaries
Review Commissions, etc. Although our meetings were always
interrupted by "urgent calls", he did indicate to me in
between the calls, what some of his rank and file members feel
on the question of unionisation. This is definitely something
that I intend to follow up.
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The other difficulty was access to the records of the National
Employment, Manpower and Incomes Committee (Nemic), and the
Wages Policy Committee (WPC), the two bodies that have been
directly responsible for the implementation of the wages
policy. Although these are supposed to be tripartite bodies,
their records are confidential. Consequently whatever I learnt
about NEMIC or WPC was from discussions with union officials
or consultancy reports.
The other major problem encountered was the lack of
statistical information on the number of strikes in a year,
hours lost, financial losses to the employers, and strikers
involved, etc. Although all strikes and their causes are
reported to the Commissioner of Labour, as a legal
requirement, to my dismay I have found that the annual reports
by the office of the Commissioner of Labour do not give this
statistical breakdown. Instead, the reports just say that
there have been a number of illegal strikes and work
stoppages, without actually stating the number of people
involved. For instance a report will just say the whole labour
force, or that X workers went on a strike, without indicating
what percentage of the labour force was involved. However,
these reports do show that industrial action in Botswana has
been of very short duration, lasting from a few hours of work
stoppage to one or two day "illegal° strikes.
These are the strikes that I have discussed in Chapter 9.
However, my discussion on strikes relied mostly on newspaper
reports. But again, as I have already stated, the private
press in Botswana is a recent development. Consequently, I
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have not been able to get the details of the strikes that took
place before the advent of the free press. However, I have
every confidence that the few strikes that I discuss in the
study, will not leave anybody in doubt that Batswana workers
have not been impotent playthings, but have often struggled
within the limits of the repressive legal structure to
confront both the state and capital.
1.6 Limitations of the Study
But having stated what this thesis is about, it is also
important to state what it is not about. This thesis is not
about the development of either capitalist class or working
class consciousness. Although these are very important aspects
in the analysis of capitalist development anywhere, and in
fact capital and labour exists in a dialectical relationship,
I have for the purpose of this thesis left them out,
especially because I wanted to concentrate on macro-structural
issues within which these arise. I hope future researches on
the state-labour relation in Botswana will address this very
important issue.
Every method of inquiry has its weak points and strong points,
and this applies no less to my own method than to other
methods. The weaknesses and strengths of various research
methods are subjects of on-going debates. Suffice it to say
that I cannot pretend that I have risen above the fray of
those debates. But where my conclusions or inferences could be
seen as tendentious, I have tried to temper that by the
generous use of official documents.
354
Notwithstanding all these problems, I have every confidence
that the thesis is well researched, informed and up to date in
so far as its object of analysis is concerned, to wit, the
analysis of structures of repression and forms of worker
resistance. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the
first of its kind on the political economy of industrial
relations in Botswana. It therefore has the shortcomings and
imperfections of any pioneer work. It is the task of future
research to go further and close any gaps, or provide an
alternative analysis of Botswana's industrial relations
system.
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and Commissioner of Labour, Department of Labour and Social
Security (5/2/1992)
MOTSI-IWARAKGOLE J. Former Executive Committee member, Botswana
Federation of Trade Unions. Now National Organising
Secretary, Manual Workers Unions(4/ll/199l).
OLSEN P. Former Chief Industrial Relations Officer. 	 Now
Labour Consultant (16/9/1991).
SALESHANDO D. Former Executive Committee member, Botswana
Federation of Trade Unions. Now Executive Secretary, Botswana
Manual Workers Union (14/11/1991).
SETLHARE E. Former Executive Committee member, Botswana
Federation of Trade Unions. Now Deputy Executive Secretary,
Botswana Manual Workers Union (14/11/1991).
MOOKODI,	 G.	 Personnel Manager,
	 Sefalana Sa Botswana
Wholesalers (2/2/1992)
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